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This thesis consists of three papers on child labour and schooling in Ghana. The first paper 
examines the correlates of child labour and schooling, as well as the trade-off between work 
and schooling of children aged 5-17 years with the 2013 Ghana Living Standard Survey data. 
A bivariate probit model is used since the decisions to participate in schooling and in the 
labour market are interdependent. The results show that there is a gender gap both in child 
work and schooling. In particular, boys are less likely to work (and more likely to be enrolled 
in schools) relative to girls. Whereas parent education, household wealth and income of the 
family are negatively correlated with child work, these factors influence schooling positively. 
In addition, parents‟ employment status, ownership of livestock, distance to school, child 
wage and schooling expenditure increase the probability of child labour and reduce the 
likelihood of school enrolment. In terms of the relationship between child labour and 
schooling, the results show that an additional hour of child labour is associated with 0.15 
hour (9 minutes) reduction in daily hours of school attendance; and the effect is bigger for 
girls relative to boys. Also, one more hour of child labour is associated with an increase in the 
probability of a child falling behind in grade progression by 1.4 percentage points. 
 
The second paper estimates the impact of Ghana‟s Livelihood Empowerment Against 
Poverty (LEAP) cash transfer programme on schooling outcomes (enrolment, attendance 
hours, repetition and test scores) and child labour in farming and non-farm enterprises. Using 
longitudinal data, the paper employs three different quasi-experimental methods (propensity 
score matching, difference-in-difference, and difference-in-difference combined with 
matching). Overall, the results show that the LEAP programme had no effect on school 
enrolment and test scores, but it increased the weekly hours of class attendance by 5.2 hours 
and reduced repetition rate by 11 percentage points for children in households that benefited 
from the programme. In addition, there was heterogeneity in these impacts, with boys 
benefiting more relative to girls. In terms of child labour, the results show that the 
programme had no effect on the extensive margin of child labour in farming and non-farm 
enterprises. However, the LEAP programme reduced the intensity of farm work done by 
children by as much as 2.6 hours per day. The largest impact of the programme, in terms of 
iii 
 
reduction in the intensity of child labour in farming, occurred in female-headed and 
extremely poor households.  
 
The last paper investigates the impact of mothers‟ autonomy or bargaining power in the 
household on their children‟s schooling and child labour in Ghana. The paper uses a non-
economic measure of women‟s autonomy, which is an index constructed from five questions 
on power relations between men and women. The paper employs both an Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) and an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. Overall, the results suggest that 
ignoring the endogeneity of mothers‟ autonomy underestimates its true impact on schooling 
and child labour. They also show that an increase in mothers‟ autonomy increases school 
enrolment and hours of class attendance, with girls benefiting more than boys. The paper 
finds a negative relationship between mothers‟ autonomy and both the extensive and 
intensive margin of child labour. In addition, it demonstrates that improvement in women‟s 
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CHAPTER 1:  General Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Human capital is an important driver of economic growth and development (Barro, 1991).  
The slow rate of economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa has partly been attributed to 
poor human development outcomes (Garcia and Moore, 2012). Investment in human capital 
development at an earlier age can have a significant effect on an individual‟s lifetime 
earnings capacity, which ultimately affects economic growth (Ferré and Sharif, 2014). 
Education is one of the ways through which an individual can improve upon his/her human 
capital. And in the case of children, parents consider the net present discounted value of the 
cost and future benefits of schooling in order to decide on the level of investment to make in 
their children‟s education. One of the main costs of education is foregone earnings from child 
work, since work and school are the two main contenders of children‟s non-leisure hours. 
This forgone income from work is an important cost of education; especially in countries 
where incomes are usually low. Hence there is high prevalence of child labour in most 
developing countries.  
 
There are approximately 168 million child labourers aged 5-17 which represents 11 percent 
of children in the World (ILO, 2013). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the highest proportion 
of child labour with a participation rate of 21.4 percent. This implies that one in every five 
children in the sub-region is engaged in child labour. The sub-region also leads in the 
proportion of children engaged in hazardous works with 10.4 percent of its children in such 
activities (ILO, 2013). The large number of children in the labour market is troubling due to  
its adverse effect on total output which is estimated to be about 1- 2 percent loss of the annual 
Gross Domestic Product (Nielsen, 1998).  This loss in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) results 
from the loss in human capital necessitated partially by the effect of child labour on school 
attendance (Khanam and Ross, 2011), test score performance (Heady, 2003; Bezerra et al., 
2009) and high dropout (Cardoso and Verner, 2006).  Also, work has a detrimental effect on 
the health of children because of their fragile anatomical, physiological and psychological 




Not only does SSA lead in the proportion of children in the labour market, but the sub-region 
also has the lowest school enrolment rates and other education outcomes. School enrolment 
rates in the sub-region have not increased much in relation to other regions and the world as a 
whole.  For instance, adjusted primary school Net Enrolment Rate (NER) and completion 
rates in SSA were 77 percent and 67 percent respectively, while the world average rates were 
90 percent and 88 percent correspondingly in 2009.  Enrolment rates at secondary and tertiary 
levels of education are even lower with Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 43 percent in 2009 
(after increasing from 28 percent in 1999) for lower secondary education in comparison to 
72-80 percent for the rest of the world (UNESCO, 2011). The low school enrolment rates 
have partly been attributed to child labour (Khanam and Ross, 2011). Hence, this thesis 
examines child labour and schooling in a developing country, specifically Ghana. 
 
Ghana provides an ideal environment for this study because it is one of the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa with the highest child labour participation rate (UNICEF, 2012). Although 
there is no consistent child labour survey in the country, the 1999 Ghana Living Standard 
Survey (GLSS 4) report indicated that the total number of children engaged in the labour 
market was 1.4 million and this amounted to 27.8 percent of children in the country (GSS, 
2000). In 2001, a comprehensive research on children‟s involvement in the labour market 
was undertaken under the Ghana Child Labour Survey (GCLS) (GSS, 2003). This survey 
showed that out of about 6.4 million children aged 5-17 years in the country, about 2 million 
of them were working and out of this about 1.2 million were child labourers. The report also 
revealed that out of the number of child labourers, about 1 million (1,031,220) of them were 
below the age of 13 years. These findings by the GCLS report (2003) led to the incorporation 
of elimination of child labour into the country‟s development plans including the Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) and the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 
II). Again, the country ratified the ILO Convention on the Minimum Age (Convention 182) 
in 2011 and enacted the Human Trafficking Act (Act 720) in 2005. Despite these 
interventions, child labour participation rate is still on the ascendency with the 2014 Ghana 
Living Standard Survey report showing that 21.8 percent of children (1,892,553) in the 
country are child labourers. Also, Ghana was listed as one of the countries that use child 
labour in cocoa production and gold mining by the US Department of Labour in 2014
1
. 
                                                          
1
 According to the Sixth Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization report of USA‟s Department of Labour 
List of Goods of Produced by Child Labour or Forced Labour. 
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In addition, improvements in educational outcomes in Ghana have not been impressive, with 
the exception of enrolment rates particularly at the primary level which has a Gross 
Enrolment Rates of 95 percent and 128.3 percent in 2007/2008 and 2014/2015 academic year 
respectively (Ministry of Education, 2016). Even with such improvement, one million 
children aged 6-14 years were out of school in 2008 (Ghana Statistical Service et al, 2009). 
Again, repetition rates for public primary schools were 6.5 percent, 6.6 percent and 8.5 
percent in 2003/2004, 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 academic years respectively (Ministry of 
Education, Science and Sports, 2006).   
 
Participation of children in the labour market and low educational outcomes in Ghana are 
relatively higher among the poor (Grootaert and Coulombe, 1998; Nielsen, 1998; 
Akyeampong et al., 2007). To bridge the income gap and lift people out of poverty, the 
country has formulated the National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS). One of the most 
important programmes being implemented under the NSPS is the Livelihood Empowerment 
Against Poverty (LEAP) scheme. The LEAP is a cash transfer scheme introduced in 2008 to 
alleviate short-term poverty and build the human capital of poor household members. The 
LEAP programme is targeted at households that besides falling into the extreme poverty 
definition also have a member who falls into one of these three main demographic 
characteristics:  a single parent with orphans and vulnerable child (OVC); poor elderly person 
(over 65 years) or someone with extreme disability who cannot work. The programme 
provides poor households with periodic cash transfer conditioned on school enrolment and 
retention; as well as non-participation of children in the labour market among other 
behavioural changes.  
 
The transfer of cash to poor households has several implications on households‟ decision 
making including children‟s participation in the labour market and schooling as well as 
schooling outcomes. Cash transfers can enable poor households who could not afford 
schooling initially to now send their children to school, thereby increasing school 
participation. Again, the cash could enable poor households that were depending on the 
income from child labour to withdraw their children from the labour market; and this may 
also reduce child labour. Furthermore, the cash may enable households to purchase 
educational materials and nutritious food, as well as, provide for the health needs of their 
children. All these will improve upon children‟s schooling outcomes such as repetition rate 
and test score. However, this cash could also enable poor households that were unemployed 
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to now engage in businesses that will require the uses of child labourers and hence increase 
child labour; and this may reduce school attendance and test scores. Hence, the effects of 
cash transfer on work and school participation as well as schooling outcomes are not straight 
forward and remain an empirical question (De Hoop and Rosati, 2013). 
 
The transfer of cash and development of the income generation capacities of poor households 
are important measures for improving education and eliminating child labour. However, the 
empowerment of women is equally important, especially in patriarchal societies like in most 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries where there is male dominance. This is so because the 
allocation of the household‟s resources among various goods, particularly on children‟s 
products, depends on who is the main decision maker.  Literature suggests that children 
benefit more when resources are in the hands of women relative to men (Hoddinott and 
Haddad, 1995; Quisumbing, 2003; Al Riyami et al., 2004; Woldemicael, 2010; Allendorf, 
2012; Ebot, 2014). Women‟s autonomy or bargaining power in decision making is very 
important for child labour and schooling decisions (Reggio, 2011; Ambreen, 22013). Women 
tend to have less autonomy or decision making power in most SSA countries, including 
Ghana. This is so because the majority of women live in rural areas where they have less 
access to work outside the household and are constrained by norms and customs that assign 
different roles to men and women. Also, in Ghana, couples do not always pool their resources 
together and joint decision makings between couples are usually rare (Baden et al., 1994). 
Hence, this thesis further examines women‟s autonomy or bargaining power in Ghana and 
how this affects child labour and schooling. 
 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis 
Based on the above analysis, this thesis examines the determinants of children‟s participation 
in work and/or school; and the effect of cash transfer programme and mothers‟ autonomy in 
the household on human capital development in Ghana. Specifically, the study seeks to: 
 
1. Identify the main correlates of child labour supply and schooling; as well as the effect 
of work on schooling. 
2. Estimate the impacts of the LEAP cash transfer programme on child labour supply 
and schooling outcomes (enrolment, class attendance, repetition and test scores). 
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3. Examines the effects of mothers‟ autonomy or bargaining power on child labour 
supply and schooling. 
 
 
1.3 Child Labour and Schooling in Ghana 
1.3.1  Definition of Child Labour 
In most African countries and, in particular Ghana, the engagement of children in certain 
works is considered a form of training or socialization. In recognition of this, Ghana‟s 
Children Act (1998) allows the employment of children age 13 years and above in “light 
works” which are not harmful to their health and education. However, the Act prohibits child 
labour which it defines as “the engagement of a child in exploitative labour, which deprives 
the child of his/her health, education and development”. The minimum employment age for a 
child is 15 years
2
 but such works must not be “hazardous”. A work is considered hazardous 
when it poses danger to the health, safety or morals of a person and it includes:  
 
1. Going to sea 
2. Works in mining and quarrying sectors 
3. Porterage of heavy loads 
4. Works in manufacturing industries where chemicals are produced or used 
5. Works in places where machines are used 
6. Works in places such as bars, hotels and places of entertainment where a person may 
be exposed to immoral behaviour. 
 
The minimum age for employment of a child in hazardous works is 18 years since children 
are persons below the age of 18 years. In addition to the above, the Act prohibits employment 
of children in night works that take place between 8pm to 6am. These definitions imply that 
the involvement of children less than 13 years in any economic activities is considered child 
labour. For children between ages 13-17 years, their involvement in economic activities can 
be defined as child labour only if that work is harmful to their health, schooling and 
development, or the work is hazardous in nature based on the definition of hazardous work 
stated above. Apart from the Children‟s Act, the Ghana‟s Labour Act (2003) also makes 
                                                          
2
 This is in accordance with the ILO Minimum Age Convention which Ghana ratified in 2011. 
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employment of children illegal. Though these two Acts seek to protect children, there seem to 
be a gap between the legal intent and practice as enforcement of these laws is rare (Manful 
and McCrystal, 2011).  In addition, the definition of “light works” is too vague (Canagarajah 




1.3.2  Extent and Nature of Child Labour in Ghana 
Ghana, like other developing economies, has been battling with the problem of child labour. 
To eliminate the child labour menace, the government has initiated a number of initiatives 
both legislative and policy wise. The country was among the first countries to ratify the UN 
Convention on „The Rights of the Child‟ and followed it up by developing a national policy 
framework dubbed „The Child Cannot Wait‟ in 1992. This provided a national strategy for 
protecting children. The National Action Plan, which is a multi-sector approach coordinated 
by the Child Labour unit of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, was 
validated in 2009. Also, in response to the high international concern on the use of child 
labourers in cocoa farming, the country instituted the National Programme for the 
Elimination of Worst Form of Child Labour in Cocoa (NPECLC) and the Hazardous Child 
Labour Framework, all with the long term aim of eliminating child labour in Ghana. In terms 
of legislation, the government has enacted the „The Children Act‟ (1998) to protect children‟s 
rights and the Labour Laws (2003) with clauses that prohibit child labour.  
 
Despite these interventions, the incidence of child labour is still high in the country as stated 
earlier. There is no consistent child labour survey in the country, however, various versions 
of the Ghana Living Standard Surveys (GLSSs) have been reporting on children‟s (7-14 
years) engagement in the labour market. For instance, the 1988 GLSS stated that about 7 
percent of the country‟s labour force is made up of persons below 15 years. This increased 
slightly to 7.8 percent in 1995 (GLSS 3). However, it was the fourth round of the GLSS 
(GLSS 4) that brought into light the issue of working children. The GLSS 4 estimated that 
about 1.47 million children aged 7-14 years were engaged in economic activity with a 
participation rate of 27.8 percent. In addition, it showed that 30.3 percent and 25.5 percent of 
                                                          
3
 The definition of child labour used in the thesis excludes children‟s involvement in household chores. Also, 
there is no universal definition for child labour and according to the ILO the definition of child labour should be 
dependent on the age of the child, nature of work, conditions of work and hours of work, hence a “working 
definition” for child labour is provided for each chapter. 
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girls and boys in the country were engaged in economic activity
4
 respectively. In terms of 
location, 26 percent and 28.2 percent of urban and rural children respectively were engaged 
in some form of economic activity. 
 
The most comprehensive survey on children‟s involvement in the labour market is the Ghana 
Child Labour Survey (2003), which estimated that about two million
5
 children aged 5-17 
years in the country were engaged in economic activity with participation rate of 31.3 
percent. The survey distinguished between children‟s engagement in economic activities, 
child labour and hazardous works based on the above definitions. Since children as young as 
five years have been found in the labour market (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1998), this 
survey reduced the starting age of children in the labour market to five contrary to previous 
surveys that considered children from seven years
6
. Though the GLSS continues to report 
children‟s engagement in the labour market, the next child labour survey was only carried out 
in 2012/13 as part of the sixth GLSS. Figure 1.1 shows child labour participation in 2003 and 
2014. 
 




Source: 2003 Child Labour Report and GLSS 6 Child Labour Report (2014) 
 
                                                          
4
 Any activity that yields either cash or in-kind benefits to the child or his/her household. This is a broader 
definition of child labour. It excludes household chores but includes child labour and hazardous works. 
5
 This is based on children activity in the last 7 days; using the last 12 months prior to the survey the 
participation rate was 40 percent with about 2.5 million children engaged in economic activities in 2003. 
6
 The starting and ending ages of children in the labour market may have accounted for the difference between 
the Ghana Living Standard Surveys estimates and the estimates from the Child Labour Surveys. However, most 
of the analysis on the extent of child labour in Ghana is based on the 2001 Child Labour Survey and 2012/13 
GLSS 6 Child Labour Survey and both surveys considered children aged 5-17 years. 
7
 The first child labour and GLSS 6 child labour surveys were carried out in 2001 and 2012/13 respectively but 




































From figure 1.1, it is clear that there has been a slight increase in child labour participation 
rate from 2003 to 2014 among all groups despite the various interventions implemented to 
curb it. As, at 2014, 21.8 percent of children, which amount to 1,892,553 children in the 
country, were child labourers; while, in 2003, there were 1,273,294 child labourers (20 
percent of children in Ghana). For both periods, the proportion of rural children engaged in 
child labour was higher than those from urban centres. In addition, while girls‟ labour market 
participation rate increased from 20.4 percent in 2003 to only 20.8 percent in 2014 that of 
boys increased from 19.6 percent to 22.7 percent. In addition, though child labour 
participation rate among girls was higher than that of boys in 2003, this reversed in 2014. 
Moreover, out of the number of child labourers recorded in 2014, more than half of these 
children (14.2 percent of children in Ghana), which amount to 1,231,286 children, were 
engaged in hazardous works.  This represents a huge increase from the 2003 figure of 501, 
601 children in hazardous works.  
 
Furthermore, the sixth GLSS report indicated that majority of child labourers in Ghana were 
engaged in unpaid family works (93.7 percent), followed by own account workers (2.7 
percent), unpaid apprentices (1.5 percent), paid workers (1.1 percent), causal/domestic 
workers (0.8 percent) and other workers (0.2 percent). In terms of industry, 77.2 percent of 
child labourers were engaged in agriculture related activities, 12.4 percent were found in 
wholesaling and retailing; only 3.8 percent in the manufacturing sector and the remaining 6.6 
percent found in other industries including mining and quarrying, construction and 
transportation among others (GSS, 2014b). Also, as depicted in table 1.1, children 
involvement in work increased as their ages increased. 
 
Table 1. 1 Involvement of Children in Various Works by Age Groups ( in %) in 2014 
  Economic  Activities Child Labour Hazardous Works 
All 28.5 21.8 14.2 
5-7 years 10 10 4.5 
8-11 years 25.6 25.6 12 
12-14 years 38.3 26.9 18.8 
15-17 years 43.7 23.9 23.9 






1.3.3  Education in Ghana 
Ghana‟s educational system has gone through various reforms with the most significant one 
that brought in the current education and training system being the 1986/87 Education 
Reforms Programme. This reduced the duration of the education system from the 6-4-5-2-3/4 
to the 6-3-3-4; that is pre-tertiary schooling reduced from 17 years to 12 years (Palmer, 
2005). However, under the former system the number of years that a person spends at the pre-
tertiary level is dependent on his/her ability as some students proceeded to secondary school 
after six years at the primary level while other spent between one to four years at the middle 
school before proceeding to secondary school. Currently, basic education consists of six years 
of primary and three years of junior high school; while post-basic education comprises of 
three years of senior high/technical/vocational school and four years of tertiary education. 
Though the duration of senior high school was changed from three years to four years in 
2007, it was reverted back to three years in 2013. In addition to these, there is pre-school 
education, which consist of crèches (between the ages of 3 and 4) and nursery schools 
(between the ages of 4 and 6) with the national primary school entry age being six years. 
 
Other significant policy strategy in the education system is the adoption of the Free 
Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) in 1995 that aimed to ensure universal 
primary education by 2005; however, this was not achieved (Akyeampong, 2009). The 
FCUBE initially covered mandatory schooling of all children to the primary level, but it was 
extended to include the Junior High level (i.e. from 6 years to 9 years of mandatory school), 
and it was further increased to include two years of pre-primary school; thereby making the 
mandatory schooling years eleven (UNICEF, 2012). Interventions introduced to facilitate the 
achievement of the goal of the FCUBE are the capitation grant, school feeding programme, 
early childhood education, free exercise books and uniform among others. The capitation 
grant piloted in 2005 abolished the payment of school levies at pre-school and basic level of 
education in public schools. Under this system, every public kindergarten, primary and junior 
secondary schools receives a grant of about three Ghana cedis (GH¢) per pupil per year in 
2005, but this was increased to GH¢4.50 per head in 2009.  
 
The school feeding programme was also launched in 2005. This involves the provision of one 
nutritious meal to primary school children in public school. The free exercise books and 
uniforms interventions were started in 2010 and they involve the distribution of these items to 
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needy children in deprived areas. In spite of these initiatives, there are still schools that do not 
have access to textbooks and other teaching materials, particularly rural schools (UNDP, 
2014). In other words, though the majority of children have exercise books, most of them do 
not have textbooks (Ministry of Education, 2014). 
 
These interventions have resulted in increases in school enrolment, especially at the basic 
level. For instance, Net Enrolment Rates (NER) at the primary level increased from 68.8 
percent in 2005/06; to 78.6 percent in 2006/07 and to 88.5 percent in 2008/09 and remained 
at that level in 2009/10, but increased to 89.3 percent in 2013/14, as shown in the figure 1.2 
(Ministry of Education, 2015). From figure 1.2, NERs are usually lower than Gross 
Enrolment Rates (GERs) after adjusting for the ages of pupils. This may be due to late 
enrolment, high dropout rates and high repetition rates among other factors. Also, for all 
years, boys have higher GERs and NERs relative to girls. This gender gap, however, seems to 
narrow at higher levels of education as the NER at the Senior High School (SHS) was 21.7 
percent for boys and 21.8 percent for girls in 2013/14 (Ministry of Education, 2015). 
 
 Figure 1. 2 Gross and Net Enrolment Rates for Primary School Pupils (2001-2013)  
 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2015 
 
Again, the country has made some progress in respect of children (5-17 years) who have 
never been to school, but there are still variations in this rate geographically.  The proportion 
of children who have never been to school was 17.6 percent in 2003 and this was higher in 
rural areas where 24.5 percent of children had never been to school relative to 6.2 percent in 
urban area (GSS, 2003). This has reduced, as only 5.9 percent of children aged 5-17 years 






























in 2014. In terms of gender, while 6.1 percent of girls have never been to school, only 5.7 
percent of boys have never been to school as of 2014. Reasons for not attending school are 
numerous with the main reason relating to schooling costs and facilities (i.e. no school in 
community, high school cost and school too far) followed by the need to work in either 
family enterprises or work outside for pay or engage in household chores (GSS, 2014b).  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is a collection of three papers on child labour and schooling in Ghana. These three 
papers will form the main chapters of this thesis.  The first chapter covers the introductory 
part which is presented above.  
 
The second chapter uses Ghana‟s Living Standard Survey (2013) data to examine the main 
factors associated with child labour (extensive and intensive margin of child labour) and 
schooling (enrolment and hours of class attendance) of children aged 5-17 years. 
 
The third chapter of this thesis examines the impacts of the LEAP programme on child labour 
and schooling outcomes. High poverty rates have been linked with high child labour force 
participation rate and low schooling in developing countries. Most developing countries are 
implementing various social protection policies, including cash transfer schemes, as a way of 
alleviating poverty and developing the human capital of beneficiaries. In spite of the rapid 
expansion of cash transfer programmes in SSA, there is limited research on the impacts of 
these programmes. This chapter helps to fill in this gap in the empirical literature by using  
longitudinal data collected in 2010 and 2012 on Ghana‟s Livelihood Empowerment Against 
Poverty (LEAP) programme to estimate the impact of this scheme on child labour and 
educational outcomes (enrolment, class attendance, repetition and test scores). Since the data 
is observational in nature, the chapter uses three quasi-experimental evaluation techniques –
Propensity Score Matching (PSM), Difference-in-Difference (DD) Matching combined with 
Difference-in-Difference (MDD). 
 
The fourth chapter of thesis examines the effect of mothers‟ bargaining power or autonomy 
on child labour and schooling in Ghana. Women‟s autonomy in the households is one of the 
most significant factors that influence children‟s schooling and child labour decisions, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. However, women tend to have lower 
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decision making power or autonomy relative to men in most developing countries, including 
Ghana, due the patriarchal nature of these societies. This chapter uses a nationally 
representative survey conducted in 2010 in Ghana. It uses an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation strategy to account for the possibility of endogeneity of mothers‟ bargaining 
power. 
 
The thesis ends with chapter five which summarizes the main findings of the previous 
chapters. This final chapter also addresses some limitations of the thesis and provides areas 



















CHAPTER 2: Child Labour and Schooling in Ghana: Correlates 
and Trade-Off 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Ghana has made some progress in poverty reduction with the national poverty rate falling 
from 39.5 percent in 1998/99 to 24.2 percent in 2012/13 (GSS, 2014c). At the same time, the 
country has introduced the Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE), the 
capitation grants and school feeding programme among other interventions in education. In 
spite of these policies, child labour is relatively high and some children are still out of school. 
The first child labour survey conducted in 2001 estimated that the proportion children (5-17 
years) engaged in child labour was about 20 percent (GSS, 2003). This increased to 21.8 
percent in 2014 (GSS, 2014b). This raises the questions of what factors influence households‟ 
decision to send their children to work and/or school. Also, among children who are already 
working, what determines the number of hours of work they do and what is the effect of these 
works on education?  
 
This chapter provides answers to these questions by establishing the main correlates of child 
labour participation and school enrolment using the bivariate probit model. This is because 
these decisions are interdependent. Also, the chapter examines the factors that affect the 
intensive margin of child labour (hours of work); and the effect of work on education. 
Specifically, it investigates the main correlates of children‟s (5-17 years) participation in 
child labour and schooling; as well as their participation in hazardous works. Furthermore, it 
examines the effect of work intensity on hours of class attendance and educational 
attainment. As noted by Orazem and Gunnarsson (2004), it is important to adjust for age 
when considering the educational attainment of children; hence, the chapter uses the so called 
School- for-Age (SAGE) as a measure of educational attainment. 
 
Universally, there is an agreement on the need to eliminate child labour and improve 
schooling enrolment; however, there is no consensus on the right way to tackle these (Ray, 
2000). With respect to child labour, the main policy instrument has been the enactment of 
laws prohibiting it and the banning or labelling of products made using child labour (Basu 
and Van, 1998).  However, over the years, the effectiveness of these policies has been 
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questioned. There is little evidence on the effectiveness of banning policies and these are 
limited to developed countries (Piza and Souza, 2016). Banning of child labour may move 
children into the informal sector where conditions of work are worst relative to the formal 
sector; and it may even increase child labour, as was found in India (Bharadwaj et al., 2013). 
The ineffectiveness of banning policies may stem partly from the fact the children‟s 
participation in work and school is affected by multiple factors and these factors differ by 
countries. Therefore, determination of factors affecting the joint decisions of work and/or 
school is necessary for formulation of policies to eliminate child labour and improve upon 
schooling.  
 
Though there are numerous studies (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1997; Canagarajah and 
Coulombe, 1998) on child labour, most of these are concentrated on factors affecting the 
participation decision of the child (extensive margin of child labour). They ignore the factors 
that affect the total number of hours of labour (intensive margin of child labour) supplied by 
children. This chapter tries to fill in this gap in the literature by examining both the extensive 
margin and intensive margin of child labour. Also, it improves upon previous studies by 
including schooling and community variables, such as child wage, distance to nearest school 
and schooling expenditure, which are important in explaining work and school decisions. 
Hazardous work is the worst form of child labour; hence, it is more dangerous to children‟s 
development. However, this type of work has received less attention relative to „normal‟ 
child labour in the literature (ILO, 2011). This chapter extends the literature on child work by 
examining children‟s participation in hazardous works as well as the intensity of such works. 
 
The chapter uses data from the sixth round of the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS 6). 
This survey was conducted in 2012/2013 by the Ghana Statistical Service and it contains 
information on children‟s involvement in various activities including schooling, child labour, 
and hazardous works among others. In addition, this survey has information on the 
characteristics of children, as well as their parents and households characteristics.  Hence, this 
dataset is ideal for analysis on child work and schooling. The decisions to send a child to 
work and to school are interdependent since these two child activities compete for the non-
leisure hours of children. Therefore, this chapter uses a bivariate probit model to 




The results show that for both hazardous and non-hazardous work, parent education, 
household wealth and income of the family have a negative and a positive association with 
child labour and schooling respectively. Also, a child‟s likelihood of working increases while 
his/her probability of schooling falls when his/her parents is employed. In addition, 
household ownership of livestock, distance to nearest school, child wage and schooling 
expenditure have a positive and a negative effect on child labour and school enrolment 
respectively. Furthermore, child labourers work for fewer hours when they are enrolled in 
school. Also, ownership of land, receipt of remittance, increase in household income and 
wealth, as well as low school expenditure all leads to a reduction in the hours of child labour. 
Finally, the chapter finds that an additional hour of child labour is associated with 0.15 hour 
(9 minutes) reduction in hours of class attendance; and the effect is bigger for girls. Also, one 
more hour of child labour increases the probability of a child falling behind in grade 
progression by 1.4 percentage points. 
 
The rest of this chapter is as follows. The next section (section two) reviews relevant 
literature on factors affecting child labour and schooling (enrolment and hours of attendance) 
as well as the effects of work on children‟s educational attainment. This is then followed by 
the methodology which looks at the data and estimation technique employed in this chapter in 
section three. Analysis of child labour and schooling situation in Ghana is in section four. 
Discussion of the results follows in section five with section six concluding this chapter. 
 
2.2  Review of Relevant Literature 
Analysis of child labour was initially viewed as lack of access to schooling (Blunch and 
Verner, 2000). Hence, initial studies, including Chao and Alper (1998), viewed child labour 
as a factor affecting schooling decision and included it as an explanatory variable in the 
estimation of the factors affecting schooling. Later, the literature moved to integrate the work 
decision, and thus analyse schooling and child labour decisions jointly or separately. Studies 
(Patrino and Psacharpoulous, 1997; Ray, 2000; Ravallion and Wooden, 2000; Phoumin and 
Fukui, 2006) that examine these two decisions separately usually use the probit or logit 
models to estimate the main determinants affecting them. However, to account for the 
interdependence between work and school decisions, other studies (Cartwright and Patrino, 
1999; Haile and Haile, 2012; Yared and Gurmu, 2015) have employed the bivariate probit, 
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the sequential and multinomial logit/probit models to study these. This chapter follows this 
latter approach since there is the likelihood that these two decisions are interdependent. 
 
In terms of the factors influencing child labour and schooling decisions, reviews of the 
empirical literature show that these decisions are affected by poverty, educational facilities, 
parental education and employment, as well as the child, household and community 
characteristics (Brown et al., 2002; Fors, 2012; Webbink et al., 2011). Theoretically, poverty 
can adversely affect child labour through several channels. As noted by Fors (2012), the 
effect of poverty on child labour and schooling can be analysed from two sources, namely 
subsistence and lack of opportunity. Poor households may depend on the income or benefits 
from child work. Hence, they may send their children to the labour market, but remove them 
from the labour market once their income levels improve. Thus, child labour is a response to 
extreme poverty. This idea forms the basis of the multiple equilibria model by Basu and Van 
(1998) which was tested by Bhalotra (2007). Households may not be poor in terms of 
income, but they may lack opportunities in the form of low return on investment in schooling 
which may result in lower wages (Fors, 2012). Consequently, they may resort to child labour. 
 
Empirical studies on child labour and poverty have reported mixed results. This has been 
attributed to several factors, including the measurement of poverty. Empirically, different 
measurements of poverty have been used (Ilahi, 2001). Expenditure per capita of the 
household as a proxy for welfare was used by Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) in their 
study of child labour and schooling in Ghana; they found an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
However, Blunch and Verner (2000) used households‟ access to basic items.  This study 
measures poverty with expenditure per capita and wealth index which shows the household‟s 
ownership of forty durable assets, including television, fridge, radio etc.  These help to 
establish the effect of both current income and households‟ accumulated wealth on child 
labour and schooling of children. 
 
Poverty of opportunity includes schooling-related factors such as poor school quality, 
absence of schools and higher schooling costs. These supply-side variables have been found 
to affect both child labour and schooling in Africa (Bonnet, 1993; Ray, 2003; Leclercq, 
2002). Parents may not send their children to school because of the poor quality of school. 
Measurement of school quality is usually difficult and empirical studies use proxies such as 
the cost of schooling (Lavy, 1996), building characteristics, writing materials (e.g., chalk, 
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notebooks, pencils, etc.), availability of textbooks, graded classrooms (Angrist and Krueger, 
1991) and distance to the nearest primary school. While distance to the nearest school has 
been found to affect schooling, it had no effect on child labour (Kondylis and Manacorda, 
2006). Other studies (Lavy 1996; Jensen and Nielsen, 1997) find that transportation costs of 
schooling are important for child labour and school participations. Gertler and Glewwe 
(1990) refine this conclusion by investigating the willingness to pay for reducing the distance 
to school and find that both rich and poor households are willing to pay a price for reduction 
in the distance to schools to less than one kilometre. 
 
In addition to these factors, other child, parent, household and community characteristics 
have been identified in the literature to affect parents‟ decisions to send their children to work 
and/or school. Available studies show that a child‟s age (Brown, 2006; Okpukpara and 
Odurukwe, 2006; Mwebaze, 2004) has a positive influence on whether he/she will attend 
school or engage in child labour. Thus, as children grow and acquire more skills, they are 
used for productive activities in either the household or outside the household. Also, older 
children with younger siblings also tend to care for them and engage in child labour.  In 
addition, when the definition of child labour is extended to include their involvement in 
household chores, then girls have higher probability of working relative to boys (Blunch and 
Verner, 2000). This gender gap is also found in schooling as boys are more likely to attend 
school in comparison to girls (Nielsen, 1998; Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1998). 
   
Furthermore, two important parent characteristics found in the literature that affect child 
labour and schooling are parents‟ education and employment status (Basu and Ray, 2002). 
Parents who are more educated tend to send their children to school (Lavy, 1996) instead of 
sending them to the labour market.  Less educated parents are more likely to send their 
children to the market regardless of income, as they do not weigh the costs and benefits of 
child labour (Rimmer, 1992; Psacharopoulos, 1997; Brown, 2006). Separating the 
educational level of parent into that of the father and mother enables proper assessment of 
which parent‟s education is important. For instance, while Emerson and Souza (2007) find 
fathers‟ education to be important in child labour reduction; Kurosaki (2006) finds that it is 
the mother‟s education that matters for child labour reduction. 
 
Again, in most developing countries,  children  grow up to do jobs similar to that of their 
parents, hence parental employment status has a strong effect on children‟s working status 
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and/or schooling. Also, most parents in developing countries view child labour as a form of 
training for their children, especially in occupations that require less formal education (Bass 
2004; Lieten, 2002; Beegle et al., 2004). However, there are two main arguments regarding 
the relationship between parents‟ employment and child labour. There is the complementary 
argument which says that when mothers engage in jobs outside the households, children take 
up works in the house, especially when there are younger children in the household (Levison, 
1991; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1995). Also, children, especially girls, tend to work when 
their mothers are working as they follow their mothers to work (Francavilla and Gianelli 
2007; Bhalotra, 2003). The substitution argument, on the other hand, views parents and 
children as substitutes in the work place (Basu and Van, 1998), such that when parents work, 
then the children will not work. Parents with irregular employment, however, resort to child 
labour to supplement the household income (Psacharopoulos, 1997).  
 
Household characteristics, such as the household size and its location, as well as the 
economic conditions at the community level, are important determinants of child labour and 
schooling.  The effect of the number of people in the household (household size) on child 
labour and schooling depends on whether these members are dependants or working since it 
affects the household‟s income and labour availability. A household with more persons will 
need more income to take care of them and may send the children to the labour market as was 
found in Peru by Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997). On the other hand, if these members 
are working then a household with more members may not need to resort to child labour. 
Hence, the composition of the household is more important than the size. This has been 
recognised in several studies. For instance, Rosati and Rossi (2001) categorised households‟ 
members into babies or children, while Nkamleu, (2009) used the dependency ratio of the 
household. The effect of the number of children on child labour and investment in schooling 
is explained by the so called „quantity and quality hypothesis‟. Parents in developing 
countries where insurance markets are incomplete tend to have more children and invest in 
their education so that these children will care for them when they are old (Pörtner, 2001). 
However, poor households with no access to financial market tend to have more children so 
as to use them as labourers.   
 
Also, child labour is considered a rural phenomenon where general economic condition is 
relatively lower (Rahikainen, 2001; Webbink et al., 2011). This is partly because rural areas 
have relatively lower access to education and other social amenities. What is more, such areas 
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tend to depend on agriculture, as is the case with Ghana, where most farmers engage in 
subsistence farming. With no insurance for their farming activities, child labour becomes the 
easier option for such households to gain additional income or fall back on in case of income 
shock. For instance, in rural India, parents withdraw their children from school to work when 
they expect lower incomes from crop production (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997). 
 
Regarding the adverse effect of child labour on schooling, initial studies have examined its 
effect on school enrolment or attendance. For instance, Boozer and Suri (2001) studied the 
effect of child labour on school attendance among children in Ghana in the late 1980s. 
Instrumenting for the hours of child work with rainfall variation and income fluctuation, they 
estimate that an hour of child work reduces school attendance by approximately 0.38 hours. 
However, in countries where the majority of child labourers combine work and school, and 
where children work after school or during weekends, analysing the effect of work on school 
enrolment or attendance may bias the result downwards (Heady, 2003). Hence, recent studies 
on the relationship between child work and schooling consider different schooling outcomes, 
such as test scores and educational attainment.  
 
Heady (2003) analyses the effect of child labour on test score performance in Ghana. The 
results show that work outside the household has a substantial effect on learning 
achievement.  However, one problem in the estimation of the effect of work on school is the 
issue of endogeneity of the work and/or school. In addressing this issue, Beegle et al. (2004) 
estimate the causal impact of child labour on educational attainment using two rounds of 
panel data from the Vietnam Standard Living Survey. They instrument for participation in 
child labour with rice prices and commodity disaster; and find that child labour reduces the 
probability of being in school by 30 percent and educational attainment by 6 percent. 
 
Other studies use different instruments to estimate the casual link between child labour and 
schooling outcome. For instance, Gunnarsson, Orazem and Sanchez (2006) use variation in 
truancy regulations in cross-countries as instrument. They find out that child work has a 




 graders in nine Latin American countries. 
Similarly, Bezerra et al. (2009) use an instrumental variable approach where the average 
wage for unskilled male in the state where the child resides is used as instrument. They find 
that child labour causes a loss in students‟ school achievement as children who do not work 
have better school performance than students who work. The effects of child labour on other 
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educational outcomes have also been examined. For instance, Cardoso and Verner (2006) 
estimate the effect of child labour (participation and hours) on school drop-out in Brazil. 
They also use an instrumental variable approach by instrumenting for child work with 
declared reservation wage (minimum salary acceptance) as instrument for child labour. The 
result indicates that child labour has no impact on school attendance or drop-out in urban 
areas. 
 
There are also studies that estimate the effect of child labour on school attainment using 
schooling-for-age as a measure of schooling outcome. For example, Khanam and Ross (2011) 
analyse the effect of child labour participation on school-for-age among rural children in 
Bangladesh with logistic regressions. They find that school attendance and grade attainment 
(school-for-age) are lower for children who are working.  In terms of gender-disaggregated 
estimates, their results show that the probability of grade attainment is lower for girls than 
boys.  Haile and Haile (2012) also examine the trade-off between child labour and school-for-
age in Ethiopia. Unlike Khanam and Ross‟s (2011) study, however, child labour was 
measured by the number of hours, instead of children‟s participation in the labour market. 
This measurement is better relative to participation in the labour market as it shows the effect 
of the intensity of the works on schooling. Haile and Haile‟s (2012) study indicate that longer 
hours of work reduce the educational attainment of working children. 
 
Finally, Ray and Lancaster (2005) also analyse the impact of child labour on school 
attendance and school-for-age. However, unlike the above studies on child labour and school-
for-age, they use household access to water and electricity as well as households‟ possession 
of assets as instrument for child labour. Using data from seven countries (Belize, Cambodia, 
Namibia, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, and Sri Lanka), they conclude that children‟s work, 
even in limited amounts, adversely impact on children‟s school performance. That is, child 
labour reduces school attendance and school-for-age. However, it is not clear whether these 
variables are valid instruments for child labour. 
 
This chapter uses the School-for-Age (SAGE) measure of educational attainment since it 
captures numerous schooling variables such as late entry into school and repetition. This is so 
because a child‟s current grade vis-à-vis his age depends on the age at which he/she enters 
into school as well as his/her academic performance over the years. Hence, this chapter 
examines the effect of hours of work on school-for-age (SAGE). Using SAGE makes it 
21 
 
possible to capture the accumulated (long term) effect of child labour on educational 
performance. To capture the influence of the intensity of work on educational attainment, the 
hours of child labour per week, instead of the extensive margin of child labour, is used. The 
chapter also examines the short term effect of work on schooling by investigating the 
influence of working hours on school attendance hours. 
 
2.3  Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
The main data for this study is the sixth Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS 6). This is a 
nationally representative survey collected by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). The GLSS 
6 used five main questionnaires namely household; non-farm household; governance, peace 
and security; prices of food and non-food items; and community. This study uses both the 
household and community data of the GLSS 6. The household questionnaire covers 
demographic characteristics of respondents; education and skills training; health and fertility 
behaviour; employment and time use among other household characteristics. The community 
questionnaire covers general information on facilities available in the communities such as 
roads, education, health, communication, banking as well as the general wellbeing of the 
community including wages of agriculture workers. 
 
The survey was undertaken over a period of 12 months from October 2012 to October 2013. 
The survey design involves a two-stage stratified sampling where in the first stage 1,200 
Enumeration Areas (EAs) were selected from the ten regions of the country using probability 
proportional to the population sizes. These EAs form the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs). A 
complete listing of all the households in the 1,200 EAs were undertaken to form the 
Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs) and then fifteen households from each EA were 
systematically selected bringing the total sample size to 18,000 households. Only 16,772 
households, however, were completely interviewed. Out of the 16,772 households interviews, 
7,445 are from urban and 9,327 from rural areas.  The community survey was done in only 
693 rural communities in 655 EAs. Table 2.1 shows the sample size of the GLSS 6 and its 





Table 2. 1 Sample Composition of Ghana Living Standard Survey 6 
  Total Male Female Rural Urban 
Number  of EAs 1,200   -   - 655 545 
Number of Households 16,772 12,043 4,729 9,327 7,445 
Individuals 72,372 35,055 37,317 44,894 27,478 
Target Children (5-17 years) 24,372 12,413 11,959 15,787 8,585 
Note: For number of households, male and female refer to male headed and female headed households. 
Source: GLSS 6 
 
 
Over 70 percent of these households were headed by men with the remaining heads being 
women. In all, 72,372 persons were completely interviewed with majority of them located in 
rural areas and being females. Out of the total number of persons interviewed about 34 
percent (24,372) are within the age group 5-17 years. They form the sample for this study. 
Though the GLSS 6 is a nationally representative survey, it is not self-weighting because 
households did not have equal chance of been selected into the survey. However, appropriate 
weights were computed to reflect the probability that a household is selected from an EA in 
the first and second stage of selection. Detailed information on the survey and calculation of 




GLSS 6 has some interesting information on children‟s activities in the last 7 days. This 
makes it a very good data for child labour and school enrolment analysis.  It contains 
information on whether the child attended school, engaged in any economic activity that can 
be classified as child labour or hazardous work, worked in the home in the form of household 
chores or the child was idle. With information on both work and schooling status of children, 
this paper jointly estimates the work and school decisions. It focuses on questions relating to 
whether a child (5-17 years) has been involved in any work (child labour or hazardous work) 
in the last seven days preceding the survey. This question is supposed to be answered by the 
child or household head in the absence of the child. However, only 11.35 percent of 
respondents were children, while the majority of the respondent for this question were 
household heads and parents. Similarly, answers to the questions on children‟s schooling 




                                                          
8
 This is cited as GSS (2014a) in the reference section. 
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2.3.2 Model Specification and Estimation Strategy 
Participation in Child Labour and School 
Formal analysis of investment in human capital is based on the theory of human capital. With 
this theory, individuals choose the level of consumption and allocation of their time so as to 
maximize the discounted expected future utility (Becker, 1981; Ben-Porath, 1967; Siebert, 
1990). However, this standard human capital model is not sufficient to explain child labour 
and schooling, since the decision-maker is often not the child and the majority of children 
work in unpaid family enterprises (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1998). In this situation, the 
decision maker may be the household head or parent who allocates the total time of all 
household members so as to maximize a Becker-type of a single utility function. 
 
The decision to involve a child in a specific activity (that is work or school) is dependent on 
the utility that the household will derive from such activity relative to other activities. The 
child goes to school if the utility from school is greater than the utility from work; and the 
child works if the reverse holds. From this, the probability of schooling and working could be 
estimated separately with a probit or a logit model since the outcome is binary. However, 
choice of estimation model use in this chapter is influenced by the decision making process. 
Assuming that the decision to work and/or school is a joint one since work and school 
compete for the child‟s non-leisure time, the chapter uses a bivariate probit model to test the 
interdependence between work and schooling decisions. The latent schooling (  
   and work 
   
   decision equations are: 
 
  
                      
                        (1) 
  
                      
                                 (2) 
               
                    
                
And the likelihood equation to be maximized is: 
  ∏∫ ∫         
     
  
     
  
             
Where    is the normal density function of the bivariate probit model, which is given by: 
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The estimates of parameters of interest are obtained by simultaneously equating to zero the 
derivative of the log likelihood function with respect to the parameters of interest. To 
ascertain the magnitude of the effect of each of the explanatory variables, the marginal effects 
of these explanatory variables (Christofides et al. 1997) are estimated. These marginal effects 
are computed at the mean value for continuous explanatory variables; and for dummy 
explanatory variables, these marginal effects are computed by taking the difference in the 
joint probabilities evaluated at the two values of the dummy variable.  
 
From equation 1,    equals to 1 if the child is still enrolled in school and 0 otherwise.    
equals to 1 if the child engaged in child labour or hazardous work for cash or in-kind benefits 
to the family in the last seven days, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of correlation between 
the error terms      allows us to measure the correlation between the outcomes after 
considering the effects of the explanatory variables.    and    are vectors of explanatory 
variables that influence the schooling and work decisions respectively. The same vector of 
covariates is included in the two equations. This means that the system is just identified 
(Haile and Haile, 2012).   
 
Hours of Child Labour 
Maximisation of the household utility subject to both income and total time constraints 
results in the number of hours of work per day     . Given that schooling hours are fixed 
and the total daily hours is normalised to one, the choice available from the household utility 
maximisation problem is the hours of work. This maximisation of the household utility might 
lead to a corner solution where zero hours of work will be supplied and it becomes positive 
afterwards. With     as the latent variable, the hour‟s equation is given by: 
 
   {
                                    
 
   
                                                           
                (3) 
Where    is the number of hours of work per week by a child;    is a vector of unknown 
parameters and    is the error term which is normally distributed with mean zero and  
 as the 
variance.     is a vector of child, parent, household and community as well as schooling 
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characteristics likely to affect the hours of work. Hence, the hours of work per week      
equation to be estimated is: 
                                 (4) 
Estimating equations (4) by Ordinary Least Square will lead to an inconsistent estimate since 
the specification corresponds to a left censored model at 0. Majority of the children reported 
0 hours of work. For this reason, a tobit model is used to estimate the parameters      
 
Children not involved in the labour market have zero hours of work, while the weekly hours 
of working children were positive. Hence, the tobit model includes both the censored (hours 
equal zero) and the uncensored (hours are positive) in the estimation. The marginal effects 
can be computed on the latent dependent variable, conditional expectation of hours being 
positive and unconditional expectation. Since our interest is on factors that influence working 
children‟s hours, the marginal effect is computed at positive values of hours of work (i.e. 
when working hours are positive). 
 
 
Effect of Hours of Child Labour on Schooling 
Though a negative and significant coefficient of rho     in the bivariate probit estimation will 
indicate a trade-off between schooling and work, this does not show the extent to which work 
influences education. Also, in terms of policy, the effect of hours of work on educational 
attainment is more important relative to a negative trade-off between participation in work 
and school. Children who work for longer hours are more likely to spend lesser hours on 
class attendance as well as for studying at home or doing home based works (assignments). 
Also, these children are less likely to be attentive inside and outside of the classrooms due to 
fatigue from work. This may have adverse effects on their educational performance and 
attainment. Thus, child labourers are more likely to start school late and also have higher 
repetition rates.  To explore this trade-off between work and school further, the chapter 
estimates the association between hours of work and educational outcomes which is 
measured with hours of class attendance and age-adjusted educational attainment of children 
(school-for-Grade). Similar to the hours of work equation and with      as the latent variable, 
the hours of class attendance per week is given by: 
 
   {
                                         
 
   
                                                                        
               (5) 
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Where    is number of hours of class attendance per week for a child s.    is a vector of 
unknown parameters and    is the error term which is normally distributed with mean zero 
and   as the variance.    is a vector of child, parent, household and community as well as 
schooling characteristics likely to affect the hours of class attendance. Hence, the hours of 
class attendance per week      equation to be estimated is: 
                                     (6) 
Where    and    are as defined above. Here      is our coefficient of interest that measures 
the effect of hours of work on class attendance and it is expected that to be negative.    is 
the log of weekly of hour of child labour.  Since children who are not in school will have zero 
hours of class attendance, a tobit model is used.  
 
Since most child labourers in Ghana combined work and school, they tend to forgo leisure 
and work after school or during holidays. Hence, finding the effect of child labour on class 
attendance may not be the ideal way to capture the potential negative effect of work on 
education. Using leisure hours for work may make children too tired to study at home or to 
concentrate at school (Gunnarsson et al., 2006). This point has been recognised by most 
recent empirical studies (Heady, 2003; Gunnarsson et al., 2006; Khanam and Ross, 2011; 
Rosati and Rossi, 2003) that argue that school enrolment or class attendance are only 
indicators of time spent on schooling and not schooling outcomes. The potential negative 
effect of work on schooling is investigated further through an assessment of the effect of 
hours of work on educational attainment (SAGE) with a probit model where the latent 
equation for the variable of interest is given by: 
 
        
                        (7) 
 
Where   is the parameter of interest that measures the effect of hours of work on educational 
attainment (   .     is the log of a child‟s hours of work per week and X is a vector of 
explanatory variables that affect a child‟s educational attainment.   is normally distributed 
error term with mean of zero and homoscedastic variance. The observable variable 
(educational attainment) is given by: 
 
  {
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                   (9) 
 
The School-for-Age (SAGE) measure of educational attainment as outlined by 
Psacharopoulus and Yang (1991) is given by: 
 
     (
                  
               
    )                  (10) 
 
Where NS is the national primary school entry age and this is the sixth year for children in 
Ghana (Keteku, 1999). The years of schooling refers to the years of schooling completed; 
such that a child in primary two has one year of schooling. From the formula above, SAGE 
takes the value of 100 or above (indicating the child has attained the maximum number of 
years possible to date or above the maximum due to early school entry or promotion in class); 
below 100 and 0 (implying the child has never attended school). A child with SAGE score of 
less than 100 is „falling behind‟ in his/her education; and hence all children with SAGE score 
of under 100 are considered as having below normal grade progression in the school system. 
Following Ray and Lancaster (2005) and Khanam and Ross (2011), the SAGE scores are 
converted into a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if a child has below normal 
school progression (that is 0<SAGE < 100) and he/she is falling behind in the schooling 
system, and 0 otherwise (SAGE     . 
 
Using the SAGE formula presented in equation (10) implies that children who are in their 
first year of schooling and are six years old will have an infinite value since the denominator 
is zero ( that is Age– NS = 0). To avoid such infinite values the sample is restricted to 
children aged 7-17 years for the SAGE specifications. Also, if a child starts school before 
he/she reaches the national minimum primary school entry age of six then SAGE potentially 
can be greater than 100, such children are added to those with SAGE score equal to 100 since 
they are few. The marginal effect of the probit estimation is computed to get the effect of an 
hour of work on educational attainment (SAGE).   
 
 
Endogeneity of Child Labour and Schooling 
Treating child labour participation as exogenous variable could bias the estimate of the effect 
of work on schooling. An unbiased estimate of the effect of work on school can be obtained 
through an instrumental variable estimation approach. With this approach, a valid instrument 
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for child labour is needed and such variable should strongly affects child labour, but should 
have no direct effect on schooling. Such valid instruments, as noted by Ray and Lancaster 
(2003), are difficult to find in most household datasets. Most empirical studies (Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulas, 1997; Sánchez et al., 2003; Khanam and Ross, 2011; Haile and Haile, 2012; 
Amin et al., 2006) on the effect of child labour on education have treated child labour as an 
exogenous variable, though a few (Bhalotra, 1999; Gunnarson et al., 2003; Ray and Lancaster 
2003, 2005) have tried to instrument for it. According to Khanam and Ross (2011, p 700), 
“such studies that have tried to control for endogeneity of child labour have relied on some 
strong and rather arbitrary identification restrictions ….. and none of these studies have tested 
the validity of the instruments used”, thereby bringing into question the validity of these 
instruments.  
 
Since there is no valid instrument for child labour in GLSS6 dataset, an instrumental variable 
approach is not applied in the estimation of the effect of child labour on educational 
attainment. Hence, the results show an association between child labour and educational 
attainment and causal inference cannot be made from them. Also, unlike other studies, such 
as Khanam and Ross (2011) who use the extensive margin of child labour, child work is 
measured as hours of work per week (intensive child labour) in this paper. 
 
Definition of Variables 
As indicated earlier, the outcome variables of interest in this chapter are child labour 
(hazardous work) and schooling. Child labour is defined in this paper according to what was 
stated in section 1.3.1. Thus, for children aged between 5 and 14 years, their engagement in 
any work (excluding household chores) for pay, profit or gain is considered child labour; 
while for children aged between 15 and 17 years, their engagement in any work (excluding 
household chores) for pay, profit or gain is considered child labour only if such work is 
hazardous in nature based on the definition of hazardous child labour provided in section 
1.3.1. Child labour (   ) is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if a child was engaged in 
child labour in the last seven days preceding the survey and 0 otherwise. Hazardous work 
refers to the involvement of children (5-17 years) in works that are hazardous in nature based 
on the definition of hazardous works in section 1.3.1 and it is coded 1 if a child was engaged 
in hazardous work in the last seven days before the survey and 0 otherwise. The hours of 
child labour (hazardous work) is the total number of hours of child labour (hazardous work) 
done by a child in a week. In terms of schooling, enrolment (   ) is a dummy variable which 
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equals 1 if a child is still in school and 0 otherwise, while hours of class attendance refer to 
the weekly total number of hours of class attendance of a child.  
 
The explanatory variables used in these regressions are child, parent and household 
characteristics, as well as schooling and community variables. Child characteristics include 
the child‟s age, square of his/her age, gender and his/her relationship to the household head. 
Parent‟s employment status and their levels of education, as well as whether they stay in the 
household are also included. In terms of household characteristics, the age, gender and 
marital status of the head; the number of children, presence of elders (persons above 60 
years) in the household; household size; per capita expenditure; livestock ownership; land 
ownership and size; receipt of remittance and the location of the households are included in 
the estimation. Also, schooling cost and type of school that the child attends are included. 
The inclusion of the later variable is meant to capture school quality since private primary 
schools often outperform public ones in Ghana (Heyneman et al., 2009). 
 
Finally, community variables comprising of distance to the nearest to primary and Junior 
High school; and daily wages of children in farming were collected for sub-sample of 
communities. These variables are included and a different regression estimated for this sub-
sample. Again, as stated earlier, children‟s works analysed in this paper include child labour 
and hazardous works. See tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for detail definition of these 
variables and their descriptive statistics. 
 




 and School Participation 
National estimates of child workers and their characteristics masked some of the peculiar 
characteristics of child workers located in different part of the country. Hence, using the 
dataset, this section examines the characteristics of child workers residing in either an urban 
or a rural area. Although the national participation rate of boys in economic activity is 29.2 
percent that of the rural boys is as high as 39 percent against 15 percent for urban boys. 
                                                          
9
 Child labour refers to the involvement of children (5-17 years) in any economic activity for cash or in-kind 
benefits but it excludes household chores. The definition of hazardous works used here is same as the definition 




Similarly, rural boys have higher participation rate for child labour (33 percent) and 
hazardous works (20 percent) in comparison to national estimates. Table 2.2 shows the 
profile of a boy and a girl child worker living in either a rural or an urban area. Though rural 
boys have higher participation rates in economic activity, child labour and hazardous works 
than rural girls, the reverse holds for those from urban areas. For instance, urban girls‟ 
participation rates in child labour and hazardous works are 16 percent and 12.3 percent as 
against that of boys which are 15 percent and 11.84 percent respectively. Similar results are 
observed with respect to the hours of work done by children in a week. While rural boys 
work more hours than rural girls, in urban areas, girls work more hours than boys.  
 
Table 2. 2 Profile of a Child Worker in Ghana in 2013 
  Boy Girl 
  Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Average age 12.2 12.79 12.1 12.82 
Average age of starting work 8.6 9.5 8.6 9.8 
Proportion engaged in economic activity 38.72 14.6 34.86 15.85 
Proportion involved in child labour 32.82 11.84 28.39 12.31 
Proportion involved in hazardous works 19.64 7.45 15.92 7.68 
Proportion engaged in household Chores 74.84 73 80.81 80.51 
Average hours in economic activity in a week 21.39 17.42 19.17 19.96 
Average hours in child labour in a week 22.15 18 19.7 20 
Average hours in hazardous work in a week 27 21 24 25 
Average hours in household chores in a week 6 7 12 11 
Proportion in School 78.93 86.98 81.46 83.03 
Average hours of school attendance per week 26 29 26 29 
Average hours of class missed per week 2.65 2.32 2.56 2.14 
Average hours of homework per week 0.51 1.61 0.59 1.55 
Proportion working in Trading 5.58 30.05 12.55 50.94 
Proportion working in Agriculture 91.7 60.93 83.25 39.89 
 
The above seems to suggest that while child labour is dominated by boys in rural areas, in 
urban areas it is girls dominated. This might be explained by the kind of child workers found 
in these areas.  Rural child labourers are usually from the community and near-by 
communities. Hence, they tend to be involved in household unpaid activities or other 
agricultural based works. However, in the case of urban areas, child workers are usually 
migrants who have migrated to the urban centres of the country for work. They are usually 
involved in petty trading and protégé of loads (locally called kayayei) in the various urban 
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markets, as well as serving as domestic home-helps. These are „female activities‟ in the 
Ghanaian culture and a reason for the dominance of female child workers in urban areas. 
 
This segregation of works by gender is confirmed by sector of employment of child workers 
in urban and rural areas. The proportion of girls found in trading is more than boys in both 
rural and urban areas. Again, on average a child worker in an urban area is relatively older 
than his counterpart in a rural area. This is true for both sexes with average ages of 13 years 
and 12 years for urban child and rural child worker respectively. This is supported by the age 
at which a child starts to participate in the labour market. On average an urban boy/girl child 
worker starts working at the age of 10 years, while a child in a rural area starts working at age 
9 years. 
 
Finally, similar to the national enrolment rates among urban and rural children, school 
enrolment rate among child workers in urban areas is 87 percent for boys and 83 percent for 
girls against 79 percent and 81 percent for boys and girls in rural areas respectively.  It is 
surprising that in rural areas, the school enrolment rate of female child workers is higher than 
male child workers. Again, rural child workers spent lesser hours in school than their urban 
counterparts. A child worker in a rural area spends about 26 hours in a week in class while an 
urban child worker spends about 29 hours in a week in school. Similarly, urban child workers 
spend relatively more hours (about 2 hours in a week) on „homework‟ or house studies than 
those in rural areas. 
 
Another feature of child labourers in Ghana is that most of them combined work with 
schooling. Table 2.3 shows school and labour market participation of children in Ghana. 
From table 2.3, the proportion of girls that attend school only (64 percent) is higher than boys 
enrolled in school only (62.67). Also, the proportion of children attending school only 
reduces while the proportion in the labour market increases as their ages increase.  This may 
be explained by the fact that children become stronger physically and psychologically as they 
age and, hence, the rewards from work are likely to be higher for older children than young 
ones. Also, the phenomena of combining work and school is prominent in rural areas. 
Furthermore, school participation (child labour participation) increases (decreases) with 
households‟ income as school enrolment rate (child labour participation rate) is higher 




Table 2. 3 Labour Force and School Participation Among Children in 2013 
  School only Work only School & Work None (Idle) 
Gender 
    Male 62.67 6.06 24.58 6.69 
Female 64.67 5.06 22.72 8.1 
Age group 
     5-9 years 74.67 2.29 13.12 9.91 
10-13 years 61.22 4.67 30.54 3.57 
14-17 years 48.62 11.7 31.59 8.09 
Expenditure Quintiles 
    Lowest 51 9.23 28.23 11.54 
Second 60.15 5.92 26.27 7.67 
Third 67.14 4.23 22.11 6.52 
Fourth 70.86 3.88 20.88 4.37 
Highest 77.24 1.96 16.8 4 
Location 
    Urban 79.71 2.31 12.94 5.04 
Rural 54.46 7.35 29.53 8.66 
Accra 88.12 1.7 4.37 5.81 
Other Urban 77.86 2.44 14.82 4.87 
Rural Coastal 72.66 2.53 16.95 7.86 
Rural Forest 59.88 3.99 31.22 4.9 
Rural Savannah 47.86 10.35 30.59 11.21 
Source: Author‟s Calculation from GLSS 6 
 
 
Intensity of Work and Schooling 
The intensity of work undertaken by children is very important in the definition of child 
labour and in examining the effects of work on children‟s development. Majority of child 
labourers are enrolled in the education system in Ghana (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1998). 
Working children are able to combine work and school because they work during the 
weekends, missed school days, before or after school and during vacation.  Attending school 
may have a negative effect on work since it reduces the number of hours available for work. 
Children who combine work and school tend to work for lesser hours relative to working 
children who do not attend school as indicated in table 2.4. 
 
Again, table 2.4 shows that while the majority (45 percent) of child labourers who do not 
attend school work between 15-42 hours in a week; for working children who are in school, 
the majority (about 63 percent) of them work for 1-14 hours per week. This pattern is true for 
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both male and female child labourers as well as rural and urban children in the labour market. 
Again, the number of hours of work increase as the child grows, as older children work for 
longer hours than younger ones, irrespective of whether the former attends school or not. 
Furthermore, the ILO considers children working for 43 or more hours per week as engaging 
in the worst form of child labour. From table 2.4, about 35 percent of child workers not in 
school are found in the worst form of child labour against only 4.6 percent of child labourers 
in school. Finally, the proportion of urban child labourers (44 percent) found in the worst 
form of child labour (i.e. working more than 43 hours per week) is higher than proportion of 
child labourers in rural areas (31.2 percent). 
 
Table 2. 4 Weekly Hours of Work and School Attendance Status in 2013 
     Currently Attending School           Not Attending School 
Hours 1-14 15-42 43+ 1-14 15-42 43+ 
All 62.9 32.5 4.6 20.3 45 34.7 
Boys 63.5 31.9 4.7 21.5 45.1 33.4 
Girls 62.4 33.2 4.4 19 45 36 
Urban 64.9 32.3 2.7 23.8 32.2 44 
Rural 62.1 32.6 5.3 19 49.8 31.2 
Age Groups 
      5-7 years 71.1 24.6 4.3 29.5 34.7 35.8 
8-11 years 66.9 28.2 4.9 24.2 40.8 35 
12-14 years 62.2 34.1 3.7 23.4 46.1 30.5 
15-17 years 56.2 38.5 5.3 16.1 47.6 36.3 
Source: Author‟s Calculation from GLSS 6 
 
Child Labour and Educational Attainment (SAGE) 
In spite of the progress achieved in the country‟s educational sector, late entry into primary 
school and repetition rates remain a serious issue in Ghana. For example, about 60 percent of 
6-year-old children and 45 percent of 7- year-old children in rural areas were not in school in 
2010 (Darvas and Balwanz, 2013). Also, grade repetition is very common in primary school 
grades 1 and 6, with about 11 percent and 22 percent of children repeating these grades 
respectively in 2011 (GSS, 2011). Late school entry and high repetition rates have been cited 
for the wide disparities between GERs and NERs in the country. For instance, primary school 
GER in 2014 was 99.1, but NER was only 69.6 in the same year (UNDP, 2015).  The 
working status of a child can have a significant effect on their school entry age as well as 
repetition. Thus, working children are more likely to start school late if they choose to enrol 
in school at all; and also perform poorly in school due to absenteeism or inattentiveness in 
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class. Such children are less likely to study at home, since most child labourers use off-school 
hours to work.   
 
The school-for-Age (SAGE) or Grade-for-Age has become an important educational outcome 
for assessing the educational attainment of children since it adjusts for a child‟s age. SAGE 
can be classified into three: Below SAGE, Normal SAGE and Above SAGE. Children with 
the Normal SAGE are those with educational attainment commensurate with their ages, while 
Above SAGE children have educational attainments that are above the required level based 
on their ages. Below SAGE children are lagging behind in terms of their educational 
attainment; they are of concern to policymakers. Table 2.5 shows the percentage of children 
who are above, normal and below their required educational attainment. 
 
Table 2. 5 Educational Attainment (SAGE) and Children's Activities 
  Boys Girls Rural Urban All 
 
School School School School School School School School School School 















Right 17 6 18 7 12 6 23 10 18 7 
Below 78 91 76 90 84 92 70 87 77 91 
Above 5 3 6 3 4 2 7 3 5 2 
Source: Author's calculation from GLSS 6 
       
Overall, the majority of children‟s educational attainments are below what is required for 
their ages; and this is worse among children that combine schooling with work. For example, 
while 77 percent of the children who attend school only have educational attainment level 
below normal, as high as 91 percent of children who combine school with work fall into this 
category. Also, girls have relatively better educational attainment than boys, whether such 
girls are attending school only or combining schooling with working. Furthermore, the 
percentage of urban children with below normal educational attainment is lower than children 
in rural areas.  
 
 
2.5  Regression Results and Discussion 
As stated earlier, the chapter examines the joint decision of sending children to school or 
work with a bivariate probit model. Two types of child works are considered, namely child 
labour and hazardous works. Tables 2.6  and 2.7 show the marginal effects from the bivariate 
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probit estimation of schooling and child labour decisions; while tables 2.8 and 2.9 show the 
marginal effects of the joint estimation of the decision to send children to school or to engage 
them in hazardous works. Tables 2.6 (model 1) and 2.7 (model 2) are the same, except that 
table 2.7 (model 2) include community variables that are important to the decision to send 
children to school or work. Similarly table 2.9 includes these community variables while 
table 2.8 does not. Since the community questionnaire was administered only in rural areas, 
the results in tables 2.7 and 2.9 are for rural children only.  
 
In line with expectations, the coefficient of correlation (rho) between the errors in the two 
equations is statistically significant for both the overall sample, as well as the split samples 
for both child labour and school decisions; and hazardous work and schooling. This justifies 
the use of the bivariate probit model to jointly estimate these two binary equations.  
 
 
2.5.1 Participation in Work and School 
Child Labour and School Participation 
The negative and significant values of the coefficient of correlation (rho) in tables 2.6 and 2.7 
show that there is a trade-off between the choice of sending a child to school or work. Thus, 
the decision to send a child to work is dependent on the schooling decision and vice versa. 
This trade-off is stronger for boys as the value of rho is higher in the sub-sample of boys 
relative to girls (see tableA3-A4 in the appendix). 
 
From table 2.6, boys are less likely to engage in child labour, but they have a higher 
probability of going to school relative to girls. Being a boy is associated with a decrease in 
the probability of working of approximately 0.04 percentage points and an increase in the 
probability of schooling of 9 percentage points all things being equal. This contradicts earlier 
studies (Blunch et al., 2002; Canagarajah and Couloumbe, 1998) in Ghana that found gender 
to have no effect on the likelihood of a child working and schooling.  The results, however, 
are comparable to Haile and Haile‟s (2012) study in Ethiopia, which shows that male children 
are more likely to attend school compared to female children. The significance of gender 
disappears once community variables are included and the sample restricted to only children 
in rural areas (table 2.7). This may be as a result of the definition of child labour used, which 
excludes children‟s engagement in household chores where girls are prominent. 
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Also, contrary to expectations, sons and daughters of the household head are more likely to 
engage in child labour and less likely to attend school. This may be because the majority of 
the children in our sample are related to the household head directly and households usually 
use their own children for work. Bhalotra and Heady (2001) also found similar results in 
Ghana. In addition, the probability that a child will be involved in child labour is positively 
associated with his/her age, but the probability declines after a certain age (non-linear 
relationship) as indicated by the negative significance of the square of a child‟s age. Thus, 
older children have a higher probability of working in both models. All things being equal, 
table 2.6 shows that the probability of engaging in child labour is associated with an increase 
of 0.06 percentage points with an additional year. However, age has no association with 
schooling decision. The findings in this study corroborate an earlier study on child labour in 
Ghana by Blunch and Verner (2002), which shows statistically significant positive result for 
age (17 percentage points increase) and a negative statistically significant result for age 
squared (0.7 percentage points decrease).  
 
In terms of parent characteristics, children whose fathers have primary education or above are 
less likely to engage in child labour, but more likely to attend school relative to children with 
fathers who have no education. The educational level of the father has a stronger association 
with schooling than with work. The influence of the father‟s education on both work and 
school is even larger once the child wage and distance to the nearest primary or junior high 
school are controlled. This supports the existing evidence (such as Emerson and Souza, 2006) 
which show that a father education has a greater positive and negative influences on 
schooling and child labour respectively. This may be explained by the fact that educated 
fathers know the negative effect of work on children‟s human capital development vis-à-vis 
the positive effect of schooling on their future welfare. However, the educational level of a 
mother has no significant association with the working status of her children, though it 
increases their probability of school enrolment. 
 
The employment status of the father and mother has positive and negative correlations with 
child labour and school enrolment respectively. This is contrary to the theoretical prediction 
that when the parents are employed child labour reduces and schooling increases. This is 
could be attributed to the fact that in Ghana, and other developing countries, most parents are 
self-employed, hence their children tend to support them. Also, most children grow up doing 
similar jobs as their parents since parents might believe that “training by doing” has more 
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value than education (Bass, 2004; Smits and Gunduz-Hosgor, 2006). This finding supports 
earlier works (e.g. Francavillia and Gianelli, 2007) which show that children work more 
when their mothers are working. The result, however, contradicts the findings of other studies 
(Sakellariou and Lall, 1998; Cartwright, 1999) that found the employment of the mother to 
negatively affect the likelihood of child labour occurring. Again, the results of this study 
indicate that the presence of the mother in the household has a positive association with the 
probability of child labour in the family, but has no association with school enrolment. 
However, the presence of the father has no association with the probability to work or school. 
 
Furthermore, the probability of engaging in child labour for children from male headed 
households is 0.2 percentage point higher than their counterpart from female headed 
households. Also, the probability of participation in schooling is 4 percentage points lesser 
for children in male headed households.  Again, children in households where the head is 
married are less likely (about 0.2 percentage point lower) to engage in child labour and 2.6 
percentage points more likely to attend school. This may be explained by the fact that married 
household heads have additional income from their spouses; hence, they are more likely to 
send their children to school than to the labour market. In addition to the factors above, 
household composition, its location and wealth have all been linked to child labour in most 
empirical studies (Ray, 2000; Beegle et al., 2006). In terms of household composition, the 
chapter takes into account the number of children, the presence of elders (persons above 60 
years) and the household size. Though these variables have the predicted signs (i.e. positive 
coefficient for child labour and negative for schooling), they are not statistically significant.  
 
In addition, the findings show that while household income has no association with schooling 
and working decisions, household wealth does. An increase in household wealth is associated 
with a reduction in the probability of child labour of 0.03 percentage points and an increase in 
schooling probability of 0.4 percentage points. This supports Kruger et al. (2007) who report 
that household wealth leads to a reduction in child labour and an increase in schooling among 
Brazilian children. Also, ownership of livestock by a household is associated with an increase 
in the likelihood of child labour of 0.05 percentage points, but it has no association with 





Table 2. 6 Correlates of School and Child Labour Participation for Children (Model 1) 
Independent Variables Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Boy -0.000441** (0.000216) 0.00878*** (0.0031) 
RelH 0.00275*** (0.000699) -0.0383*** (0.00745) 
Age 0.000575*** (0.000197) 0.00487 (0.00438) 
Age2 -0.000017** (0.000008) -0.000473** (0.000204) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00173** (0.000757) 0.0368*** (0.00928) 
FatherEduSec -0.00112** (0.000544) 0.0224*** (0.00711) 
MotherEduPrim -0.000637 (0.000438) 0.0273*** (0.00832) 
MotherEduSec 0.000386 (0.000427) -0.011 (0.00809) 
FatherEmptsta 0.00872*** (0.0016) -0.0990*** (0.0145) 
MotherEmptsta 0.00977*** (0.00187) -0.0987*** (0.0197) 
FatherHH 0.000009 (0.000527) 0.00337 (0.00896) 
MotherHH 0.00116** (0.000509) -0.00821 (0.00817) 
HeadAge 0.00005 (0.0004) -0.000523 (0.000693) 
HeadAge2 -0.00002 (0.0003) 0.00203 (0.00631) 
MaleHead 0.00248*** (0.00069) -0.0402*** (0.00621) 
HeadMar -0.00164*** (0.000459) 0.0264*** (0.0046) 
NoChildren 0.000108 (0.000104) -0.00149 (0.00168) 
Elders -0.000246 (0.000311) 0.00585 (0.00512) 
Ownland -0.00005 (0.000211) 0.00164 (0.00357) 
Landsize -0.00011 (0.00015) 0.00075 (0.00203) 
Ownlivestock 0.00055** (0.000265) -0.00563 (0.00411) 
HHsize -0.00054 (0.0077) 0.000542 (0.00127) 
RurUrb -0.000474* (0.000266) 0.00596 (0.00418) 
Remittance -0.000048 (0.000449) 0.0021 (0.00756) 
AssetIndex -0.000257*** (0.000081) 0.00370*** (0.000967) 
LogExpCapita 0.000198 (0.000141) 0.00152 (0.00264) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.000708*** (0.000261) 0.00815** (0.00392) 
Rho -0.2556 0.0286 
 
 







Sample   22,260  
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Furthermore, in line with expectations, there is a positive relationship between schooling 
expenditure (proxied by school expenditure per annum per cluster) and child labour. An 
additional Ghana cedis increase in school expenditure is associated with 0.07 percentage 
points increase in the probability of child labour and 0.8 percentage points reduction in the 
likelihood of schooling. The influence of schooling cost on school and child labour 
participation is even larger in rural areas (table 2.7). This supports studies (Drèze and 
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Kingdon, 2001; Leclercq, 2002) that view access to education as a sure way of reducing child 
labour. 
 
Table 2. 7 Correlates of School and Child Labour Participation for Children (Model 2) 
Independent Variables Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Boy -0.000324 (0.00043) 0.00362 (0.00527) 
RelH 0.00360*** (0.00125) -0.0473*** (0.0138) 
Age 0.000700* (0.00041) -0.0125 (0.00974) 
Age2 -0.0017 (0.0019) 0.000404 (0.00047) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00545** (0.0022) 0.0609*** (0.0166) 
FatherEduSec -0.00338** (0.00158) 0.0351*** (0.0121) 
MotherEduPrim -0.00159 (0.00116) 0.0251* (0.0136) 
MotherEduSec 0.000164 (0.00104) -0.0037 (0.0132) 
FatherEmptsta 0.0150*** (0.00275) -0.202*** (0.032) 
MotherEmptsta 0.0166*** (0.00317) -0.226*** (0.0429) 
FatherHH 0.000412 (0.00118) -0.00721 (0.016) 
MotherHH 0.00197* (0.00109) -0.0267* (0.0145) 
HeadAge 0.00012 (0.00092) -0.000218 (0.00118) 
HeadAge2 -0.0017 (0.0872) 0.000751 (0.00109) 
MaleHead 0.00418*** (0.0013) -0.0533*** (0.0115) 
HeadMar -0.00292*** (0.00093) 0.0371*** (0.00792) 
NoChildren 0.000291 (0.000213) -0.00397 (0.00274) 
Elders 0.000454 (0.00068) -0.00636 (0.00872) 
Ownland -0.000571 (0.00045) 0.00706 (0.00548) 
Landsize 0.000032 (0.000081) -0.000034 (0.000109) 
Ownlivestock 0.000675 (0.000574) -0.0091 (0.00732) 
HHsize -0.000141 (0.000156) 0.00207 (0.0021) 
Remittance -0.00032 (0.000923) 0.00453 (0.0117) 
AssetIndex -0.000286* (0.000171) 0.00356* (0.00198) 
LogExpCapita 0.000386 (0.000293) -0.00583 (0.00435) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.00167*** (0.000588) 0.0222*** (0.00693) 
DistPrimary 0.000206** (0.000088) -0.00248*** (0.000845) 
DistJHS 0.000136*** (0.00005) -0.00165*** (0.000419) 
Childwage 0.00009** (0.00004) -0.00117** (0.000579) 
Rho -0.1771 0.036 
  Wald Test, rho=0; chi2(1) Pro 23.182 0 
 Log Pseudolikehood 
 
-1984317.8 
  Sample   12.891     
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




With respect to the community variables, table 2.7 shows that distance to nearest primary 
school is associated with an increase in the probability of child labour of 0.02 percentage 
points and a reduction in school participation of 0.21 percentage point. Similar results were 
found for distance to the nearest JHS. This shows that not only is financial access to 
education important to parents in deciding on their children‟s activities (schooling or child 
labour), but physical access to education is equally important. The findings here corroborate 
earlier studies in Ghana (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1998; Chao and Alper, 1998; Blunch 
and Verner, 2000) and other developing countries such as Vietnam (Beegle et al., (2009). 
Also, as expected, children in urban areas are less likely to engage in child labour in 
comparison to rural children, but urban location has no effect on schooling. Finally, an 
increase in the daily agriculture wage of children is associated with 0.09 percentage points 
increase in child labour and 0.12 percentage points reduction in schooling. Similar result was 
obtained by Robles-Vásquez and Abler (2000). They attempted to measure the wage 
elasticity and found that the wage elasticity of labour supply among Mexican boys is very 
small. The results from the split samples confirm the above findings of this thesis though 
there are few differences (see tables A3 and A4 in the appendix). 
 
 
Hazardous Work and Schooling Participation 
Hazardous
10
 child labour is considered as the worst form of child labour as it poses more 
danger to the health, safety and morals of a child. As noted by Rogers and Swinnerton 
(2008), the worst form of child labour can do damage to children. Owing to data constraints 
on hazardous child labour, there is a dearth of empirical literature on the determinants of 
hazardous child labour. Few studies have tried to explain its existence including Dessy and 
Pallage (2005). They suggest that such works pay better than other jobs available to children, 
and it is this compensating wage differential that account for the existence of hazardous child 
labour. However, Rogers and Swinnerton (2008) attributed the existence of this form of child 
labour to imperfect information on the part of parent, since they may not know the 
exploitative nature of these works. This study contributes to this literature by examining the 
factors that are associated with children‟s participation in hazardous works or school. 
 
                                                          
10
 As stated earlier, according to the Ghana Child Labour Act, hazardous child labour include children 
engagement in activities such as going to sea, works in mining and quarrying sectors, porterage of heavy loads, 
works in manufacturing industries where chemicals are produced or used, works in places where machines are 
used, works in places such as bars, hotels and places of entertainment where a person may be exposed to 
immoral behaviour, as well as night works that occurred between 8pm and 6am. 
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Table 2. 8 Correlates of School and Hazardous Work Participation (Model 1) 
Independent Variables Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Boy -0.000643** (0.000269) 0.00929*** (0.00322) 
RelH 0.00285*** (0.000699) -0.0344*** (0.00745) 
Age -0.00095*** (0.000287) 0.0173*** (0.00306) 
Age2 0.00007*** (0.0001) -0.00119*** (0.000135) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00371*** (0.00105) 0.0465*** (0.00979) 
FatherEduSec -0.00171** (0.000772) 0.0218*** (0.00757) 
MotherEduPrim -0.00114* (0.000594) 0.0275*** (0.00835) 
MotherEduSec 0.000426 (0.00059) -0.0103 (0.00821) 
FatherEmptsta 0.00786*** (0.00119) -0.0817*** (0.0107) 
MotherEmptsta 0.00719*** (0.000998) -0.0661*** (0.00816) 
FatherHH 0.000781 (0.000723) -0.00443 (0.00945) 
MotherHH 0.000382 (0.000572) -0.000288 (0.00743) 
HeadAge -0.000049 (0.000055) 0.000445 (0.000712) 
HeadAge2 0.000068 (0.000052) -0.00074 (0.00066) 
MaleHead 0.00243*** (0.000578) -0.0341*** (0.00603) 
HeadMar -0.000850** (0.000381) 0.0154*** (0.00452) 
NoChildren 0.00017 (0.000135) -0.00189 (0.00174) 
Elders -0.000391 (0.000407) 0.00636 (0.00529) 
Ownland -0.000345 (0.000274) 0.00413 (0.00363) 
Landsize 0.000094 (0.00015) -0.00013 (0.00195) 
Ownlivestock 0.000722** (0.000316) -0.0068*** (0.000404) 
HHsize -0.00671 (0.000103) 0.000625 (0.00132) 
RurUrb -0.000203 (0.000321) 0.00272 (0.0042) 
Remittance -0.00117*** (0.000634) 0.0123 (0.00802) 
AssetIndex -0.00042*** (0.000097) 0.00481*** (0.00103) 
LogExpCapita 0.00154*** (0.000195) -0.0124*** (0.00265) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.00091*** (0.000301) 0.00927** (0.00384) 
Rho 0.29502 0.02956 
 
 




   
3471923.3 
Sample     22,260   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similar to child labour, boys are less likely to engage in hazardous works, but more likely to 
enrol in school as presented in table 2.8. Also, children of the household head are more likely 
to engage in hazardous child labour, but the probability of them being enrolled in school is 
lesser than children not related to the household head.  The probability of engaging in 





Table 2. 9 Correlates of School and Hazardous Works Participation (Model 2) 
Independent Variables Hazardous work Participation School Participation 
 
Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Boy -0.00064 (0.000476) 0.00701 (0.00516) 
RelH 0.00282** (0.00119) -0.0322** (0.0128) 
Age -0.00179*** (0.000536) 0.0190*** (0.00499) 
Age2 0.000129*** (0.00003) -0.00140*** (0.00022) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00897*** (0.00258) 0.0813*** (0.0177) 
FatherEduSec -0.00569*** (0.00196) 0.0447*** (0.013) 
MotherEduPrim -0.00157 (0.00116) 0.0241* (0.0132) 
MotherEduSec 0.000171 (0.00116) -0.00356 (0.0131) 
FatherEmptsta 0.00958*** (0.0016) -0.112*** (0.0131) 
MotherEmptsta 0.0108*** (0.0016) -0.127*** (0.0136) 
FatherHH 0.00126 (0.00136) -0.0159 (0.0153) 
MotherHH 0.000661 (0.00111) -0.00782 (0.0126) 
HeadAge -0.000132 (0.0001) 0.00151 (0.00111) 
HeadAge2 0.000012 (0.00092) -0.00013 (0.00103) 
MaleHead 0.00335*** (0.000989) -0.0372*** (0.0104) 
HeadMar -0.000559 (0.000639) 0.00486 (0.00727) 
NoChildren 0.000401* (0.000239) -0.00475* (0.00263) 
Elders 0.000522 (0.000776) -0.00635 (0.00861) 
Ownland -0.000431 (0.000479) 0.00459 (0.00537) 
Landsize 0.00188*** (0.00063) -0.00022*** (0.00006) 
Ownlivestock 0.00122* (0.000643) -0.0143** (0.00702) 
HHsize -0.000251 (0.000176) 0.00308 (0.00197) 
Remittance -0.00157 (0.00108) 0.0187 (0.012) 
AssetIndex -0.000464** (0.000183) 0.00523*** (0.00194) 
LogExpCapita 0.000995*** (0.000341) -0.0122*** (0.00387) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.00179*** (0.000552) 0.0208*** (0.00582) 
DistPrimary 0.000322*** (0.00008) -0.00357*** (0.000771) 
DistJHS 0.000145*** (0.00004) -0.00157*** (0.000441) 
Childwage 0.000165*** (0.00004) -0.00173*** (0.000452) 
Rho -0.22422 0.03696 
  Wald Test, rho=0; chi2(1) Pro 34.344 0.0000 
 Log Pseudolikehood 
  
-189731 
 Sample     12,891  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Furthermore, the employment of the father and mother positively influences children‟s 
engagement in hazardous work, but it has a negative association with school participation. 
Also, the probability of engaging in hazardous work is lesser for children whose fathers or 
mothers have completed primary school in comparison to children with fathers or mothers 
who have no education. Similar results were obtained when the sample was restricted to 
children in rural areas; as well as boys and girls (see appendix tables A5a-A7b). 
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2.5.2 Hours of Child Work 
Table 2.10 and 2.11 present the marginal effects of the tobit estimations of the determinants 
of the weekly hours of child labour and hazardous work respectively. The first column in all 
tables shows individual, household and community characteristic variables believed to 
influence hours of work for the overall sample; while columns 2 and 3 contain the results for 
boys and girls.  
 
Hours of Child Labour 
The result in column 1 shows a significantly negative relationship between school enrolment 
and the hours of child labour. Child labourers who are enrolled in school work 4.13 hours less 
than their counterpart who are not in school.  School enrolment has larger influence on boys 
relative to girls, as a boy worker works 4.3 hours less, while a girl worker reduces her hours 
of work by 4 hours. The negative association between schooling and hours of child labour is 
collaborated by the negative relationship between hours of class attendance and hours of 
child labour. This result contradicts earlier study among girls in Bangladesh where increases 
in enrolment was not associated with appreciable decreases in child labour (Ravallion and 
Wodon, 2000).  
 
Again, sons and daughters of the household head work more hours than children not related 
to the head. Relationship to the household head has the largest influence on sons relative to 
daughters. This result is contrary to other studies that found sons and daughters of the 
household head working for lesser hours (Ndjanyou and Djienouassi, 2010). Also, possibly 
due to the definition of child labour used, the findings do not indicate a gender gap in terms 
of the number of hours worked.  
 
Hours worked by children increases with age at a decreasing rate for the overall sample. 
However, the results of the split sub-sample show that there is a linear relationship between 
age and hours of child labour. The implication is that older children work more hours than 
younger children. This result supports earlier studies on child labourers in Ghana (Bhalotra 
and Heady, 1998; Owusu and Kwarteng, 2008) that found older children working for more 






Table 2. 10 Correlates of Weekly Hours of Child Labour for Children 















Enrol -4.12*** (0.287) -4.247*** (0.411) -4.013*** (0.399) 
ClassAtthrs -0.02*** (0.0036) -0.014*** (0.0050) -0.018*** (0.0053) 
Boy -0.0655 (0.113) - - - - 
RelH 1.430*** (0.273) 1.642*** (0.387) 1.230*** (0.383) 
Age 0.682*** (0.118) 0.520*** (0.162) 0.835*** (0.170) 
Age2 -0.02*** (0.0052) -0.0120* (0.0071) -0.026*** (0.0075) 
FatherEduPrim -0.0391 (0.279) -0.238 (0.399) 0.186 (0.391) 
FatherEduSec -0.501** (0.195) -0.597** (0.275) -0.404 (0.271) 
MotherEduPrim 0.486** (0.215) 0.752*** (0.287) 0.263 (0.305) 
MotherEduSec -0.219 (0.210) 0.128 (0.278) -0.527* (0.303) 
FatherEmptsta 7.844*** (0.569) 7.383*** (0.737) 8.326*** (0.878) 
MotherEmptsta 11.08*** (0.432) 10.68*** (0.613) 11.42*** (0.571) 
FatherHH 0.120 (0.325) 0.151 (0.472) 0.116 (0.448) 
MotherHH 1.867*** (0.263) 1.604*** (0.358) 2.092*** (0.373) 
HeadAge 0.00927 (0.0273) -0.0528 (0.0380) 0.0716* (0.0390) 
HeadAge2 -0.00004 (0.0002) 0.000523 (0.0004) -0.000598 (0.0004) 
MaleHead 0.679*** (0.218) 0.819*** (0.317) 0.504* (0.296) 
HeadMar -0.219 (0.153) -0.277 (0.211) -0.144 (0.216) 
NoChildren -0.0364 (0.0606) -0.0151 (0.0826) -0.0554 (0.0875) 
Elders 0.237 (0.180) 0.211 (0.228) 0.249 (0.273) 
Ownland -0.138 (0.121) -0.241 (0.162) -0.0173 (0.180) 
Landsize -0.0078* (0.0041) -0.00635 (0.0048) -0.00846 (0.0069) 
Ownlivestock 0.216 (0.140) 0.211 (0.199) 0.227 (0.196) 
HHsize 0.0771* (0.0456) 0.0624 (0.0605) 0.0930 (0.0673) 
RurUrb -0.171 (0.146) -0.376* (0.202) 0.0113 (0.207) 
Remittance 0.0765 (0.224) -0.0530 (0.280) 0.171 (0.347) 
AssetIndex -0.14*** (0.0351) -0.144*** (0.0509) -0.143*** (0.0479) 
LogExpCapita 0.445*** (0.0816) 0.381*** (0.114) 0.505*** (0.116) 












 Sample 22,326   11,359   10,967   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Furthermore, fathers‟ education level to primary school has no association with hours of child 
labour in both the pooled sample and sub-samples. However, children with fathers who have 
completed post-primary school work 0.5 hour less than children whose fathers have no 
education. Conversely, a mother with only primary school certificate reduces the hours of 
work of her male children by 0.8 hour, but this has no influence on her daughters‟ hours of 
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work.  The education level of a mother is associated with the hours of work of her daughters 
only if it is post-primary school. This finding is in line with earlier works (Ray, 2000; Deb 
and Rosati, 2002; Bhalotra and Heady, 2003) which show that there is a negative relationship 
between parent‟s education and children‟s working hours. Also, from table 2.10, the 
employment status of the father and mother has a positive influence on hours of child labour.  
 
In addition, the headship of the household has a weak influence on children‟s hours of work.  
Moreover, an increase in the income of the household is associated with a reduction in the 
number of hours of child labour of 0. 45 hours, with the biggest influence occurring among 
girls. Also, the household wealth has a negative association with hours of child labour for 
both boys and girls. This finding is consistent with other studies (Phoumin and Fukui, 2006; 
Kim and Zepeda, 2004; Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Bhalotra, 2000) that found an inverse 
relationship between income or wealth and hours of child labour. A unit increase in schooling 
expenditure is associated with an increase in the hours of child labour of 1.16 hours.  
 
Lastly, some community variables were included and a separate estimation done for this sub-
sample. The results (see table A8 in the appendix) show that distance to the nearest school 
has a positive association with hours of child labour for the overall sample and boys, but it 
has no influence on girls‟ hours of work. Also, higher child wage is associated with more 
hours of work for both the pooled sample and sub-samples. In terms of the other variables, 
the results of this sub-sample  (rural children only) estimation are in line with the above 
results in terms of significance of the coefficients (see table A8 in the appendix). 
 
Hours in Hazardous Works 
Table 2.11 shows the tobit marginal effects conditioned on working for the pooled sample 
(column 1), boys only (column 2) and girls only (column 3). The results show that school 
enrolment has negative association with hours of hazardous work; it reduces hours of work 
by 4.2 hours for the overall sample. Similar results were obtained for boys and girls with the 
largest influence occurring among girls.  
 
The actual hours that children spend in schools have no association with their hours of work 
in hazardous activities. Also, a child who is the son of the household head works 1.9 hours 
more than a male child worker who is not related to the household head. Moreover, a child‟s 
hours of hazardous work increase with girls‟ age, but age has no association with boys‟ hours 
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of hazardous work. Additionally, the education of the father does not affect his children‟s 
hours of hazardous work, both for the overall sample and sub-samples. Again, the 
employment of the father and mother positively influence the hours of hazardous work, with 
that of the latter having the largest influence.  
 
Table 2. 11 Correlates of Weekly Hours of Hazardous Works for Children 















Enrol -4.29*** (0.352) -4.26*** (0.497) -4.36*** (0.483) 
ClassAtthrs -0.0095* (0.0055) -0.0135* (0.0075) -0.00407 (0.0081) 
Boy -0.0729 (0.170) - - - - 
RelH 1.449*** (0.426) 1.884*** (0.573) 1.002* (0.605) 
Age 0.422** (0.174) 0.315 (0.230) 0.527** (0.255) 
Age2 -0.00740 (0.0075) -0.00147 (0.0099) -0.0134 (0.0110) 
FatherEduPrim -0.207 (0.404) -0.739 (0.574) 0.318 (0.559) 
FatherEduSec -0.213 (0.290) -0.450 (0.420) -0.0395 (0.391) 
MotherEduPrim 0.375 (0.314) 0.984** (0.387) -0.157 (0.451) 
MotherEduSec -0.235 (0.314) 0.251 (0.404) -0.647 (0.459) 
FatherEmptsta 6.654*** (0.654) 6.355*** (0.876) 6.964*** (0.959) 
MotherEmptsta 9.163*** (0.481) 8.645*** (0.705) 9.568*** (0.613) 
FatherHH 0.141 (0.482) 0.313 (0.676) 0.0378 (0.663) 
MotherHH 1.319*** (0.385) 0.618 (0.479) 1.958*** (0.570) 
HeadAge -0.0464 (0.0372) -0.120** (0.0502) 0.0319 (0.0545) 
HeadAge2 0.000436 (0.0003) 0.0011** (0.0005) -0.00029 (0.0005) 
MaleHead 0.835** (0.335) 0.898** (0.452) 0.708 (0.466) 
HeadMar 0.296 (0.240) 0.375 (0.332) 0.238 (0.331) 
NoChildren 0.138 (0.0886) 0.136 (0.120) 0.134 (0.127) 
Elders 0.455* (0.275) 0.338 (0.349) 0.544 (0.405) 
Ownland -0.58*** (0.180) -0.88*** (0.249) -0.258 (0.265) 
Landsize -0.00232 (0.0045) -0.00481 (0.0065) 0.00163 (0.0086) 
Ownlivestock 0.402* (0.212) 0.443 (0.305) 0.345 (0.289) 
HHsize -0.0856 (0.0698) -0.0545 (0.0910) -0.112 (0.103) 
RurUrb 0.102 (0.219) -0.0393 (0.308) 0.216 (0.302) 
Remittance -0.949** (0.425) -1.152** (0.539) -0.763 (0.648) 
AssetIndex -0.17*** (0.0493) -0.22*** (0.0699) -0.124* (0.0685) 
LogExpCapita -1.05*** (0.121) -1.15*** (0.171) -0.95*** (0.169) 












 Sample 22,326   11,359   10,967   





Furthermore, male headship of the household has a positive association with the hours of 
hazardous work for boys, but not for girls. Also, land ownership and receipt of remittance has 
negative association with the weekly hours of hazardous works for the pooled sample and 
boys, but not for girls. Similarly, household wealth has no influence on girls‟ hours of work, 
but it reduces boys‟ weekly hours of hazardous work. However, the income of the household 
has negative association with the weekly hours of hazardous work of the total sample and the 
sub-samples. Again, schooling cost has positive influence on the weekly hours of hazardous 
work, with boys working 1.5 hours more in a week when there is a unit increase in schooling 
expenditure. Again, the inclusion of the community variables and restriction of the sample to 
rural children did not change the above results (seen in table A9 in the appendix).  
 
 
2.5.3 Effect of Work on Schooling 
Class Attendance 
Table 2.12 shows the marginal effects of the tobit estimation of the effect of child labour on 
weekly hours of class attendance. The significant and negative coefficient of „LogHoursCL‟ 
(log of hours of child labour) show that work has a detrimental effect on class attendance. An 
additional hour of child labour is associated with a reduction in class attendance of 0.15 hour 
(that is 9 minutes of class attendance). The effect is higher for girls than boys.  One hour of 
child labour is associated with 0.18 hours decrease in girls‟ hours of class attendance (about 
11 minutes of class attendance) and 0.11 hours for boys (about 7 minutes of class 
attendance). This result supports other studies such as Khanam and Ross (2011) that found 
that work has an adverse effect on school enrolment. 
 
Though the aim of this section of the chapter is to examine the association between hours of 
child labour and class attendance, the results also show some interesting outcomes that merit 
special consideration. For example, the existence of gender gap in schooling in Ghana and 
elsewhere has been documented in several studies, including Canagarjah and Coulombe 
(1998) and Khanam and Ross (2011). However, the results of this study show that the gender 
of a child has no influence on the hours of class attendance. Also, older children attend school 
regularly relative to younger ones. Again, a father‟s educational qualification has no 
association with his children‟s weekly hours of class attendance, but mothers‟ education at 
the primary level influences class attendance. Also, the father‟s employment status increases 
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the hours of class attendance for the combined sample as well as girls, but it has no influence 
on boys. Likewise, the presence of the father (mother) in the household increases (decreases) 
the hours of class attendance for girls, but it has no effect on boys. 
 
Table 2. 12 Effects of Hours of Child Labour on School Attendance for Children 













LogHoursCL -0.15*** (0.0221) -0.11*** (0.0295) -0.177*** (0.0334) 
Boy 0.123 (0.239) - -     -    - 
RelH -1.025* (0.538) -0.678 (0.747) -1.242 (0.779) 
Age 0.659*** (0.224) 0.695** (0.318) 0.653** (0.314) 
Age2 -0.03*** (0.0105) -0.034** (0.0148) -0.0322** (0.0147) 
FatherEduPrim 0.557 (0.622) 1.202 (0.877) -0.0238 (0.869) 
FatherEduSec -0.0888 (0.458) 0.0849 (0.628) -0.171 (0.654) 
MotherEduPrim 1.000** (0.501) 0.789 (0.712) 1.222* (0.699) 
MotherEduSec -0.852* (0.487) -0.285 (0.682) -1.386** (0.686) 
FatherEmptsta 1.503*** (0.576) 0.663 (0.784) 2.396*** (0.845) 
MotherEmptsta -0.101 (0.544) 0.423 (0.739) -0.616 (0.801) 
FatherHH 1.573** (0.787) -0.164 (1.132) 3.237*** (1.091) 
MotherHH -1.75*** (0.656) -1.219 (0.897) -2.343** (0.962) 
HeadAge -0.0317 (0.0596) 0.0403 (0.0857) -0.105 (0.0829) 
HeadAge2 -0.00023 (0.0006) -0.00076 (0.0008) 0.000309 (0.0008) 
MaleHead -0.171 (0.488) -0.0353 (0.700) -0.204 (0.680) 
HeadMar -0.99*** (0.342) -0.885* (0.464) -1.084** (0.502) 
NoChildren -0.198 (0.147) -0.384* (0.200) -0.00744 (0.212) 
Elders 1.136*** (0.400) 0.821 (0.560) 1.487*** (0.569) 
Ownland 0.00765 (0.273) 0.0137 (0.388) -0.0116 (0.383) 
Landsize 0.00163 (0.0011) 0.00132 (0.0009) 0.00478 (0.0051) 
Ownlivestock -1.28*** (0.296) -1.26*** (0.423) -1.262*** (0.414) 
HHsize 0.190* (0.0994) 0.317** (0.135) 0.0599 (0.145) 
RurUrb 0.803*** (0.310) 0.363 (0.443) 1.304*** (0.431) 
Remittance 2.549*** (0.518) 2.45*** (0.703) 2.631*** (0.766) 
AssetIndex -0.00657 (0.0685) -0.00969 (0.0977) -0.00670 (0.0955) 
LogExpCapita 0.536*** (0.175) 0.413* (0.250) 0.655*** (0.245) 
LogTotalEduexp -2.14*** (0.284) -1.51*** (0.402) -2.153*** (0.401) 













 Sample 20,906   10,896   10,210   




In terms of household characteristics, the marital status of the head and the household‟s 
ownership of livestock negatively influence the weekly hours of class attendance. The 
presence of elders (persons above 60 years) increases the hours of class attendance for the 
pooled sample (1.14 hours) and girls (1.49 hours), but it has no influence on boys. Also, the 
location of the household in an urban area and receipt of remittances are positively associated 
with children‟s hours of class attendance. Moreover, household income is positively 
associated with hours of class attendance though the magnitude of the effect is small. 
Additionally, schooling variables such as schooling expenditure and attendance of public 
school have a negative influence on hours of class attendance. Finally, controlling for 
community variables (table A10, appendix) give similar results to the above analysis, but 





Table 2.13 shows the marginal effect of the probit estimation of the effect of hours of child 
labour on educational attainment (SAGE). Column 1 shows the result for the overall sample, 
while columns 2 and 3 represent the results for boys and girls respectively.  
 
The coefficient of the „LogHoursCL‟ variable (log of hours of child labour) is significant and 
positive. This gives evidence to the fact that work has an adverse influence on a child‟s grade 
progression for the overall sample, boys and girls. The result indicates that an additional hour 
of work increases a working child‟s probability of falling behind in grade attainment by 1.4 
percentage points relative to a non-working child. The influence of hours of work on 
educational attainment is higher for boys than girls. It increases the probability of a boy 
falling behind in grade attainment by 1.6 percentage points and for girls the probability 
increases by 1.2 percentage points. This indicates that work not only reduces the number of 
hours that children spend in the classroom, but it also reduces their educational attainment in 
the long term. This result supports other studies on children from Bangladesh (Khanam and 




                                                          
11
 The SAGE value could be reflective of the parents‟ preferences or it could be the result of some factors that 
influenced the decision to send the child to school early in the years preceding 2012/13. However, there is no 
retrospective information in the dataset so the estimate of the association between child labour hours and SAGE 
could be biased if there were retrospective factors that influenced early or late school entry. 
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Table 2. 13 Effects of Child Labour on Educational Attainment (SAGE) 















LogHoursCL 0.0143*** (0.0042) 0.016*** (0.0053) 0.0121* (0.0065) 
Boy -0.00147 (0.0090) -      - -      - 
RelH -0.114*** (0.0152) -0.09*** (0.0211) -0.133*** (0.0214) 
Age 0.258*** (0.0106) 0.262*** (0.0147) 0.251*** (0.0153) 
Age2 -0.008*** (0.0005) 0.008*** (0.0006) -0.008*** (0.0006) 
ClassAtthrs -0.0012** (0.0005) -0.00089 (0.0007) -0.0015** (0.0007) 
TypeSch 0.0151 (0.0116) 0.0358** (0.0156) -0.00539 (0.0170) 
Scholarship -0.0801 (0.0590) -0.120 (0.0844) 0.0430 (0.0691) 
Classmisshrs 0.0020*** (0.0007) 0.00126 (0.0010) 0.003*** (0.0008) 
HomeworkhrsS 0.000724 (0.0019) 0.00277 (0.0034) -0.000797 (0.0023) 
FatherEduPrim 0.0795*** (0.0181) 0.076*** (0.0252) 0.088*** (0.0259) 
FatherEduSec -0.00693 (0.0171) 0.00416 (0.0242) -0.0145 (0.0239) 
MotherEduPrim 0.0311** (0.0143) 0.0428** (0.0205) 0.0171 (0.0198) 
MotherEduSec -0.053*** (0.0188) -0.0494* (0.0267) -0.0544** (0.0256) 
HeadAge -0.007*** (0.0023) -0.01*** (0.0033) -0.00511 (0.0032) 
HeadAge2 0.0064*** (0.0002) 0.001*** (0.0003) 0.00033 (0.0003) 
MaleHead -0.0261* (0.0149) -0.0242 (0.0205) -0.0279 (0.0213) 
HeadMar -0.0113 (0.0124) -0.00158 (0.0163) -0.0227 (0.0186) 
NoChildren 0.00444 (0.0049) 0.00351 (0.0069) 0.00655 (0.0067) 
Elders 0.00330 (0.0159) -0.0207 (0.0216) 0.0323 (0.0213) 
HHsize -0.00280 (0.0035) -0.0043 (0.0049) -0.00157 (0.0048) 
RurUrb -0.0163 (0.0109) -0.04*** (0.0150) 0.00963 (0.0158) 
AssetIndex -0.011*** (0.0024) -0.008** (0.0034) -0.015*** (0.0034) 
LogExpCapita -0.00356 (0.0064) -0.0159* (0.00898) 0.0106 (0.00911) 












 Sample 11,050   5,686   5,364   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similar to the class attendance results, there are other outcomes from these estimations that 
deserve special attention. For instance, sons and daughters of the household head are less 
likely to fall behind in grade attainment relative to non-children of the household head. Also, 
the probability of a child falling behind in grade attainment is positively associated with a 
child‟s age but this association becomes negative after a certain age as indicated by the 
significant and negative coefficient of the age square. In addition, children who attend school 
more (i.e. have more hours of class attendance) have lower probability of falling behind in 
grade progression than children who are irregular in school. Furthermore, boys‟ likelihood of 
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falling behind in grade attainment is 3.6 percentage points higher if they are enrolled in 
public schools. Parents‟ educations have negative association with children‟s probability of 
falling behind in school progression only if their educational level is above primary level. 
These results are consistent with the finding of Ray and Lancaster (2005). Households with 
older or male heads have a lower probability of their children falling behind in educational 
attainment, relative to those with young or female heads. This is true for the overall sample 
and boys, but not for girls. Furthermore, the location of a household in an urban area has 
negative association with boys‟ likelihood of falling behind in grade attainment, but it has no 
influence on girls.  
 
Finally, household wealth has positive association with the educational attainment of 
children. An increase in the wealth of a household negatively influences the probability of a 
child falling behind in educational progression. However, the income of the household has no 
influence on children‟s educational attainment. The findings on the importance of household 
wealth are inconsistent with Maitra (2003) and Amin et al. (2006) who found no relationship 
between educational attainment and income. Also, the results show that schooling 
expenditure has a positive influence on the educational attainment of girls.  
 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
This chapter sought to identify the main correlates of both extensive and intensive margins of 
child labour and schooling in Ghana, as well as examine the associated effect of work on 
children‟s educational attainment. Believing that the decision to participate in the labour 
market and/or school is a joint one, the chapter adopted a bivariate probit model in the 
estimation of the joint decision. Results from this estimation confirm expectations that these 
choices compete with each other. This chapter classified child work into child labour and 
hazardous work based on definitions contained in the 1998 Children‟s Act of Ghana. 
 
The result establishes that there is a gender gap in both child labour and school participation. 
Boys are more likely to enrol in schools relative to girls. The former is also less likely to 
participate in the labour market. This reflects cultural values in Ghana that consider boys as 
more „valuable‟ relative to girls. As such, parents place higher values on investment in boys‟ 
education relative to that of girls. Also, other child characteristics, such as age and 
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relationship to the household head, have great influence on the decision to send a child to 
school or work.  
 
Furthermore, parental education, household wealth and schooling cost are associated with 
parents‟ decision to send their children to school or work.  Educated parents are more likely 
to send their children to school instead of sending them to the labour market. Also, children 
from wealthier households are less likely to participate in child labour and more likely to be 
enrolled in school. However, the current income of the household does not influence the 
decision to send a child to work or school. Schooling expenditure and distance to the nearest 
school have a positive association with child labour participation, but they exert a negative 
influence on schooling. In rural areas, the wage rate for children in agriculture sector 
positively influences their participation in the labour market at the expense of schooling.   
 
Additionally, children‟s participation in hazardous works is influenced by similar factors with 
the exception of household income, a child‟s age and education of parents. Though a 
household‟s current income has no association with children‟s participation in child labour, it 
greatly influences their involvement in hazardous works. The probability of a child engaging 
in hazardous work decreases with household income. Also, the effect of parent‟s educational 
level on hazardous work is higher than its influence on child labour. Again, the likelihood 
that a child will engage in hazardous works increases at an increasing rate with his/her age. 
But, in the case of child labour, a child‟s probability of working increases with age to a point 
and declines afterwards. 
 
Though mere participation of children in the labour market (whether child labour or 
hazardous works) is bad, the intensity of the works they do determine the extent to which 
such works will affect their human capital development. Hence, factors influencing the 
intensive margin of child labour were also examined.  The study found that school enrolment 
and the hours of class attendance negatively influence the hours of work undertaken by 
children. The intensity of child labour is also positively associated with a child‟s age and his 
relationship with the household head. In terms of parent characteristics, the results show that 
children work for less hours when their parents have post-primary education.  
 
Additionally, the results on the intensive margin of child labour show that both household 
wealth and current income negatively influence the hours of child labour undertaken by 
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children. Thus, poverty is a key correlate of the intensity of works done by children. This is 
confirmed by the positive association between child wages and hours of child labour among 
children in rural areas. Furthermore, schooling cost and distance to the nearest school 
positively influence the intensity of work that children do. In the case of hours of hazardous 
works, in addition to the above factors, the receipt of remittance and land ownership reduce 
the number of hours in such works. 
 
In terms of the effect of child labour on education, the results from the estimations show that 
not only is hours of child labour detrimental to hours of class attendance, but it also increases 
the probability of a child falling behind in his/her educational attainment. An additional hour 
of child labour is associated with 0.15 hour (i.e. 9 minutes) reduction in the hours of class 
attendance. With respect to educational attainment, an extra hour of child labour is associated 
with 1.43 percentage points increase in the probability of a child falling behind in educational 
progression. The significant and negative coefficient of the rho (in the bivariate results) and 
hours of child labour (in the tobit results of class attendance) indicates that work has a 
detrimental effect on education. Also, the negative association between work and education is 
confirmed by the significant and positive coefficient of hours of child labour in the education 
attainment results.  
 
Overall, one important factor that influences both the extensive and intensive margins of 
child labour and hazardous works from the above results is household income or wealth. Not 
only is child labour prevalent in poor areas, but, also, there is a negative correlation between 
child labour participation and household income or wealth. Similarly, children‟s hours of 
work is negatively influenced by household income and wealth. In addition, children‟s 
agriculture wage exerts a positive effect on child work in rural areas. Thus, children are more 
likely to work, and for longer hours, when the wage rate is higher. These results support the 
traditional view that poverty is the main determinant of child labour (Basu and Van, 1998; 
Beegle et al., 2006; Duryea et al., 2007). Conversely, children tend to be enrolled in school 
and spend more hours in class when the household‟s income increases.  
 
The effect of income on child labour and schooling is investigated further in the next chapter 
(chapter three). The transfer of cash to poor households will not only enable them to afford 
schooling costs, but it will also enable them to buy nutritious foods for their children, thereby 
leading to better educational outcomes. In addition, if poverty propels households to send 
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their children to the labour market, then the transfer of cash to the poor will reduce the 
opportunity cost of schooling and, hence, reduce child labour. Lastly, an interesting result 
that came out of the above analysis is the influence of parents‟ characteristics on both child 
labour and schooling. It has been argued that parents have different preferences for child 
products. However, the realisation of an individual‟s preference depends on the level of 
bargaining power that he/she has in the household‟s decision making. Also, though the 
amount of economic resources available to households are important for child labour and 
schooling decisions, the bargaining power of each household‟s member is equally important 
since it determines resource allocation in the household. Therefore, chapter four of this thesis 































CHAPTER 3: Cash Transfer, Schooling and Child Labour: The 
Case of the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
Programme in Ghana 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Cash transfer schemes have become important policy tools for poverty alleviation and human 
capital development in developing countries. These schemes cover about 150 million 
households in poor countries and benefit around half a billion people (Barrientos and Hulme 
2009).  Under these schemes, eligible household members who are usually poor are provided 
with periodic cash payment with conditions that they must adhere to (conditional cash 
transfer) or without conditions (unconditional cash transfer). Most cash transfer schemes that 
aim to build the human capital of beneficiaries usually have substantial schooling conditions 
that ensure that parents send their children to school and, by extension, do not involve them 
in the labour market (Fiszbein et al., 2009).  
 
Cash transfer schemes are new in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to Latin American 
countries. However, they are spreading rapidly in the sub-region with over 30 countries 
implementing such schemes in Africa as of 2009 (Miller, 2009). The rapid expansion of cash 
transfer programmes in Africa may be attributed to the positive results on education and 
health outcomes achieved by earlier schemes in Latin American countries (Saavedra and 
Garcia, 2012). However, the question that needs to be answered is whether countries in SSA 
can use cash transfer programmes to achieve similar positive results in human capital 
development as observed elsewhere in the literature. This chapter answers this question by 
examining the impact of a cash transfer scheme on educational outcomes and child labour in 
Ghana.  
 
Ghana is one of the countries in SSA with relatively high child labour participation rate. 
According to the most recent Ghana Living Standard Survey Report (2014), 31 percent of 
children aged 5-17 years are involved in economic activity
12
. In addition, 22 percent of 
children in the country are child labourers, while 14.2 percent of the country‟s children are in 
hazardous works (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a). In terms of education, Ghana has seen 
                                                          
12
 Not all works performed by children are considered child labour. Child labour includes works harmful to the 
schooling, health and development of a child. 
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some improvements, particularly at the primary level, where Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) 
has increased from 95 percent in 2007/2008 to 110.4 percent in 2014/2015 academic years 
(Ministry of Education, 2016). In spite of these achievements in the educational sector, the 
country has relatively lower Net Enrolment Rates, higher repetition rate and lower test scores 
(Ministry of Education, 2016; Education Assessment Report, 2016). 
 
One of the main factors linked to child labour and lower school outcomes in Ghana is poverty 
(Canagarajah and Nielsen, 2001; Blunch and Verner, 2000; Ray, 2000; Osei et al., 2009). In 
recognition of this, the country introduced a cash transfer scheme called Livelihood 
Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme in 2008, where child labour participation 
rates are considered in the selection of beneficiary communities. Also, beneficiary 
households are expected to adhere to certain behavioural changes
13
 including sending their 
children to school and elimination of the worst form of child labour. Provision of cash to poor 
households augments their incomes and enables them to afford schooling expenditure; hence, 
it may reduce child labour and increase schooling as evident in certain Latin American 
countries. However, as noted by Kakwani et al. (2005), the success of Conditional Cash 
Transfer (CCT) programmes in Latin American countries does not guarantee their success in 
other countries. 
 
This chapter examines the success of a cash transfer programme with respect to human 
capital development in Ghana. Specifically, it seeks to answer the following questions: Does 
the transfer of cash to the poor improve educational outcomes? Will the transfer reduce child 
labour?  Also, what is the effect of this cash transfer on children who are already in the labour 
market and/or enrolled in schools? And, does this transfer impact on short term educational 
outcomes such as repetition and test scores? Finally, is there substantial heterogeneity in the 
effects of this scheme? 
 
Although, numerous evaluation studies have been carried out on CCT programmes, most of 
them are found in Latin American countries with limited research in SSA. Considering the 
rapid expansion of CCT programmes in SSA, there is the need for vigorous evaluation 
studies on these schemes to ascertain their effectiveness in achieving their goals. In addition, 
drawing primarily from experience in Latin America, existing studies (Parker and Skoufias, 
                                                          
13
 These apply to certain beneficiaries as discussed in section 3. 
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2000; Maluccio and Flores, 2004; Olinto and de Souza, 2005) usually examine the impact of 
cash transfer schemes on whether children participate in the labour market or not (extensive 
margin of child labour). These studies often fail to investigate the extent to which these 
schemes impact on the duration (intensive margin) of child work (Gee, 2010). This chapter, 
therefore, contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the effectiveness of CCT 
programmes in reducing the intensity of work done by child labourers. 
 
Furthermore, there is limited studies on CCT and other educational outcomes such as test 
scores (Ponce and Bedi, 2008) as most studies on CCT and schooling have concentrated on 
school enrolment and attendance. While enrolment and attendance are the first steps required 
to ensure a higher level of educational attainment and achievement, focusing on such 
indicators may not be enough to capture the human capital development aspect of such 
programmes. This is particularly the case in SSA where majority of the child labourers 
combine work and school; though such children are more likely to leave school early (Basu 
and Van, 1998). In addition, for CCT programmes with schooling conditions, parents may 
enrol their children in school just to meet these conditions and send the children to the labour 
market after school. Therefore, it is important to examine whether such programmes also 
impact positively on educational outcomes such as repetition and test scores (cognitive 
ability).  
 
In addition, this study will assist policy makers to improve upon the design of the LEAP 
scheme for expansion. Ghana‟s LEAP programme, like most cash transfer programmes in 
SSA countries, is currently being implemented in only 185 districts out of 216 districts in the 
country; and scaling up of the programme to other districts is on-going. This study will 
enable policy makers to know whether the programme is achieving its objective or not. One 
of the goals of the LEAP programme is human capital development of beneficiaries. The 
scheme‟s impact on educational outcomes and child labour are very important for the 
attainment of this goal.  
 
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on a longitudinal LEAP dataset collected by 
the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) of University of Ghana 
and University of North Carolina, with support from Yale University. This data is non-
experimental, so in order to overcome the problem of a counterfactual group and attribute 
changes in child welfare outcomes to the LEAP programme alone, three alternative quasi-
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experimental methods are used in this chapter. In particular, propensity score matching 
(PSM), difference-in-difference (DD) and difference-in difference combined with matching 
(MDD) estimation techniques are used. However, discussion of the results is based on the 
MDD estimation method since it is best among these three. This is because the matching 
procedure provide a better „control‟ group that are similar to the LEAP recipients in their 
observable traits, while the difference-in-difference method addresses differences in 
unobservable characteristics. This approach makes it possible to control for bias resulting 
from both observable and unobservable factors associated with the selection of participants 
into the LEAP programme.  
 
In addition, the chapter examines heterogeneity in the effects of the LEAP programme by 
splitting the sample into various groups. Theoretical models and empirical findings seem to 
suggest that children tend to benefit more when resources are in the hand of their mothers 
relative to their fathers (Basu, 2006; Doss, 1996). Hence, for the impact of the LEAP on child 
labour in farming, the sample is split into two groups based on the gender of the household 
head. The LEAP programme is targeted at the poor. However, some of these households are 
poorer than others. Hence, the sample is divided into two income groups (extremely poor and 
non-extremely poor households) to access the impact of the LEAP on child labour among 
different income groups of beneficiaries. In terms of the effect of the scheme on educational 
outcomes, the sample is disaggregated by the gender and age of the children. 
 
The results show that the LEAP programme had no effect on school enrolment rates in the 
overall sample and all subsamples except boys and older children aged 13-17 years. The 
programme has a positive impact on school enrolment rate of boys and older children. 
Furthermore, the LEAP programme increased weekly hours of class attendance and reduced 
repetition rates among children aged 5-17 years. Again, the study finds no effect on test 
scores (cognitive achievement). In terms of child labour in farming, the results show that the 
LEAP programme has no impact on extensive margin of child labour (that is participation in 
farming activities) for the overall sample and all sub-samples except in female headed 
households. However, for working children, the LEAP reduced their working hours in 
farming in the overall sample and all sub-samples, except children in non-extremely poor 
households. Lastly, for child labour in non-farm enterprises, there is no significant difference 
in the probability of participation in child labour or hours of work among children in 
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households that benefited from the LEAP programme and their counterparts in the control 
group. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. This introduction section is followed by a 
review of the literature on CCT, educational outcomes and child labour in section two. 
Section three presents a detail description of the LEAP programme in Ghana. This is 
followed by the empirical methodology in section four. Analysis of the results follows in 




3.2  Literature Review 
This section reviews various empirical studies on the impacts of CCT programmes on 
educational outcomes and child labour. It begins with a review of the theoretical channels 




Theoretically, the impact of a cash transfer scheme on investment in human capital can be 
analysed through its income and substitution effects (Kabeer et al., 2012). Considering 
schooling as a normal good, the income effect implies that the increase in household‟s 
income due to the cash transfer increases the demand for schooling. Thus, cash transfer may 
enable poor households that could not invest in their children‟s education previously due to 
poverty and/or credit constraints to do so. By the income effect, households are able to pay 
for school expenses and provide their children with school materials, which may lead to 
increase in school participation. On the other hand, cash transfer reduces the opportunity cost 
of schooling (that is the income from child labour). This result in a shift from labour market 
participation to schooling and this is known as the substitution effect. With the substitution 
effect, cash transfer reduces households‟ valuation of the income from child labour and, as 
such, they may substitute child labour for schooling. 
 
In the case of conditional cash transfer, there is another form of substitution effect with 
respect to investment in human capital. This occurs because of the imposition of conditions. 
The attachment of conditions to these transfers increases the opportunity costs of failing to 
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adhere to the conditions and losing the transfer. Hence, beneficiaries substitute other 
investment spending for investment in human capital. The magnitude of the effect of CCTs 
on school participation (enrolment and attendance), therefore, is the net result of the income 
and substitution effects of the transfer. Hence, the relationship between CCT and school 
participation is expected to be positive (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).  However, the effect of 
CCT on child labour is not straightforward, since an increase in school participation may not 
translate into reduction in child labour. This is particularly the case in most SSA countries 
where most child labourers combine work with school. As noted by De Hoop and Rosati 
(2013), cash transfer can have an ambiguous effect on child labour theoretically as the cash 
transfer may empower poor households who were unemployed previously to engage in 
businesses which may require the use of child labourers. 
 
The impact of CCT programmes on students‟ educational performance (that is repetition rate 
and test scores) is also ambiguous theoretically. This is because there are several channels 
through which CCT can affect educational performance. On one hand, CCT programmes may 
exert a positive impact on educational performance because they increase school attendance; 
and this is likely to lead to higher test scores (Bedi and Marshall, 1999 and 2002). In addition, 
CCT programmes may increase the consumption of nutritious food and school supply (Baez 
and Camacho, 2011). Better nutrition and provision of school supply may in turn translate 
into better educational performance (Ponce and Bedi, 2008). Also, CCT programmes may 
result in reduction in child labour (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003; Caldés et al., 2006; Villatoro, 
2005). This may in turn exert a positive effect on educational performance (that is reduction 
in repetition and increase in test score).  
 
On the other hand, a CCT programme may have adverse effects on educational performance. 
Increases in school enrolment as a result of the CCT programme may translate into congested 
classrooms, which in turn may negatively affect education performance given a constant 
supply of schooling inputs (Ponce and Bedi, 2008). In addition, children from poor 
households that are brought into the educational system by the programme may have lower 
expected returns from schooling than those already in schools. With lower expected returns 
from schooling, this group will learn less; and this may reduce the average educational 
performance (Filmer and Schady, 2009). Hence, theoretically, the impact of CCT on test 
scores and repetition is not straightforward. Whether the positive aspects of CCT 
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programmes will outweigh the negative effects due to the same schemes is an empirical 
question. 
 
Review of Empirical Studies 
There are numerous studies on the impacts of CCTs on school enrolment and to a lesser 
extent school attendance, especially in Latin American countries. As stated earlier, most 
studies focus on the casual effect of CCT programmes on school enrolment as measured by 
whether the child is registered in school or not. Only a few studies examine school 
attendance, which is the number of hours in a day, or days in a week, that the child goes to 
school. Reviews of empirical literature on CCT and education programmes show that, on the 
whole, CCT may impact positively on school participation (IEG, 2011; Fiszbein and Schady, 
2009; Rawlings and Rubio, 2005). However, these reviews also indicate that there is 
substantial variation in the size of the effect of CCT programmes on schooling among 
countries; and among different groups within countries (Saavedra and Garcia, 2012). 
 
One of the earliest CCT programme is the Mexican Progresa (now called Oportunidades). 
This programme has been studied widely. Parker and Skoufias (2000) evaluated this 
programme using a cluster randomised method and found that the offer of a Progresa subsidy 
lowered by approximately 3.1 percentage points the probability that boys aged 8-17 will 
work; and for girls of the same age range, their likelihood of working is reduced by 1.2 
percentage points. However, the programme had no effect on the children who were already 
working. Behrman, Parker and Todd (2011) examine the long run impact of this same 
Oportunidades and discuss whether these estimates differ from the short run estimates (i.e. 
whether the impact of the programme changes over time). Their propensity score estimates 
suggest that the probability that boys who were 14-16 years old in 2003 (5.5 years after the 
programme was first implemented) work is 14 percentage points lower in Oportunidades 
villages than in communities that had never benefited from the scheme. They found no 
evidence that work participation changed for girls in this age group. The reduction in work by 
boys in the long run is stronger than the modest impact in the short run found by Skoufias and 
Parker (2000). This suggests that the beneficial impact of the Mexican conditional cash 




In terms of the impact of the Mexican Progresa on schooling, numerous studies have been 
carried out. For instance, Behrman et al. (2010) study the short-term effects of this scheme on 
urban children with the Urban Evaluation Survey, which is longitudinal in nature. The 
baseline data was gathered in the fall of 2002 prior to beneficiary households receiving the 
programme‟s benefits. Two rounds of surveys were conducted post-programme initiation in 
2003 and 2004. In all rounds, data were gathered on households living in both intervention 
and non-intervention areas. They employed a difference-in-difference method combined with 
the propensity score matching method for their estimation. The results show a statistically 
significant positive effect of the programme on school enrolment, school attainment, time 
devoted to homework and the probability that parents assist their children with homework.  
 
Behrman et al.‟s (2010) results were confirmed by Dubios et al. (2012) on the same Mexican 
Progresa (Oportunidades). However, in addition to school enrolment, Dubios et al. (2012) 
also examined the effect of the programme on performance in passing grades. They used a 
randomized experiment implemented under the Progresa programme to collect data for the 
study. The data consists of a sample of 506 communities (with 320 and 186 communities in 
treatment and control group respectively) interviewed in 1997 and 1998.They found that the 
programme had a positive impact on school enrolment at all grade levels. However, in terms 
of school performance, it had a positive impact at the primary school level, but a negative 
impact at the secondary level. The authors suggested that the negative impact of the 
programme on school performance at the secondary level may be due to the disincentives 
created by termination of the programme‟s benefits after the third year of secondary school.  
 
Brazil is also one of the pioneers of CCT programmes in Latin America. It implemented two 
main schemes – the Programa de Erradicacao de Trabalho Infantil (PETI) and Bolsa Escola. 
These two programmes are similar as they provide cash transfers to households conditioned 
on school participation. Yap et al. (2002) investigated the impact of the PETI programme on 
schooling, labour market participation, hours worked, academic progress and dangerous 
work. They relied on experimental design for the data collection in 1999 among six 
communities. Three of these municipalities were in the PETI programme, while the 
remaining three municipalities have similar socioeconomic status as the former, but were not 
in the PETI programme and served as a control group. In all, 2,864 households with 5,611 
children aged 7-14 years were drawn randomly for the analysis. Their results show that the 
PETI programme increased hours in school by 11-17 hours. In addition, the PETI programme 
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had a positive and significant effect on grade-for-age for participating children in all three 
states. In terms of child labour, the probability of working dropped by 5-18 percentage points 
in the three treated communities; while the probability of working at least 10 hours reduced 
by 5-9 percentage points for children in the programme. These results were confirmed by 
Pianto and Soares (2003) on the same PETI scheme. 
 
With respect to Brazil‟s „Bolsa Escola‟ programme, various studies have examined the effect 
of the programme on human capital development indicators such as schooling outcomes and 
child labour. One of such studies was conducted by Cardoso and Souza in 2004. Using 
household level data from the 2000 Census, they adopted PSM estimation. After using this 
method to balance the observed covariates between the treatment group and a comparison 
group, they find that the programme had no significant effect on child labour, but a positive 
and significant impact on school attendance. The authors attributed this result to the fact that 
households may prefer their children to combine school and work since the transfers are too 
small to serve as an incentive for them to forgo working. 
 
In addition to Mexico and Brazil, CCT programmes in other Latin American countries have 
also been studied. For instance, the Costa Rica‟s Superémonos was studied by Duryea and 
Morrison (2004). Superémonos is a conditional transfer programme that provides poor 
families with a subsidy for the purchase of food conditional on regular school attendance by 
children. They used a survey conducted in 2001 which consists of 746 participating families 
and 1,042 non-participating families to analyse the effect of the scheme on child labour, 
school attendance and school performance. They adopted the „propensity score matching‟ 
technique to compare the outcomes of the programme between participants and non-
participants. The results showed that the Superémonos programme has a statistically 
significant impact on school attendance in 2001, with an increase in the probability of school 
participation of five percentage points. However, there were no significant effects on the 
probability of passing a grade and working. For the 2002 school year, there was 8.7 percent 
statistically significant increase in the probability of attending school, but no impact on the 
probability of working in the week prior to the survey. 
 
Also, Maluccio and Flore (2004) studied the Nicaraguan‟s Red de Protección Social (RPS),  
which aims at supplementing households‟ income to increase household expenditures on 
food, reduce primary school desertion, and improve the health care and nutritional status of 
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children under age five. Their study was based on a randomisation of this community-based 
intervention with measurements before and after the intervention. The data collected for the 
evaluation were from an annual household panel data survey implemented in both 
intervention and control areas of RPS before the start of the programme in 2000; and in 2001 
and 2002 after implementation of the programme. In all, 42 households were randomly 
selected in each comarca (region) using a census carried out by RPS with a sample of 1,764 
households. They found that the RPS induced a significant average net increase in school 
enrolment of 17.7 percentage points for the target population of children aged 7-13 years who 
had not yet completed the fourth grade of primary school. In addition, it resulted in 23 
percentage points increase in hours of school attendance for children of the same age group. 
Also, overall, the programme had significant improvement in the average retention rate or 
continuation rate of 6.5 percent. Finally, the result showed that the percentage of children 
working was lower after the implementation of the programme, though the difference 
between the participants and non-participants was not statistically significant.  
 
Furthermore, Filmer and Schady (2009) analysed the effects of a CCT programme in 
Cambodia, known as the CESSP Scholarship Programme (CSP), which gives scholarships to 
poor children for the three years of the lower secondary school cycle. The main data for this 
study came from a household survey of 3,225 randomly selected applicants out of 26,537 
scholarship applicants. The data was collected approximately 18 months after the children 
filled out the application forms (that is in 2006). Using the regression discontinuity (RD) 
estimation method, the paper estimates the impact of the CSP on school enrolment and 
attendance, as well as test scores. The results show that the programme had a large effect on 
school enrolment and attendance, which increased by approximately 25 percentage points. 
However, there was no evidence that, 18 months after the scholarships were awarded, the 
recipient children did any better on mathematics and vocabulary tests, than they would have 
in the absence of the programme. They suggested that the CSP programme had no effect on 
test scores because of „self-selection‟ into schools based on expected gains. Thus, the 
children brought into schools by the CSP programme may be drawn disproportionately from 
the left-hand side of the ability distribution (that is low ability children). This could limit the 
extent to which additional schooling translates into more learning and better test scores. 
 
In Africa, one of the earliest cash transfer schemes is South Africa‟s Child Support Grant 
(CSG). This was evaluated by UNICEF (2012) with non-experimental approaches since there 
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is no practical or legal scope for random allocation of grants in South Africa. Using 
propensity score matching, the study examined how duration in the CSG programme affects 
grade attainment, scores on mathematical ability tests and scores on reading and vocabulary 
tests for children who were 10 years old at the time of the survey. The results indicated that 
children who were enrolled in the CSG at birth completed significantly more grades of 
schooling than children who were enrolled at age six.  Also, the receipt of the CSG by the 
household reduced adolescent absences from school, particularly for male adolescents. In 
addition, early receipt of the CSG (in the first seven years of life) reduced the likelihood that 
children will grow up into adolescents who will work outside the home particularly girls.  
 
Ward et al. (2010) studied the impact of Kenya‟s Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children (CT-OVC) programme on various indicators including schooling. Baseline and 
follow-up surveys were conducted in 2007 and 2009 in two locations that were randomly 
selected to benefit from the intervention, and two locations selected to act as controls. In all, a 
total of 2,255 households were interviewed at baseline and again at follow-up. The authors 
did not find evidence of increased enrolment or attendance in basic schools, but the 
programme increased enrolment among the youngest children. In addition, the programme 
had a positive impact on secondary school enrolment in older children, with an increase of six 
to seven percentage points in treated areas relative to the control areas. Using the same 
dataset, De Hoop et al. (2014) examined the impact of this scheme on children‟s activities. 
They found that the programme did not have a statistically significant effect on school 
participation of children from beneficiary households, but it lowered these children‟s 
participation in work for pay and work without pay (household chores). This finding contrasts 
with Ward et al.‟s (2010) study, which found increases in school participation as a result of 
Kenya‟s programme. Asfaw et al. (2012) also used difference-in-difference method and 
found that Kenya‟s cash transfer programme had no impact on children‟s involvement in 
wage employment, but it reduced boys‟ (age 10-15 years) work on family farms. 
 
Malawi launched its Mchinji Social Cash Transfer in 2006 as a major poverty reduction tool 
in the country‟s National Social Protection Policy. Miller et al. (2008) examined the impact 
of this programme on households and individual welfare indicators including education and 
work. Data collection for this study occurred between March 2007 and April 2008. It 
consisted of three rounds of data collection (that is at baseline in March 2007, mid-term in 
September 2007 and final one in April 2008) on intervention and control households. In all, 
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about 819 households were surveyed for the study from eight Village Development 
Communities (that is 408 recipients and 411 non-recipients households). The results showed 
that children in the intervention households experienced improvements in school enrolment 
and class attendance, as well as, increased in schooling expenditure; but the scheme had no 
effect on the number of days that children were absent from school in the month prior to the 
survey. In terms of child work, fewer intervention children did chores or caregiving at 
someone else‟s home versus comparison children; but more intervention children did other 
family work, such as selling goods. Also, other studies on this programme gave evidence of 
reduction in child labour outside the household, but an increase in children involvement in 
tasks within the household (Covarrubias et al., 2012). 
 
In recent years, there has been a rise in studies on various pilot cash transfer schemes in SSA. 
These include studies on Zambia, Tanzania and Lesotho. In Zambia, the government began 
an implementation of a Child Grant Programme (CGP) in three districts (in Kaputa, Kalabo, 
and Shangombo) in 2010; and contracted the American Institutes for Research (AIR) to 
evaluate the programme in 2014. Using a Randomized Control Trial (RCT), the survey 
includes 2,421 households in 90 Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) that 
were randomly assigned to treatment or control groups. These households were interviewed 
in 2010 and follow-up data collection occurred in 2014 (that is 48 months after the baseline 
survey). Overall, the results after 4 years of the programme show that the programme had no 
impacts on school enrolment and attendance of children in the age groups 4–7, 8–10 and 15–
17 years. However, it increased school enrolment of children 11–14 years by 5.6 percentage 
points. In terms of child labour, the programme had no effect on both children‟s participation 
in the labour market and number of hours they spend in unpaid/paid works (American 
Institutes for Research, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, Evans et al. (2014) studied a community based Conditional Cash Transfers in 
Tanzania based on randomised trial. This programme provides a cash stipend to households 
conditional on them satisfying basic conditions, including health clinic visits for children age 
0-5 and for elderly age 60 and over; and school enrolment and attendance for children age 7-
15. The data collection involved randomisation of 80 communities into treatment and control 
groups. A household survey was carried out at baseline (in late 2009) and midline (in mid-
2011) among households in both groups. The overall dataset included information from 1,764 
households (6,924 individuals) surveyed at the baseline and 1,758 households (7.036 
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individuals) surveyed at the midline (at mid-2011). They found that the programme improved 
literacy, school enrolment, and grade progression, although it did not improve the frequency 
of school attendance. 
 
Lastly, Pellerano et al. (2014) evaluated Lesotho‟s Child Grant Programme (CGP). The CGP 
is an unconditional social cash transfer targeted at poor and vulnerable households. The 
programme provides a regular quarterly transfer to poor households whose children are 
selected through a combination of Proxy Means Testing (PMT) and community validation. 
The main data for the study is a longitudinal data collected in 2011 and 2013 among a 
representative sample of CGP recipients (treatment group) with a control group (that is 
similar households and children who do not benefit from the programme). Using Difference-
in-Differences estimation strategy, their results indicate that the programme had a positive 
effect on children‟s enrolment in school of about 5 percentage points. Also, the CGP 
positively contributed to retention of children aged 13-17 years in primary school, 
particularly boys who would have otherwise dropped out. However, the programme did not 
have any noticeable impact on other important dimensions of school progression, such as 
early enrolment, repetition, primary school completion and enrolment in secondary. 
 
The above empirical studies show that though Cash Transfer affects both the incidence 
(participation decision) and duration (hours work) of child labour, most studies focus on child 
labour participation. Examining the effects of cash transfers on participation in the labour 
market alone may not give an accurate result of the impacts of such schemes in Ghana, since 
most child labourers combine work and school (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1998). Thus, 
children may not stop working because of the cash transfer, but rather they may work for 
fewer hours as the households can now afford to hire outside labourers. Also, no study has 
examined the impact of Ghana‟s LEAP programme on child labour to the best of my 
knowledge. However, with respect to the impact of the LEAP programme on schooling 
outcomes, this paper is to some extent similar to de Groot et al (2015). These authors 
examined that impact of the LEAP programme on school enrolment and missed school days. 
This paper extends the literature on the impact of LEAP on schooling outcomes by examining 





. In addition, there is little evidence on the impact of CCT on school performance 
and the development of children‟s cognitive abilities (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).  Though 
few studies have examined CCT programmes‟ impact on tests administered at school, such 
studies may suffer from selection bias, since the programmes may lead to the enrolment of 
lower ability children who were not in school initially. Due to the selection bias associated 
with school-based test, this chapter examines the impacts of the LEAP programme on a 
home-based test. 
  
3.3.  Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) Programme 
The Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme is part of Ghana‟s 
National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS). Though the incidence of extreme poverty in 
Ghana has been halved from 16.5 percent (2005/06) to 8.4 peercent (2012/13), the country 
still faces high income inequality with a Gini-coefficient of 42.3 percent in 2013 (GSS, 
2013). This high income inequality necessitated the formulation of the National Social 
Protection Strategy (NSPS). The NSPS facilitates the provision of the various social 
protection interventions, with the aim of protecting the right of the extremely poor and 
vulnerable, thereby ensuring that they have decent lives.  The aims of the LEAP programme 
are alleviation of short-term poverty and the development of the human capital of beneficiary 
members in the long term. The programme was piloted in late 2008 with about 1,654 
households in 21 districts and it was expanded in both 2009 and 2010. As of 2015 there were 
522,000 beneficiaries from 4,074 communities in 116 districts (Ministry of Gender, Children 
and Social Protection, 2016). 
 
Selection of LEAP Beneficiary Households 
The LEAP programme is targeted at households that fall below a specific poverty line
15
 and, 
in addition, have a member who fall into one of these three main demographic characteristics: 
a single parent with orphans and vulnerable child (OVC); a poor elderly person (over 65 
years); or someone with severe disability. Selections of households followed three processes. 
The first process involves the selection of the poorest districts using poverty indicators in the 
various districts. The selected districts then form District LEAP Implementation committees 
(DLICs), who then select communities from the districts to benefit from the LEAP. The 
                                                          
14
 While this paper defines enrolment as dummy variable which is 1 if a child was enrolled in school in the 
previous year and he/she is still in school, and 0 otherwise; De Groot et al, (2015) defined enrolment as 1 if a 
child is currently enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. 
15
 They use the extreme poverty line existing in the country at the time of selection into the LEAP scheme. 
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selection of the communities takes into account the prevalence of health conditions (such as 
the incidence of guinea worm, buruli ulcer and HIV/AIDS), National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) registration level, availability and access to quality social services, 
prevalence of child labour and child trafficking as well as the geographical isolation of the 
community. However, there is no consistent weighting of these factors in the selection 
process. 
 
Community LEAP Implementation Committees (CLICs) are then formed in the selected 
communities to identify eligible households based on the three criteria. The selected 
beneficiaries and methodology for the selection of beneficiary households are then presented 
by the CLIC to the community members so that they can make suggestions on the inclusion 
or exclusion of certain households. The eligibility criteria for selection of beneficiaries are 
clearly stated in the LEAP operational manual and these criteria must be explained to 
recipients; however, it has been found that they are not well communicated to the 
beneficiaries (Park et al., 2012). 
 
Benefits Under the LEAP Programme 
Beneficiary members of the selected households are registered freely on the National Health 
Insurance Scheme. In addition, beneficiary households received a monthly cash transfer 
which ranged between GH¢8 and GH¢15 ($5.7-$10.7)
16
 in 2010. This was increased to 
GH¢24 and GH¢45 (US$13.3 – US$25)
17
 in 2012; but the exact amount receive by a 
household depends on the number of household members that fall into the three demographic 
characteristics specified above. As  of 2015
18
, a household with one, two, three and four or 
more members that fall in any of the three demographic characteristics get GH¢64 ($16.8), 
GH¢76($20), GH¢88($23.2) and GH¢106($27.9) respectively. The cash increment over time 
may be partly due to conclusion reached by some studies that the amount is too small 
(Daidone and Davis, 2013).  
 
Conditions of the LEAP Programme 
The LEAP programme is unconditional for elderly persons over 65 years and persons with 
extreme disability, though continuous receipt of the cash depends on having a health 
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 Using the exchange rate of GH¢1.4to US$1 as at 31/12/2010 from Bank of Ghana 
17
 Using the exchange rate of GH¢2 to US$1 as at 31/12/2012 from Bank of Ghana 
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insurance card (Handa et al., 2014). However, for single parents who take care of orphans 
and vulnerable children, they must adhere to these behavioural conditions: 
 Enrolment and retention of all school age children in school 
 Birth registration of new-born babies and their attendance at postnatal clinics 
 Full vaccination of children up to the age of five 
 Non-trafficking of children and their non-participation in the worst forms of child 
labour 
The CLIC is responsible for the monitoring of households to ensure that they adhere to these 
conditions. However, the effectiveness of this monitoring is in doubt, since some of the 
beneficiaries are also part of the CLIC (Daidone and Davis, 2013). Also, most of the 
beneficiaries are not even aware of the existence of these conditions (Park et al., 2012). 
 
 
3.4.  Methodology 
3.4.1  Data 
This study uses the LEAP programme evaluation dataset which was collected by the Institute 
of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) of the University of Ghana in 
collaboration with the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Baseline information on 
699 future LEAP beneficiary households from the Brong-Ahafo, Central and Volta regions of 
Ghana were collected as part of a nation-wide representative household survey conducted in 
2010.  This nation-wide survey consists of 5,009 households (excluding the 699 future LEAP 
beneficiaries); 3,136 of these households were located in rural areas with the remaining found 
in the urban centres.  
 
From these 3,136 rural households, those located in districts and communities close to the 
future LEAP beneficiary households were selected as „potential‟ control group. This selection 
process involved the dropping of households from the Upper East, Upper West and the 
Northern regions. A total of 914 households were selected as control group
19
. Hence, the 
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 The selection of the control group at baseline year was done using PSM and it consisted of 699 households 
but 215 households were added to this group to increase the sample (for the control group to be 914 (699+215)) 
and the statistical power. The loss of households during the follow-up survey and the addition of the 215 
households may have resulted in the statistically significant differences between the treated (LEAP) and control 
(Non-LEAP) groups, hence the uses of matching combined with difference-in-difference estimation strategy in 
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baseline data (the survey in 2010) consists of 699 future LEAP beneficiaries (treatment 
group) and 914 Non-LEAP households (control group). A follow up survey was conducted 
among the LEAP beneficiaries and the control households two years after the implementation 
of the programme (in 2012). In all, a total of 1,504 of these households were re-interviewed 
with an attrition rate of about eight percent. Hence, the panel data for this study consists of 
646 treated and 858 control households (excluding attrition). Table 3.1 shows the sample 
distribution of the data for this study. 
 
From table 3.1, a total of 2,139 children (persons less than 18 years) were interviewed in 
2010. This comprises of 935 and 1,204 children from LEAP and Non-LEAP households 
respectively. The number of children interviewed two years after the implementation of the 
LEAP programme was 1,945, with 869 and 1076 from LEAP and Non-LEAP households 
respectively. With respect to child labour in farming, the focus is on households that farmed. 
From table 3.1, out of the total household interviewed in 2010, 946 of them farmed in that 
period and this increased to 953 households in 2012. Also, the sample size for examining the 
effect of the LEAP programme on child labour in non-farm enterprises consists of children in 
households with such enterprises. There were 769 and 684 children in these households in 
2010 and 2012 respectively. 
 
Table 3. 1 Sample Size of the LEAP Data 
  Baseline (2010) Post-LEAP (2012) 
  LEAP Non-LEAP Total  LEAP Non-LEAP Total 
Households 646 858 1,504 646 858 1,504 
 
      
Children (5-17 Years) 935 1204 2,139 869 1076 1,945 
 
      
Farming Households 604 342 946 629 324 953 
 
      
Households with Non-farm Enterprises 256 190 446 291 192 484 
 
      
Children in households with non-farm 
business 
426 343 769 383 301 684 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
this paper. Attrition in the sample was not systematic and it has been found to have no effect on the internal 
validity of the results (Handa et al., 2014). 
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3.4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
This section looks at the descriptive statistics of the overall sample, followed by 
characteristics of farming households, as well as summary statistics of households with non-
farm enterprises.  
 
 
Households and Children Characteristics 
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample (LEAP and Non-LEAP 
households). Table 3.2 shows that households‟ heads in the LEAP group are different from 
those in Non-LEAP group. This is evident by the statistically significant difference in all the 
baseline (pre-LEAP) characteristics of the households‟ heads (age, sex, marital status, and 
years of schooling) of the two groups. The average age of a household head is 56 years and 
60 years respectively for Non-LEAP and LEAP households. In addition, approximately 50 
percent of Non-LEAP and 41 percent of LEAP households are headed by men. In terms of 
marital status, whereas married Non-LEAP households‟ heads constitute 44 percent, roughly 
37 percent of LEAP households‟ heads were married.  Lastly, household heads belonging to 
the Non-LEAP category has more years of schooling (approximately 4years) relative to 
LEAP households heads (approximately 2years). The trend is not different for post-LEAP 
period.  
 
In terms of household demographics, statistically there is a difference only in the presence of 
orphans and widows in the household between Non-LEAP and LEAP groups at baseline. The 
percentage of households with orphans increased in both Non-LEAP (3 percent) and LEAP 
groups (44 percent) in 2012. In addition, whereas the proportion of Non-LEAP and LEAP 
households with widows were approximately 31 percent and 51 percent respectively at 
baseline, it increased to 33 percent and 55 percent respectively during the follow up in 2012. 
The high proportion of LEAP households with orphans is not surprisingly since the presence 
of an orphan in a household is one of the eligibility criteria for selection into the LEAP 
programme. Furthermore, for both periods (2010 and 2012), there are four members in a 
household on average for both Non-LEAP and LEAP households, with the average number 






Table 3. 2 Mean Characteristics of LEAP and Non-LEAP Households 
  Baseline (2010) Post-LEAP (2012) 
  
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
Head Characteristics             
Head Age 56.46 60.14 -3.66** 57.92 62.68 -4.76** 
 
(0.620) (0.751) (0.967) (0.624) (0.767) (0.980) 
Male Head 0.495 0.413 0.082** 0.477 0.395 0.082** 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) 
Head Marital Status 0.440 0.374 0.066** 0.451 0.345 0.106** 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) 
Years of Schooling 4.389 2.286 2.103** 4.381 2.649 1.732** 
  (0.170) (0.157) (0.238) (0.172) (0.173) (0.248) 
Demographics             
Household Size 3.828 3.938 -0.110 4.266 4.490 -0.224 
 
(0.083) (0.099) (0.128) (0.089) (0.108) (0.1386) 
Number of Children 2.730 2.844 -0.114 2.497 2.551 -0.054 
 
(0.068) (0.081) (0.106) (0.066) (0.078) (0.1017) 
Presence of Elders (60+) 0.596 0.841 -0.24** 1.092 1.447 -0.355** 
 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.036) (0.037) (0.048) (0.060) 
Presence of Orphans 0.019 0.248 -0.23** 0.030 0.44 -0.41** 
 
(0.005) (0.017) (0.016) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
Presence of Widows 0.312 0.506 -0.20** 0.326 0.552 -0.226** 
  (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) 
Standard errors in parentheses and ** means the difference is significant at 5% 
  
With respect to other household characteristics, table 3.3 shows that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the baseline per capita expenditure for Non-LEAP households 
(GH¢588) and LEAP households (GH¢477). During the follow up in 2012, per capita 
expenditure for Non-LEAP households (GH¢728) is significantly more than per capita 
expenditure for LEAP households (GH¢580)
20
. There is also a statistically significant 
difference between the two groups in terms of land ownership with 69 percent and 52 percent 
of Non-LEAP and LEAP households owning lands respectively at baseline. However, in 
2012 (post-LEAP), whereas the proportion of Non-LEAP households owning land 
significantly increased to 73 percent, only 50 percent of LEAP households own land.   
 
The average land size for both groups is about 3 acres in both baseline and follow up periods. 
Additionally, 41 percent and 18 percent of Non-LEAP and LEAP households received 
remittances in 2010; however, remittance receipt decreased to 31 percent for Non-LEAP 
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 After converting per capita expenditure in 2012 into 2010 GH¢ 
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households, but increased to 19 percent for LEAP households in 2012. Also, 19 percent of 
Non-LEAP and 24 percent of LEAP households respectively owed debt at baseline, with 
statistically significant difference between these values.  
 
Table 3. 3 Other Characteristics of LEAP and Non-LEAP Households 




LEAP LEAP Diff 
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
Per Capita Expenditure 588.13 476.61 111.5** 782.88 579.77 203.1** 
 
(13.192) (14.856) (19.936) (22.372) (19.109) (30.685) 
Land ownership 0.692 0.515 0.177** 0.732 0.502 0.230** 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024) 
Land size (in acres) 3.142 3.003 0.139 2.760 2.462 0.298 
 
(0.135) (0.301) (0.289) (0.150) (0.156) (0.237) 
Own Animals 0.467 0.427 0.040 0.583 0.438 0.145** 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) 
Remittance Receipt 0.413 0.175 0.24** 0.310 0.195 0.115** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) 
Debt Owe 0.189 0.240 -0.05** 0.303 0.271 0.032 
 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) 
Insurance Members 1.129 1.141 -0.012 1.417 2.080 -0.663** 
 
(0.063) (0.070) (0.095) (0.071) (0.090) (0.113) 
Drinking water pipe 0.804 0.813 -0.009 0.801 0.819 -0.018 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) 
Cooking fuel  0.762 0.676 0.086** 0.733 0.689 0.044** 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) 
Electricity use 0.386 0.330 0.056** 0.497 0.498 -0.001 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) 
Refuse disposal 0.449 0.218 0.231** 0.272 0.276 -0.004 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) 
Own house 0.621 0.664 -0.043 0.647 0.579 0.068** 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.016) (0.019) (0.025) 
Sample 858 646   858 646   
Standard errors in parentheses and ** means the difference is significant at 5% 
 
 In terms of access to portable water, approximately 80 percent and 81 percent of Non-LEAP 
and LEAP households had access to pipe-borne water at baseline respectively. There was also 
statistically significant difference between Non-LEAP (76 percent) and LEAP (68 percent) 
households in terms of the uses of wood/kerosene/charcoal as cooking fuel in 2010. Also, the 
difference in terms of the proportion of households in the two groups using electricity was 
statistically significant, with 39 percent and 33 percent respectively for Non-LEAP and 
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LEAP households. Lastly, at baseline, about 62 percent of Non-LEAP and 66 percent of 
LEAP households own a house. 
 
For children characteristics (table 3.4), the average age of per child at baseline was 11 years 
for both LEAP and Non-LEAP households, with the proportion of males being 52 percent 
and 53 percent respectively for Non-LEAP and LEAP households. Also, at baseline there is a 
statically significant difference between the proportion of children who are sons/daughters of 
the household head with 64 percent of children in Non-LEAP and 57 percent of children in 
LEAP households being children of the head.  
 
Table 3. 4 Mean Characteristics of Children in LEAP and Non-LEAP Households 
  Baseline (2010) Follow-Up (2012) 
  
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
Age  10.929 11.089 -0.160 11.049 11.056 -0.007 
 
(0.106) (0.118) (0.159) (0.109) (0.121) (0.163) 
Boy 0.520 0.528 -0.008 0.528 0.525 0.003 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) 
Son/Daughter of the head 0.644 0.570 0.074** 0.653 0.558 0.095** 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) 
Sample 1204 935   1076 869   
Standard errors in parentheses and ** means the difference is significant at 5% 
 
  
Turning to the educational outcome variables, it is evident from table 3.5 that, at baseline, 
there is statistically significant difference between Non-LEAP and LEAP households in 
relation to children‟s (5-17years) school enrolment, hours of class attendance, repetition rates 
and test scores. About 94 percent and 98 percent of children from Non-LEAP and LEAP 
households respectively were enrolled in school at baseline. The proportion enrolled in 
school increased to 97 percent for children from Non-LEAP households and 99 percent for 
those in LEAP households respectively two years after the implementation of the LEAP 
programme. Weekly hours of class attendance for children enrolled in school were 
approximately 25 hours per week for those in Non-LEAP households and 20 hours per week 
for their counterpart in LEAP households. However, the weekly hours of class attendance 
decreased for children in both Non-LEAP (19 hours per week) and LEAP (17 hours per 
week) households in 2012.  
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Also, the proportion of children from Non-LEAP and LEAP households who have ever 
repeated a class or grade was about 14 percent and 20 percent respectively; with statistically 
significant difference between them at baseline. However, during the follow up period 
(2012), repetition rate for children from LEAP households reduced to 16 percent, but that of 
children in Non-LEAP households increased to 16 percent. In addition, results of the Ravens 
test score show that between 2010 and 2012, the average score of children in Non-LEAP 
households increased significantly from 4.8 to 5.4; and that of LEAP children also increase 
from 4.4 to 4.9 out of a total score of 12. Lastly, there is a statistically significant difference 
in the educational outcome variables (enrolment, class attendance, repetition and test scores) 
of boys and girls in the LEAP and Non-LEAP groups (see table B2 in the appendix). 
 
Table 3. 5 Educational Outcomes of Children in LEAP and Non-LEAP Households 
  Baseline (2010) Follow-Up (2012) 
  
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
All Children (5-17 Years) 
Enrol  0.940 0.977 -0.037** 0.974 0.992 -0.018** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
Class Attendance² 24.831 20.133 4.698** 18.612 17.055 1.557 
 
(0.423) (0.468) (0.630) (0.923) (0.786) (1.211) 
Repetition² 0.136 0.202 -0.066** 0.160 0.159 0.001 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) 
Test Scores 4.772 4.407 0.365** 5.431 4.949 0.482** 
 
(0.081) (0.084) (0.119) (0.092) (0.102) (0.137) 
Sample 1043 797   958 759   
Standard errors in parentheses and ** meaning the difference is significant at 5% 
 ² refers to children enrolled in school only 
      
Child Labour: Farming Households 
From the baseline data, 82 percent of children in the LEAP farming households were in 
school as opposed to 85 percent of children in control households. The proportion of children 
from farming households in school increased in 2012 (Post-LEAP) among both LEAP and 
non-LEAP households, though the increment among the LEAP group is higher, as can be 
seen in table 3.6. 
 
In addition, out of the total number of households that farmed, 48 percent of the LEAP 
households used children in 2010; this reduced to 39 percent in 2012. For Non-LEAP 
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households, the percentage of farming households that used child labour was about 35 
percent in both periods. These children are persons below the age of 15 years
21
. These 
children were used for land preparation, field operations after planting, harvesting and post-
harvesting activities. In terms of hours worked per day, on average, a child labourer in a 
LEAP household worked for 4.9 hours per day, while his/her counterpart in the Non-LEAP 
household worked for 2.8 hours per day in 2010. However, the average hours worked per day 
among children in households that received the LEAP declined to 4.6 hours in 2012, while 
those in Non-LEAP households increased to about 5 hours per day. 
  
Table 3. 6 Children Involvement in Schooling and Farming Activities  








Schooling Proportion 0.85 0.82 0.03 0.87 0.9 -0.03 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child Labour Proportion 0.35 0.48 -0.13** 0.35 0.39 -0.04 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Hours of  work per day ^ 2.78 4.85 -2.07** 4.95 4.57 0.38 
  (0.11) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25) 
Standard errors are brackets and ** means difference between the two groups is significant at 5% significance 
level. These are for sub-sample of farming households and ^ means only working children.  
 
Similar to the overall sample, farming households in the LEAP group were significantly 
different from those in Non-LEAP group at baseline. LEAP farming households have older 
heads, more orphans and widow, lower annual per capita expenditure and larger household 
size relative to Non-LEAP farming households (see table B3 in Appendix). 
 
Households with Non-farm Enterprises  
From our dataset, 29.67 percent of households interviewed were engaged in non-farm 
enterprises in 2010. This increased to 32.14 percent in 2012. The main activities of these 
enterprises include small agro-processing, retailing and petty trading, salt mining, baking, 
small restaurant and drinking spots as well as provision of carpentry and masonry services. 
Non-farm family work is the second sub-sector of the economy where Ghanaian children are 
employed. Table 3.7 shows characteristics of children in households with non-farm 
enterprises. From the table, there is a statistically significant difference in the proportion of 
                                                          
21
  The question was on the use or exchange of children below 15 years for farming activities. 
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children enrolled in school between the control and the treatment group at baseline in 2010. 
But school enrolment rates among children in both groups were similar in 2012, with that of 
the LEAP group being slightly higher (88 percent) than the Non-LEAP group (87 percent). In 
addition, children in the Non-LEAP households are slightly older than those in LEAP 
households. In terms of gender, about 50 percent of the children in households with non-farm 
enterprise were boys. 
 
Table 3. 7 Children’s Involvement in Schooling and Non-Farm Enterprise 
  Pre-LEAP (2010)     Post-LEAP (2012)   
  
Non-
LEAP LEAP Diff. 
Non-
LEAP LEAP Diff. 
Proportion in child labour 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.09 
 
(0.0195) (0.0194) (0.028) (0.0197) (0.0168) (0.0268) 
Proportion still in School 0.82 0.76 0.06 0.87 0.88 -0.01 
 
(0.0188) (0.0233) (0.029) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) 
Average Age 11.5 10.8 0.7 13.08 12.75 0.33 
 
(0.179) (0.209) (0.274) (0.153) (0.175) (0.115) 
Boys 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.51 0.53 -0.02 
  (0.0242) (0.027) (0.036) (0.026) (0.029) (0.038) 
** mean the difference is significant at 5% 
     
 
Also, similar to the entire sample and farming households, LEAP households engaged in non-
farm activities are relatively poorer in comparison to Non-LEAP household in both periods 
(see table B4 at the appendix). For instance, a lesser proportion of the LEAP households own 
livestock and received remittance in 2010. In addition, the treatment group (LEAP 




3.4.3 Estimation Strategy 
Estimation of the effect of the LEAP programme on child welfare indicators is faced with the 
problem of lack of a counterfactual. Assuming that      if a household receives the LEAP 
and      if it does not, and    = the outcome of the programme (child labour or schooling), 
then        is the potential outcome for household i. The effect of the programme      is then 
given by the difference in outcomes: 
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                               (1) 
 
However, it is not possible to observe simultaneously    when      and    
   Experimental design which randomly assigns households to treatment and control groups 
overcome this problem by ensuring that the treatment status is uncorrelated with other 
variables so that the potential outcome can be attributed only to the programme. In a 
regression form, the impact of the LEAP programme on child welfare outcomes can be 
expressed as: 
 
                                 (2)
          
Where all variables are as defined above and    is the error term. Under randomisation, 
equation (2) can be estimated by Ordinary Least Square (linear probability model) or binary 
outcome models (probit or logit). Since the data collection for this study is non-randomised, 
the chapter employ various non-experimental methods (Propensity Score Matching-PSM; 
Difference-in-Difference-DD; and matching combined with Difference-in-Difference-MDD) 
to measure the impact of the LEAP programme on child labour and educational outcomes of 
children. 
  
A. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method tries to mimic randomisation through the 
construction of a comparison group. The validity of PSM method rests on two main 
assumptions: conditional independence and region of common support. Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA) means that given a set of observed characteristics X which 
is unaffected by the programme, the potential outcomes Y are independent of the treatment 
assignment. The common support assumption 0 < P (Ti = 1|Xi) < 1 ensures that the 
propensity score lies between zero and one in a given set of X. PSM estimates the probability 
of participating in the programme based on observed characteristics that are unaffected by the 
programme. The predicted probability is then used to match the LEAP and Non-LEAP 
households excluding households that are out of the region of common support. 
 
Assume    equals the predicted probability that a household i is in the LEAP group 
(treatment group T) and received the LEAP and    is the predicted probability that a 
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household j in the Non- LEAP group received the LEAP (control group C). The matching 
estimator of the impact of the LEAP programme ( ) may be written as: 
 
  ∑ (   ∑             )             (3)
  
Where W(.) is the function that assigns weights to be placed on the comparison household j 
and this weight function differs among the numerous matching estimators proposed in the 
literature. The PSM is implemented with (biweight) kernel matching technique since it uses 
all the households in the Non-LEAP (control) group and, hence, lowers the variance through 
the use of more information. Thus, unlike other matching methods such as the nearest 
neighbour and radius matching that use only a few observations from the Non-LEAP group, 
the kernel matching is a non-parametric estimator that uses the weighted averages of all 
individuals in the Non-LEAP to construct the counterfactual outcome. However, since all the 
households in the comparison group are used, there may be „bad matches‟. For this reason, 
the common support condition is imposed. 
 
Two important considerations in the implementation of the kernel matching is the kernel 
function and the bandwidth employed. The biweight kernel function use is given by: 
 
         
   (  )  (  ) 
 
∑
   (  )      
 
  
   
         (4) 
 
Where the biweight kernel is given by      
  
  
            | |    and h is the 
bandwidth. The biweight kernel is symmetric and ensures that ∫         and 
∫         . However, as noted by DiNardo and Tobias (2001), the choice of the kernel 
function is relatively unimportant; what is important is the bandwidth or smoothing parameter 
(Pagan and Ullah, 1999).  Choosing high bandwidth produces a smoother estimated density 
and decreases the variance between the estimates and the true underlying density function, 
but it may also result in biased results as the underlying features may be lost. There is a large 
literature on nonparametric estimation and the optimal bandwidth (Jones et al., 1996).  What 
is important is that the estimates obtained should not be sensitive to the choice of the 
bandwidth (Todd, 1999).  A bandwidth of 0.1 is used after trying with several bandwidths. 
The PSM results remain unchanged when the bandwidth was changed.  
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Another important factor in the implementation of PSM is the choice of covariates to be 
included in the propensity score model. The CIA requires that variables that influence a 
household‟s likelihood of participating in the treatment (the LEAP programme) but not 
influence the treatment be included in the estimation. Hence, it has been suggested in the 
PSM literature that variables that are fixed overtime or baseline variables collected before the 
treatment was implemented should be used in PSM model (Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008). In this chapter, baseline variables that were collected before the 
implementation of the LEAP programme are used in the PSM estimation.  
 
Based on the targeting criteria used in the selection of the LEAP recipients, baseline variables 
such as the head of household‟s marital status and gender, as well as, household 
characteristics, such as log of annual per capita expenditure, number of children in the 
household, land size, uses of electricity, source of drinking water, presence of widows in a 
household among other housing characteristics are included in the PSM estimation. Also, 
receipt of remittance and debt owing status of the household are included in the PSM model. 
The quality of the matching procedure is assessed with various methods, including a t-test of 
the difference in covariates means between the LEAP and Non-LEAP households before and 
after the matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Again, the success of the matching 
technique is evaluated with the reduction in the standardised bias and insignificance of the 
joint likelihood ratio of the matched sample, as well as, the insignificance of pseudo    from 
the PSM estimation (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
 
B. Difference-in-Difference (DD) 
Under this method, the impact of a LEAP programme is measured by looking at the 
difference in outcomes before and after the receipt of LEAP programme among LEAP 
(treated) and Non-LEAP (control) households.  Since both pre-treatment and post-treatment 
data are available, DD method can be used to estimate the impact of an intervention by 
assuming that unobserved heterogeneity between the treated and the control groups are time 
invariant and uncorrelated with the treatment over time. This assumption implies that the 
change in outcome in the control group is an appropriate counterfactual. Thus, 
 
    
    
 |          
    





Where     
    
 |      and     
    
 |      are the average changes in outcomes for 
the control group when treatment is zero and when treatment is one respectively. In the case 
of regression, the DD estimate of the impact of a programme is    in equations (6) and (7) 
below:  
 
𝑦                             ε                  (6) 




is the child labour supply in farming (either participation or hour) of household i at 
time t (t=1, 2); S
cit 
is the educational outcome (enrolment, class attendance, repetition and test 
score) of a child c in household i at time t (t=1, 2).     is dummy variable for treatment (= 1 
for household that receives the LEAP and =0 otherwise);     is a trend dummy variable (= 1 
in 2012 and zero for 2010);         is the interaction term and    provides an estimate of the 
effect of LEAP which can be expressed as: 
 
  ̂  (?̅?    ?̅?   )   (?̅?    ?̅?   ) 
 
Where ?̅?    and ?̅?    are mean outcomes for the LEAP households after and before the receipt 
of the LEAP,  ?̅?    and ?̅?    are the after and before mean outcome for the Non-LEAP 
households.    measures the effects of the LEAP on the average outcome and is the average 
treatment effect. This chapter includes other covariates likely to affect child labour supply 
and educational outcomes. The conditioning of the DD estimator on other covariates 
minimises the standard errors as long as the effects are unrelated to the treatment and are 
constant over time. Therefore, the DD regression equations (6) and (7) above become: 
 
𝑦                                 ∑𝜑    ε                (8) 
 
                                   ∑𝜑    ε               (9) 
 
 
Where 𝑦   and      are outcome variables as stated above, LEAP=1 if household receives the 
cash transfer and otherwise zero, Year=1 for post-LEAP and Year=0 for pre-LEAP and    
captures the impact of the LEAP. X is a vector of household characteristics that are likely to 
affect the child labour supply and educational outcomes (detailed description of these 
83 
 
variables can be found in table B1 in the appendix) and 𝜑  is a vector of parameters. 
Equations (8) and (9) are estimated with fixed effect
22
 estimation technique in order to 
controls for unobserved and time-invariant characteristics that may influence the outcome 
variable. One important assumption of this DD estimation is the parallel trend. Since, the data 
cover only two periods, this assumption cannot be tested; however, this flaw is compensated 
for by combining the DD method with matching method as discussed below. 
 
 
C. Matching Combined with Difference-in-Difference (MDD)
23
 
The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimator is likely to be biased if there are unobserved 
variables that affect both participation in the LEAP and the outcome variables. Similarly, as 
stated earlier, one strong assumption underlying the DD estimates is the parallel trend 
assumption. This assumption implies that, in the absence of the treatment, the average 
outcomes for the LEAP and Non-LEAP group would have followed a parallel path over time. 
Following Grima and Görg (2007), the DD method is combined with matching technique to 
ensure that a Non-LEAP (control) group that is similar to the LEAP (treatment) group in all 
aspects is obtained. This is an improved estimator among non-experimental estimators (Smith 
and Todd, 2005) as both observed and unobserved characteristics likely to affect participation 
in the LEAP programme are taken into consideration.  The matching ensures that observable 
imbalances in baseline covariates between the LEAP and Non-LEAP groups are eliminated.  
Under this method, propensity score matching is done to find a subset of Non-LEAP 
households whose propensity scores are similar to those of the LEAP households in a first 
stage. In the second stage, the sample is restricted to these „matched households‟ and DD 
estimation is performed on these households to determine the impact of the LEAP 
programme. Thus, after the matching, DD regression is ran on the LEAP and the „matched 
Non-LEAP households‟ to ascertain the impact of the LEAP programme. This method is used 
because of the strong assumption of PSM (that is, selection into treatment is based on 
observables) and also because the parallel trend assumption under the DD method cannot be 
tested. Literature shows that the estimates improve significantly when matching method is 
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 This will cause time-invariant variables to drop. 
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 The steps used under this method are similar to those in Khandker et al. (2010; pp 198-201). 
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Finally, as stated earlier, the chapter also examine heterogeneity in the impact of the LEAP 
programme. For educational outcomes, the sample is disaggregated by the gender and age of 
the child and separate regressions run for each subsample. In terms of child labour in 
farming, since the analysis is at the household level, this disaggregation is not possible. For 
this reason, the sample is split by the gender of the household head and the annual per capita 
income of the household. Ghana‟s 2013 extreme poverty line of GH792.05 (that is GH597.77 
in 2010 Ghana cedis), which is equivalent to US$1.10 per day per person, is used to classify 
households with annual per capita income less than this poverty line as extremely poor; and 
those on or above this poverty line classified as non-extremely poor. Different estimations are 
carried out for each group.  
 
 
D. Variable Definitions 
As stated earlier, this chapter examines the impact of the LEAP programme on education and 
child labour. For education, it focuses on four main outcomes, namely school enrolment, 
hours of class attendance, repetition of a grade and test scores. School enrolment is a dummy 
variable equals to 1, if a child was enrolled in school the previous year and he/she is still in 
school, and otherwise 0. Class attendance refers to the number of hours that a child (who is 
enrolled in school) attends school in a week; while repetition is a dummy variable equals to 1 
if a child has ever repeated a grade or level in school, and otherwise 0. Finally, test score 
refers to the scores that a child obtained from a Raven‟s Coloured Progressive Matrices test. 
The Raven‟s Coloured Progressive Matrices test consists of a set of 12 questions with each 
question having a set of images that the child must choose one to complete a picture. Each 
correct answer is given a score of 1 and 0 for incorrect answer; hence, the minimum and 
maximum scores that can be obtained are 0 and 12 respectively. This test measures a child‟s 
problem solving ability or cognitive ability. The test was administered to all children (5-17 
years) irrespective of their schooling status. 
 
In terms of child labour, the focus is on children‟s engagement in family farms and non-farm 
enterprises. For child labour in farming, the unit of analysis is the household. Child labour in 
farming is coded as 1, if a household used or exchanged children for farming activities in the 
last 12 months preceding the survey, and otherwise 0. The intensive margin of child labour in 
farming is measured as average hours of work per day per child labourer. Children‟s 
involvement in non-farm enterprises is analysed at the individual level. This is because 
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owners/operators of such enterprises were asked to list persons
25
 working in such enterprises, 
and from this response it is possible to identify workers who are less than 18 years. They 
(workers less than 18 years) form the sample for this analysis. Hence, the dependent variable 
for extensive margin of child labour in non-farm enterprise is defined as a dummy variable 
which is equals to 1, if a child was engaged in non-farm enterprise and 0 otherwise. The daily 
hours of work done by a child in non-farm enterprise is used as a measure of the intensive 
margin of child labour in non-form works. 
 
As stated earlier, the chapter uses three non-experimental methods namely PSM, DD and DD 
combined with matching. For each method, two models (i.e. model 1 and model 2) are 
estimated. Model 1 examines the impact of the LEAP programme on educational outcomes 
(enrolment, attendance, repetition, test scores) and child labour (in farming and non-farm 
enterprise) without the inclusion of control variables. Model 2
26
 uses a multivariate 
framework that involves the inclusion of control variables in the estimation to check the 
robustness of the results. The latter results are presented in the appendix
27
 (see tables B7-B15 
in the appendix).  
 
 
3.5  Empirical Results and Discussion 
This section briefly discusses the results of the propensity score matching that helped to 
obtain „matched households‟ that are similar to the LEAP group before examining the impact 
of the LEAP programme on child labour and educational outcomes. The matching results 
show the variables or factors that affect the probability that a household will be selected into 
the LEAP programme. The accuracy of the results of the impacts of the LEAP programme on 
educational outcomes and child labour is, to a large extent, dependent on the quality of the 
matching estimation. 
 
                                                          
25
 Owners of such enterprises listed four important workers; hence, the number of children in non-farm 
enterprises may be understated, since owners of such enterprises with more than four employees will likely not 
include children in the listed four. 
26
 Equations 8 and 9 are estimated without the Xs in model 1 and then estimated with the Xs in model 2. 
27
 These control variables include the gender and age of the child (average age and proportion of boys for child 
labour in farming), as well as his/her relationship to the household head. Also, included in the regression are 
age, gender, years of schooling and marital status of the household head, the size of the household, ownership of 
farmland and the regional location of the household. Detail definition of these variables is presented in table B1 
in the appendix. 
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3.5.1  Participation in the LEAP Programme at Baseline (Matching Results) 
The results (table B5, in the Appendix) from the matching estimation indicate that per capita 
expenditure (in logs) negatively affect the probability of participation in LEAP. Thus, 
consistent with the selection criteria, poorer households are more likely to participate in the 
LEAP programme. This is confirmed by other housing characteristics, such as the use of 
electricity for cooking and having a proper refuse dumping place, which all have a negative 
effect on the probability of becoming a LEAP recipient. Similarly, households that own land, 
receive remittance, and have more members registered on the National Health Insurance 
Scheme had lower probabilities of participating in the LEAP programme. Lastly, the presence 
of a widow, an orphan, an elderly person (65 years and above) and child labourers in the 
household increase a household‟s probability of participation in the LEAP programme. 
 
Finally, the quality of our matching procedure is satisfactory as the matching method 
balanced the treatment and control groups at baseline. For instance, the t-test of the difference 
in covariates means between the LEAP and Non-LEAP households indicate that there are no 
statistically significant differences between these groups. Also, the matching technique 
reduces the standardised bias and the joint likelihood ratio. In addition, the pseudo    became 
insignificant after the matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The results from the 
matching, thus, show that the balancing requirements of the PSM method were satisfied (see 
appendix tables B6a-B6b).  
 
3.5.2  Impact of the LEAP Programme 
This section presents the regression results for the impact of LEAP programme on 
educational outcomes and child labour. As indicated earlier, the study uses three different 
estimations: the Propensity Score Matching (PSM), the Difference-in-Difference (DD) and 
Matching with Difference-in- Difference (MDD). The results for all three estimation methods 
are presented. However, in interpreting the results, more focus is placed on the results from 
the MDD estimation since it is the preferred estimator among the three (Smiths and Todd, 
2005). In all tables, column 1 reports the PSM estimates, while columns 2 and 3 report the 




Impact of LEAP on Educational Outcomes 
This section presents the regression results for impact of LEAP programme on school 
enrolment, weekly hours of class attendance, repetition rate and test scores (Raven Test 
Scores). This is followed by a discussion of the impact of the LEAP programme on school 
expenses.  Generally, similar results are obtained when control variables are included in the 




Table 3.8 presents the results of the impact of the LEAP programme on school enrolment rate 
for children aged 5-17. For the overall sample, the LEAP programme does not have any 
significant impact on school enrolment (MDD column in table 3.8). This result is similar to 
the results found by de Groot et al (2015) on the LEAP and school enrolment. However, 
when the sample is split by gender of the child, it emerges that the programme has a positive 
effect on boys‟ school enrolment, but no effect on girls‟ school enrolment.  Specifically, the 
probability that boys in households that benefited from the LEAP programme will enrol in 
schools is 2.7 percentage points higher than their counterparts in Non-LEAP households. This 
result may be explained by the belief in Ghana, especially in rural areas, that it is better to 
send a boy to school instead of a girl (Keller et al., 1999). This belief may stem from the fact 
that most parents in Ghana look up to their children for support in their old age. They 
consider investment in girls‟ education as unprofitable since girls are expected to marry and 
assist their husbands to cater for their children (Anyanful et al., 2001); hence most parents 
prefer to have sons instead of daughters (Frempong and Codjoe, 2017). The study also lend 
credence to an earlier study in Zambia by the American Institutes for Research (2015), where 
the country‟s Child grant led to an increase in school enrolment among boys with no effect on 
girls. 
 
In addition, results from disaggregation of the sample into age groups indicate that the LEAP 
programme had no significant effect on school enrolment of younger children aged 5-12; but 
it increased the enrolment for older children (aged 13-17) significantly by approximately 9.6 
percentage points. These results are similar to the results found by de Groot et al. (2015). 
Contrary to this study, other studies report significant increase in school enrolment in 
younger children – Maluccio and Flore (2004) in Nicaragua (17.7percent increase) and Ward 
et al. (2010) in Kenya (6-7percent increase). It has been found that the effects of most CCT 
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programmes on schooling tend to be larger in settings with lower initial conditions. Thus, the 
effects of CCT on school enrolment are larger in areas with lower enrolment rates at baseline 
(Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Saavedra and Garcia, 2012). Hence, these results are not 
surprising, since primary education in Ghana is almost universal with gross enrolment rate of 
over 100 percent. 
 
Table 3. 8 Impact of LEAP on School Enrolment Rate for Children 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample 0.0216** 0.0141 0.0113 
s.e. (0.00886) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
N 2,095 3,557 2,765 
 
   Boys 0.05445** 0.0269* 0.0269*** 
s.e. (0.0288) (0.0163) (0.0061) 
N 1,112 1,876 1,445 
 
   Girls 0.00226 0.00461 0.00382 
s.e. (0.0156) (0.0128) (0.0131) 
N 953 1,681 1,289 
 
   Young Children (Age 5-12 Years) -0.00267 -0.0144 -0.0144 
s.e. (0.00373) (0.00959) (0.0098) 
N 1,379 2,234 1,635 
 
   Older children (Age 13-17 Years) 0.0617 0.0886** 0.0958** 
s.e. (0.052) (0.0361) (0.0382) 
N 431 1,323 850 




In terms of class attendance, the MDD results (table 3.9) for the overall sample show a 
positive and significant increase in class attendance of approximately 5.2 hours per week for 
children whose households received the LEAP cash transfer relative to those from non-
beneficiary households. Similarly, the LEAP programme significantly increases class 
attendance of younger children aged 5-12 years and boys by 5.8 hours and 4.5 hours per week 
respectively. However, the scheme had no significant impact on the weekly hours of class 
attendance of girls and older children (13-17 years). This may be due to the fact that there is 
preference for boys relative to girls among parents in Ghana (Frempong and Codjoe, 2017) 
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since parents consider investment in boys ‟human capital to be more “profitable” than 
investment in girls‟ human capital (Anyanful et al., 2001). 
 
Table 3. 9 Impact of LEAP on Weekly Hours of Class Attendance  
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample 5.183 6.452*** 5.159** 
s.e. (2.823) (1.896) (2.092) 
N 938 2,526 2,001 
 Boys 3.893 5.372** 4.462***   
s.e. (3.997) (2.540) (2.804) 
N 483 1,321 1,040 
 Girls 5.656* 6.511 4.916 
s.e. (2.774) (5.982) (3.233) 
N 440 1,205 949 
 Young Children (Age 5-12 Years)  1.374 6.170** 5.791*** 
s.e. (3.182) (2.446) (1.699) 
N 1,068 1,604 1,220 
 Older Children (Age 13-17 Years) 5.75 6.806 6.906 
s.e. (6.784) (5.674) (4.156) 
N 461 922 660 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, N=sample size  
 
 
Comparing this result with the scheme‟s impact on enrolment depicts an interesting picture. 
Poor households do not send more children to school after receiving the LEAP, but rather 
they allow their children who are already in school to spend more hours in the classroom. 
One explanation for this is that most, if not all of their children, are already in school. 
Similarly, studies on the impact of cash transfers in other African countries, such as UNICEF 
(2012) in South Africa and Miller et al. (2008) in Malawi, also found significantly positive 
impact of such schemes on school attendance. However, in Kenya and Tanzania, Ward et al. 
(2010) and Evans et al. (2014) respectively found insignificant impacts. Also, elsewhere in 
Brazil (Yap et al., 2002; Cardoso and Souza, 2004) and in Costa Rica (Duryea and Morrison, 
2004) cash transfer schemes had statistically significant and positive impact on school 





Generally, it is expected that CCT programmes reduce the rate at which children repeat a 
class or a grade. Consistent with this general expectation, the MDD results in table 3.10 
depict that participation in the LEAP programme reduces class repetition of children 
significantly by about 11 percent. Also, the LEAP programme reduces boys‟ and older 
children‟s (age 13-17years) repetition rates by approximately 12 percent and 15 percent 
respectively. However, the repetition rates of girls and younger children (5-12 years) were 
not affected by the scheme.  
 
Table 3. 10 Impact of LEAP on Repetition Rate of Children 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample -0.0027 -0.106*** -0.108*** 
s.e. (0.0365) (0.0369) (0.0383) 
N 1,809 3,130 2,319 
 Boys 0.0462 -0.123*** -0.118** 
s.e. (0.0381) (0.0463) (0.0487) 
N 990 1,678 1,231 
 Girls -0.0831 -0.0668 -0.0811 
s.e. (0.0628) (0.0622) (0.0642) 
N 787 1,452 1,053 
 Young Children (Age 5-12 Years) 0.0181 -0.075 -0.0762 
s.e. (0.036) (0.0752) (0.077) 
N 1,331 1,773 1,157 
 Older Children (Age 13-17 Years) -0.0127 -0.172** -0.148** 
s.e. (0.129) (0.0701) (0.0733) 
N 324 1,357 873 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This result seems to suggest that the LEAP programme did not lead to the „classroom 
congestion effect‟ as suggested by theory, since the scheme did not result in an increase in 
enrolment, but rather it increased the hours of class attendance of existing pupils. This may 
have contributed to the reduction in class repetition. Consistent with the results here are 
studies by UNICEF (2012) and Evans et al. (2014) in South Africa and Tanzania 
respectively, which show statistically significant decreases in children‟s class/level repetition 
rate due to cash transfer schemes. In contrast, in Columbia, Barrera et al. (2011) report that 
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cash transfers increase class repetition rate; and, in Lesotho, Pellerano et al. (2014) found no 
significant impact on repetition rate. 
 
Test Scores (Cognitive Ability) 
With respect to test scores, the MDD estimations showed no significant impact from the 
LEAP programme as shown by table 3.11. This result may be attributed to the short duration 
between the implementation of the scheme and the evaluation of its impacts. Cognitive ability 
takes time to improve and, as such, the two years interval between the LEAP programme 
implementation and the follow-up data collection may be too short to observe any changes in 
cognitive achievement.  
 
 Table 3. 11 Impact of LEP on Test Scores of Children 
  PSM DD MDD  
Overall Sample -0.413* -0.116 -0.244 
s.e. (0.214) (0.21) (0.233) 
N 1,878 3,168 2,460 
 Boys -0.581** -0.0703 -0.0644 
s.e. (0.373) (0.295) (0.321) 
N 1,022 1,672 1,282 
 Girls -0.186 -0.173 -0.344 
s.e. (0.364) (0.309) (0.343) 
N 850 1,496 1,151 
 Young Children (Age 5-12 Years) -0.334 -0.0286 -0.145 
s.e. (0.267) (0.269) (0.293) 
N 616 2,173 1,637 
 Older Children (Age 13-17 Years) -0.915 -0.578 -0.64 
s.e. (0.757) (0.526) (0.591) 
N 218 995 578 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, N=sample size 
 
There are few studies on CCT and test scores. A review of the literature shows mixed results. 
Studies, such as Ponce and Bedi (2008), Behrman et al. (2009), Filmer and Schady (2009), 
and Duryea and Morrison (2004), report insignificant impact of CCT programmes on test 
scores. The results from this chapter do not corroborate earlier findings in Mexico‟s 
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Oportunidades (Dubios et al., 2012), in Columbia (Barrera et al. 2011) and in South Africa 
(UNICEF, 2012), where such programmes resulted in improvements in test scores. 
 
Impact on School Expenses 
Receipt of LEAP might impact positively on educational outcomes when poor households 
facing credit constraint use the money to finance the education of their children. Hence, this 
section examines the effect of the LEAP programme on educational expenses to ascertain 
whether the recipients spent the cash on their children‟s education or not. 
 
Table 3. 12 Impact of the LEAP on School Expenses of Children 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Uniform and Clothing -0.1 0.0885 0.0432 
s.e. (0.0641) (0.0755) (0.0897) 
N 977 2,233 1,760 
 Books and School Supplies -0.195** -0.144 -0.121 
s.e. (0.0822) (0.0965) (0.0737) 
N 1,225 2,702 2,132 
 Food and Boarding  -0.524*** 0.115 0.0893 
s.e. (0.114) (0.119) (0.138) 
N 1,016 2,161 1,739 
 Total Expenses  -0.459*** 0.00409 0.0311 
s.e. (0.0904) (0.0802) (0.0887) 
N 1,823 3,536 2,739 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, N=sample size 
 
 
From table 3.12, the LEAP programme did not have any significant impact (MDD column) 
on school expenditure for the overall sample. This is true for total expenditure, as well as the 
various school expenditure items.  When the sample is disaggregated by the gender of the 
child (table B11 in the appendix), the results show that, again, the LEAP programme did not 
have any significant impact on schooling expenditure for girls. However, for boys, the MDD 
results indicate that the LEAP programme had a significant and positive impact on total 
schooling expenditure. Again, for younger children, aged 5-12 years, the MDD results (table 
B11 in appendix) show that the LEAP programme significantly reduced expenditure on 
books and other school supplies; but it increased uniform and school clothing expenses by 22 
percent. For older children, aged 13-17 years, the LEAP programme significantly increases 
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the total educational expenditure by about 27 percent. Extensive literature search revealed 
few studies with focus on the impact of cash transfers on children‟s schooling expenditure. 
The only study in the literature is by Miller et al. (2008)
28
 in Malawi, where they find that 
Malawi‟s Mchinji Social Cash Transfer increases children‟s schooling expenditure. 
 
Impact on Child Labour 
The estimated impact of the LEAP programme on participation and daily hours of work are 
discussed below. The section begins with child labour in farming followed by child labour in 
non-farm enterprises. In the discussion of the results that follows, the focus will mostly be on 
the MDD results, as stated earlier. 
 
Child Labour in Farming  
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 report the results of the impact of the LEAP programme on the 
extensive and intensive margin of child labour in farming respectively. From table 3.13, 
participation in the LEAP programme had no effect on the probability of households‟ using 
or exchanging of children for farming activities in the overall sample and all subsamples 
except female headed households. Though the scheme had negative effects on child labour 
participation in the overall sample, extremely poor and male headed households, these effects 
were statistically insignificant. However, for households that are headed by women, 
participation in the LEAP programme reduces the probability of using or exchanging children 
for farm works by 8.2 percentage points. This result is consistent with other studies 
(Altanasio et al., 2006; Cardoso and Souza, 2004; Asfaw et al., 2012) that found no effects of 
CCT programmes on children‟s participation in the labour market. The results here seem to 
support the suggestions that children tend to benefit more when resources are in the hands of 
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Table 3. 13 Impact of LEAP on Children Participation in Farming Activities 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample 0.0055 -0.0811 -0.0495 
s.e. (0.0607) (0.0502) (0.0506) 
N 774 1,899 1,695 
  Extremely Poor 0.0299 -0.0952 -0.0817 
s.e. (0.0726) (0.0885) (0.0892) 
N 235 608 550 
  Non-Extremely Poor 0.163 0.0912 0.09132 
s.e. (0.103) (0.113) (0.113) 
N 521 1,284 1,139 
  Male Headed 0.0669 -0.0153 -0.00181 
s.e. (0.0776) (0.067) (0.068) 
N 451 1,029 941 
  Female Headed 0.0129 -0.124*** -0.0815*** 
s.e. (0.231) (0.0106) (0.0114) 
N 317 868 753 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, N=sample size 
 
In terms of intensive margin of child labour in farming, the results in table 3.14 show that the 
LEAP programme had a negative impact on the daily hours of farm work for the overall 
sample and all subsamples except non-extremely poor households. The largest impact of the 
programme occurred in female headed households. Specifically, participation in the LEAP 
programme reduces daily hours of farm work done by children by approximately 2.6 hours in 
the overall sample. However, when the sample is split, it emerges that the LEAP programme 
led to approximately 2.7 hours, 2.2 hours and 2.1 hours reduction in the intensity of work 
done by children in female headed, extremely poor and male headed households respectively. 
This result supports an earlier study in Brazil where the PETI programme had a negative 
impact on hours of work done by children. It, however, contradicts Parker and Skoufias‟ 
(2000) study on the Mexican Progresa scheme where it was found that the scheme had no 
effect on the intensity of work done by child labourers. 
 
These results seem to suggest that the LEAP programme does not influence households‟ 
decision to use or exchange their children for farming activities; but they reduce the intensity 
of work done by children who are already in the labour market. The reduction in the daily 
hours of work done by children on farms may be possible under these two scenarios. Firstly, 
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the receipt of cash may enable households to hire adults to work on their farms instead of 
using children. This will result in a fall in the hours of work done by children. Secondly, the 
transfer of income to poor households may cause them to shift from farming into other 
businesses that may not require the use of children. Inclusion of control variables does not 
change these results in terms of significance (see tables B12-B13 in the appendix). 
 
Table 3. 14 Impact of LEAP on Children’s Working Hours in Farming 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample -1.216** -2.826*** -2.595*** 
s.e. (0.517) (0.439) (0.435) 
N 311 759 683 
  Extremely Poor -1.508* -2.409*** -2.235*** 
s.e. (0.777) (0.716) (0.698) 
N 197 252 228 
  Non-Extremely Poor -0.444 -1.288 -1.288 
s.e. (0.678) (0.999) (0.999) 
N 205 504 453 
  Male Headed -0.587 -2.517*** -2.082*** 
s.e. (0.784) (0.563) (0.538) 
N 187 417 385 
  Female Headed -0.526 -2.867*** -2.673*** 
s.e. (1.037) (0.768) (0.771) 
N 121 341 298 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, N=sample size 
 
 
Child Labour in Non-Farm Enterprises  
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 show the impacts of the LEAP programme on child labour in non-farm 
enterprises. From table 3.15, the LEAP programme had no effect on children‟s participation 
in non-farm enterprises in the overall sample and all subsamples. This result supports 
Attanasio et al.‟s (2006) study on Colombia‟s Familias en Accion scheme which found no 





Table 3. 15 Impact of LEAP on Children’s Participation in Non-Farm Works 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample -0.021 -0.0371 -0.000884 
s.e. (0.0737) (0.0481) (0.0681) 
N 512 1,450 680 
  Extremely Poor 0.0816 0.054 0.0391 
s.e. (0.143) (0.121) (0.113) 
N 156 452 279 
  Non-Extremely Poor -0.0461 -0.0367 -0.0697 
s.e. (0.0761) (0.0752) (0.0993) 
N 404 1,098 801 
  Boys 0.103 0.0209 0.0879 
s.e. (0.129) (0.0552) (0.0832) 
N 205 741 553 
  Girls -0.316 -0.0949 -0.0929 
s.e. (0.298) (0.0671) (0.0853) 
N 192 709 327 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, N=sample size 
  
 
Similar to the above results, the LEAP programme had no effect on the daily hours of non-
farm work done by children in the overall sample and all subsamples as depicted in table 
3.16. Controlling for the child and household characteristics did not change these results (see 











Table 3. 16 Impact of LEAP on Hours of Non-Farm Works 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample -1.234 1.537 2.451 
s.e. (0.806) (1.111) (2.376) 
N 210 234 122 
  Extremely Poor 1.0513 1.164 1.362 
s.e. (1.159) (1.156) (1.814) 
 
101 188 172 
  Non-Extremely Poor -1.442** 1.857 -0.296 
s.e. (0.676) (1.655) (1.993) 
N 123 386 295 
  Boys -1.001 0.483 2.225 
s.e. (1.252) (1.446) (2.809) 
N 105 294 252 
  Girls -3.251** -1.454 -0.733 
s.e. (1.453) (1.324) (0.835) 
N 101 240 170 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, N=sample size   
 
 
Impact on Households’ Engagement in Farming and Non-Farming Enterprises 
Finally, this section explores the impact of the LEAP programme on households‟ engagement 
in farming and non-farm enterprise for the overall sample in table 3.17. The results show that 
the scheme had a negative impact on farming
29
, but it had no effect on the establishment of 
non-farm enterprises. This suggests that households reduced their farming operations after 
receiving the LEAP cash transfer, but do not change their engagement in non-farm 
enterprises. This may possibly explain the reduction in the intensive margin of child labour in 
farming. Working children reduced their daily hours of work on family farms probably 
because households reduced their farming activities after receiving these cash transfers.  
 
Similarly, the insignificant effect of the LEAP programme on child labour in non-farm 
enterprises may be due to the fact that the scheme did not affect households‟ engagement in 
                                                          
29
 Though table 3.1 shows that the number of farming households in the LEAP group in 2012 was more than 
those in 2010, this result indicates that the increase was not caused by the LEAP programme. 
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such enterprises. Overall, the results seem to support earlier work by Mochiah et al. (2014) in 
Ghana, where they found out that the LEAP programme reduced adult labour supply in 
farming and had no impact on adult labour supply in non-farm enterprises. 
 
Table 3. 17 Impact of LEAP on Households’ Engagement in Businesses 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Farming -0.0487 -0.0466*** -0.100*** 
s.e. (0.0503) (0.0219) (0.0299) 
    Non-Farm Enterprises -0.0715 0.0799 0.0776 
s.e. (0.0596) (0.0493) (0.0584) 
N 1493 3,008 2844 





3.6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The rapid expansion of Cash Transfer programmes in Africa, and in particular Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), can be attributed to the success of these programmes at improving the 
education and health outcomes of beneficiaries in Mexico and Brazil. The success of CCT 
programmes in Latin American countries, however, does not guarantee their success in other 
countries.  Despite, the rapid expansion of these programmes in Africa, there are limited 
studies on such schemes in the sub-region. Hence, this chapter examines the impact of a CCT 
(Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty-LEAP) programme on educational outcomes 
(enrolment, class attendance, repetition and test scores) and child labour in Ghana. 
 
The chapter uses a longitudinal data and employs three quasi-experimental methods 
(Propensity Score Matching, Difference-in-Difference and Matching combined with 
Difference-in-Difference) in estimating these impacts. Both the impact of the LEAP 
programme on educational outcomes and child labour in non-farm enterprises are analysed at 
the individual level; while children‟s involvement in farming is analysed at the household 
level since the main question on child labour was asked at that level. Also, the chapter 
examines heterogeneity in the impact by splitting the sample into various groups (gender and 





The results show that participation in the LEAP programme has no significant effect on 
school enrolment for the overall sample, younger children (5-12 years) and girls, but it did 
increase enrolment rates of boys (2.7 percentage points) and older children aged 13-17 years 
(9.6 percentage points). In terms of class attendance, it emerges that there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the LEAP programme and weekly hours of class 
attendance. Overall, the LEAP programme increased the weekly hours of class attendance of 
children in beneficiary households by 5.2 hours. When the sample is split by the gender and 
the age of a child, these results changed slightly. The LEAP programme increased the weekly 
hours of class attendance of boys and younger children (5-12 years) by 4.5 hours and 5.8 
hours respectively. However, the programme had no impacts on the weekly hours of class 
attendances of girls‟ and older children (13-17 years). For class repetition, the LEAP 
programme had a significant and negative effect in the overall sample as well as boys and 
older children subsamples; but it had no effect on the repetition rates of girls and younger 
children (5-12 years). Specifically, the repetition rate of children in households that benefited 
from the LEAP programme was reduced by about 11 percentage points, 12 percentage points 
and 15 percentage points for the overall sample, boys and older children respectively. Lastly, 
the LEAP programme had no statistically significant impact on test scores (cognitive ability).  
 
One of the channels through which the LEAP programme may impact educational outcomes 
is through its effect on purchases of educational supplies. Thus, it is expected that 
expenditure on schooling would increase once poor households are given this cash transfer. 
This chapter investigated this hypothesis by estimating the impact of the LEAP programme 
on total school expenditure as well as individual school items (uniform and clothing; books 
and school supplies; food and boarding). Overall, the LEAP programme had no impact on 
school expenditure (both the total expenses and the individual items) for the overall sample 
and girls. The scheme increased the total school expenditure for boys and older children (13-
17 years); but it reduced the expenditure on books and school supplies for younger children 
(5-12 years). Controlling for individual and household characteristics did not change these 
results in terms of statistical significance.  
 
With regard to child labour in farming, the scheme had no effect on the extensive margin of 
child labour in the overall sample and all subsamples, except in female headed households. 
The LEAP programme reduced the probability of child labour in farming in female headed 
household by 8.2 percentage points. In addition, the results show that the LEAP scheme 
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decreased the hours of farm work done by children in the overall sample and all sub-samples, 
except working children in non-extremely poor households. Specifically, participation in the 
LEAP programme reduced the daily hours of child labour on farms by about 2.6 hours in the 
overall sample, with the highest reduction in hours of farm work done by children occurring 
in female headed households, where the reduction in the intensity of child work was about 
2.7 hours. Lastly, unlike child labour in farming, the results of this chapter show that the 
LEAP programme had no effect on both the extensive and intensive margins of child labour 
in non-farm enterprise in the overall sample and all sub-samples. Thus, there was no 
difference in both the probability of child labour and hours of work in non-farm enterprises 
done by children in LEAP and Non-LEAP households.  
 
Generally, the LEAP programme reduced farming, but it had no impact on households‟ 
engagement in non-farm enterprises. This suggests that households may have abandoned 
farming after receiving the cash transfer and this reduction in farming may have led to the 
reduction in the daily hours of farm work undertaken by children. Conversely, the LEAP had 
no effect on households‟ engagement in non-farm enterprise and, as such, both the extensive 
and intensive margins of child labour in these enterprises were not affected by the scheme. 
 
The results of the impact of the LEAP programme on educational outcome (school 
enrolment, class attendance, repetition rate and test scores) and child labour (farming and 
non-farm) give several policy directions with regard to development of human capital in 
Ghana.  Firstly, from the results, it is evident that the LEAP programme had no impact on the 
education of the girl child. Though the LEAP scheme had a positive impact on school 
enrolment and hours of class attendance, and a negative impact on repetition rate of boys, the 
scheme did not affect any of the educational outcomes of girls. This implies that other policy 
interventions specifically targeting girls‟ education, such as public education and 
sensitization programmes on the importance of girls‟ education, need to be implemented if 
girls‟ education is to be improved in the country. Secondly, the LEAP programme had no 
significant impacts on test scores (cognitive ability). This may imply that perhaps other 
interventions that address early childhood nutrition and education should be implemented, 
since the development of cognitive ability starts at an early stage of a child‟s development. 
 
Finally, the findings in this chapter show that the LEAP programme did not affect the 
extensive margin of child labour in farming and non-farming activities. It follows then that 
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for the elimination of child labour to be achieved, the programme should be supplemented 
with other interventions, or the amount of cash received should be increased, as suggested by 
Daidone and Davis (2013).  Also, this chapter‟s findings lend credence to the suggestion by 
Mochiah et al. (2014) that subsequent targeting of transfers must be „carefully done‟ to 
produce the anticipated results. The results show that gender dimensions and poverty levels 
should guide policy makers in the design and targeting of this cash transfer scheme.  Based 
on the findings of this chapter, it can be argued that targeting should focus more on extremely 
poor and female headed households, as the disaggregated results show that the largest 
consistent impact of the cash transfer occurred in such households. Lastly, the findings 
suggest that other social interventions or policies that seek to empower and effectively target 
female headed and extremely poor households will be a welcome development towards 































CHAPTER 4: The Impact of Women’s Autonomy in the 
Household on Child Labour and Schooling: Evidence from 
Ghana 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The effects of different household members‟ decision making power (particularly that of 
women) on children‟s outcomes has been widely examined in both developed and developing 
countries. Women‟s decision making autonomy or bargaining power in households is one of 
the most significant factors that influence children‟s schooling and child labour decisions 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, where direct cost of schooling is mostly 
low (Luz and Agadjanian, 2015). Even in cases where the direct costs of schooling are high, 
the allocation of the household‟s resources among various goods, particularly on children‟s 
products depends on the degree of decision making autonomy of the husband and the wife. 
Empirical evidence has shown the importance of women‟s decision making autonomy on 
child welfare outcomes (Durrant and Sathar 2000, Yabiku, Agadjanian, and Sevoyan 2010; 
Shroff et al., 2011). This chapter examines the effect of a mother‟s decision making 
autonomy or bargaining power on her children‟s schooling and labour supply in Ghana. 
 
Ghana presents a useful case study for this analysis in the sense that about half of the 
country‟s population live in rural areas (Ghana Statistical Service, 2016). Urban women have 
more decision making power than their counterpart in rural areas (Bogale et al., 2011). This is 
so because women in urban cities have more opportunities for paid work; and customs and 
norms regarding gender ideology may be less enforced in cities. In addition, most households 
in Ghana are headed by males; these heads are very influential in decision-making. 
Furthermore, in most households in Ghana, pooling of resources and joint decision making 
between men and women are not the norm (Baden et al., 1994). Women tend to have lower 
decision making power or autonomy relative to men. 
 
There is no agreement on the definition and measurement of autonomy at the household level 
(Mason, 1997; Mason and Smith, 2000; Luz and Agadjanian, 2015). Most studies often focus 
on women‟s participation in economic activities; and use their control over economic 
resources as a proxy for bargaining power or autonomy.  For instance, while some studies use 
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public provision of resources to women (Lundberg et al., 1997); others use the share of 
income earned by women, unearned incomes received by women, women inherited assets, 
women‟s assets at the time of marriage and their current assets as measures of their autonomy 
(Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Quisumbing, 1994; Thomas et al., 1997; Doss, 1996). 
However, women‟s autonomy is not only about their access to resources, but also their 
freedom to act independently. Thus, women‟s abilities to formulate choices and participate in 
decision making are all part of their autonomy (Adhikari, 2016). Several studies have shown 
that labour force participation and access to resources do not necessary lead to improvements 
in women‟s autonomy (Balk, 1997; Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001; Malhotra et al., 1995). 
  
Another important dimension of women‟s autonomy is their involvement in households‟ 
decision making, especially in patriarchal societies like in most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries, where there is male dominance. In such societies, educated or employed women 
may fail to translate their preferences into actual behaviour, if their husbands are opposed to 
such preferences (Woldemicael, 2010). For instance, gender inequality and patriarchy which 
assign different roles to men and women often result in low contraceptive usage and high 
fertility rates (Balk, 1994; Basu, 1992; Caldwell, 1986; Dharmalingam and Morgan, 1996; 
Morgan and Niraula, 1995). This chapter thus adopts a non-economic measure of women‟s 
autonomy and examine its impact on schooling and child labour.  
 
The measure of mothers‟ autonomy used in this chapter is an index constructed from five 
questions pertaining to: (i) a woman‟s participation in important decisions of the household; 
(ii) a woman‟s right to express her opinions if she disagrees with her husband; (iii) a 
woman‟s right to use her earned income on herself and her children; (iv) a woman‟s ability to 
contact her family without limitation; (v) and a woman‟s ability to go out without her 
husband insisting on knowing where she is at all time.
30
 The chapter examines how a 
mother‟s involvement in these decisions impacts on her children participation in school and 
the labour market, as well as the hours of school and work they supply. Specifically, the 
chapter seeks to answer the following research questions: What are the main determinants of 
a mother‟s autonomy or bargaining power in the household? How does a mother‟s autonomy 
impact on her child‟s welfare in terms of schooling and child labour decisions? Is the 
                                                          
30
 The exact questions asked and the construction of this index is explained later.  
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relationship between a mother‟s autonomy and her child‟s welfare similar among children in 
rural and urban areas? And is this impact similar for boys and girls?  
 
Women empowerment has been on the development agenda of most Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries in recent years. The findings of this study will assist in policy formulation 
for the advancement of women and the reduction of the gender inequality that exist in Ghana 
and the sub-region as a whole. In addition, the study will help in the formulation of policies 
for child labour elimination and promotion of schooling in Ghana and, by extension, other 
SSA countries. 
 
Finally, this study expands the literature on women‟s autonomy and its impact on child 
welfare. The unitary model has been used to analyse the decision making behaviour of 
household for decades. Recent research, however, has shown that this model does not work 
well when household members have different preferences or degrees of control on their own 
resources (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Behrman, 1997; Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman, 
1997). Few studies have adopted the collective model. For those that have, most of them 
usually include potentially endogenous variables related to women‟s autonomy within the 
household directly in the outcome equation (Reggio, 2011). This chapter serves as a possible 
basis for further studies on mothers‟ autonomy particularly in developing countries. 
 
This chapter answers the above research questions with a nation-wide survey conducted in 
Ghana in 2010 by Yale University in collaboration with the Institute of Statistical, Social and 
Economic Research (ISSER) of the University of Ghana. One possible problem that may be 
encountered in analysing the impact of a woman‟s autonomy on her children‟s welfare is the 
possibility of endogeneity of the autonomy variable. This problem has been recognised by 
recent studies (Pollak, 2005; Basu, 2006; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Reggio, 2011; 
Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011). This study overcomes this problem by using both instrumental 
variable (IV) and non-instrumental estimation techniques. This is done for the overall sample 
and for children in urban and rural areas separately. Also, different regressions are carried out 
for boys and girls. 
 
The results show that increase in mothers‟ decision making autonomy increases school 
enrolment for the overall sample and all subsamples. However, in terms of hours of class 
attendance, mothers‟ bargaining power or autonomy has positive impact on the overall 
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sample, girls and rural subsample, but no effect on boys and urban children. In addition, the 
results indicate a negative effect of mothers‟ decision making autonomy on both child labour 
participation and hours of child labour. Girls benefit more from an improvement in mothers‟ 
decision making autonomy relative to boys. Finally, increase in the autonomy of women has 
bigger impacts on rural children‟s welfare in comparison to urban children.  
 
The rest of this chapter is sub-divided into the following sections. Section two provides a 
review of both theoretical and empirical studies on household decision making models and 
how a mother‟s autonomy affects her child‟s outcomes. The data used and the methodology 
employed in estimating the impacts of a woman‟s autonomy on her child‟s welfare are 
outlined in section three. This is followed by section four that discusses the main findings. 
Section five presents the conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
 
4.2  Review of the Relevant Literature 
 
Theoretical Literature 
Analysis of a household as a unit has gone through three main development since the 1970s 
(Ambreen, 2013). Firstly, models used in such analyses have moved from assuming that 
household members are altruistic, co-operative and engage in sharing into models that 
include negotiation, bargaining and even conflict. Secondly, households are no longer seen as 
a bounded unit, but rather they are permeable. Finally, households are now seen as entities 
with massive variation in their composition and structure both between and within societies; 
and these variations change with time (Bolt and Bird, 2003; Chen and Dunn, 1996; Ambreen, 
2013). 
 
Earlier analyses of households were done under the unitary framework where households 
have a single utility function. In this framework, the household consists of individuals who 
combine their time, goods purchased, and goods produced at home to maximise a common 
utility (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). Thus, the household is treated as a single 
production or consumption unit where all dynamics of decision-making within the household 
are assumed away and usually a single (presumably male) decision-maker takes all the 
decisions. Under the unitary model, the distribution of income/assets or other measures of 
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autonomy/bargaining power within the household (holding all else constant) does not affect 
outcomes (Doss, 2013). However, the unitary model of the household has been shown to be 
inappropriate for household analysis under different circumstances; and initial studies that 
tested the assumptions of this model recognised that they do not always hold. These initial 
studies found evidence suggesting that allocation of resources within the household affect 
outcomes of household decisions (Reggio, 2011). Thus, if household members have different 
preferences, then the existence of multiple voices, gender interest and an unequal distribution 
of resources in the household should be considered.  
 
The evidence against the unitary model led to the development of the collective household 
model which allows for preferences to differ among household members. These models 
assume that the household‟s resource allocations are Pareto efficient. This implies that re-
allocation of resources cannot make any household member better off without making 
someone else in the household worse off. In addition, in collective models, there is sharing 
rule which allows for different preferences of household members, but this rule can be 
affected by outside factors (Doss, 2013). Thus, unlike the unitary model, the collective model 
allows different decision makers to have different preferences; and also these models do not 
require a unique household welfare index or utility function, since the welfare index is 
dependent on prices, incomes and tastes (Chiappori, 1992).  
 
The collective models can be grouped into: cooperative bargaining models and non-
cooperative bargaining models (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000; Doss, 2013). Co-operative 
models assume that household members have free choices and any decision that each 
member makes is based on the utility to be derived from it. Under this model, each household 
member has bargaining power and this power is dependent on outside options of the 
members. This outside option is the welfare that each member would get if he or she is not a 
member of that household. The availability of outside options for individuals implies that 
policies that change these options will affect the bargaining power of household members and 
this, in turn, will affect outcomes from decisions made based on these bargaining powers. For 
instance, a cash transfer made to women may increase their bargaining power and this may 
affect the household‟s decision on child related outcomes.  
 
The co-operative collective model has been grouped into two main categories. The first 
category assumes that households‟ decisions are the outcomes of bargaining power. This 
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bargaining power allows each household member to push for their preferences; but they do 
this by comparing their current position to the fall-back position, since the household is likely 
to break-up if no agreement is reached (Ambreem, 2013). Thus, households‟ decisions are 
made based on who gains and who loses most should the household break-up (Haddad, 
1994). The second category is the co-operative conflict model. Unlike the co-operative 
bargaining model, the co-operative conflict model assumes that the perceived roles and 
obligations of household members result in differences in preferences; and this perceived 
differences in roles and obligations result in conflict resolution (Ellis, 1998). The Maternal 
Altruist model, which puts more social pressure on women to lower their needs to those of 
other household member, is an example of co-operative conflict model (Bolt and Bird, 2003). 
The Maternal Altruist model suggests that when women earn their own income, they invest 
more in their children because there are little or no opportunities for investment elsewhere 
(Devereux, 2001). 
 
Non-cooperative collective models are less common in the literature than co-operative 
models (Bolt and Bird, 2003). These models usually do not assume that households‟ resource 
allocation leads to Pareto efficiency in either production or consumption (Doss, 2013). 
Becker‟s Super-Trader household model (Becker, 1981) is an example. Some studies (Udry, 
1996; McPeak and Doss, 2006) use the non-cooperative models to test the assumptions of the 
co-operative models. For instance, Guatemala, Katz (1995) finds that each household 
member spends his/her earnings and transfers to fulfil his or her own preferences and 
responsibilities. Individuals have different preferences and the realisation of these preferences 
is based on their bargaining power or autonomy in the household. Hence, factors that 
determine a mother‟s bargaining power is important for the outcomes of decisions made in 
the household. For instance, an increase in women‟s autonomy undermines patriarchal family 
structure, reduces son-preference, and increases the opportunity costs of having children 
(Mutharayappa, 2014). 
 
Theoretically, women‟s autonomy or bargaining power has been found to be influenced by 
four main sets of determinants: (1) control over resources such as assets; (2) factors that 
influence the bargaining process; (3) mobilisation of interpersonal networks; and (4) basic 
attitudinal attributes (Quisumbling and Maluccio, 1999). Women‟s participation in economic 
activities and their control over economic resources have been the main focus for women 
empowerment in the economic literature (Quisumbling and Maluccio, 1999; Khan, 2013). 
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One of the earliest studies (Engels, 1884) advocates for policies that increase women‟s 
participation in the labour market, since that is a sure way to empower them and liberate them 
from the restrictions imposed by patriarchal norms. This view has been supported in the 
literature in recent times as women who worked outside the household have increased level 
of autonomy relative to those who do not work (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; DFID, 2007; 
Safa, 1992; Rahman and Rao, 2004).  
 
However, women‟s labour market participation decision in itself is influenced by the 
bargaining powers within the household or women‟s autonomy in the household. Hence, 
different measures of women autonomy or bargaining power exogenous to their labour 
supply have been used in the literature. These measures include assets ownership (Doss, 
1996; Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg, 1997; Quisumbing 1994); unearned income 
(Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990), transfer payments or welfare receipts (Lundberg, Pollak and 
Wales, 1997; Rubaclava and Thomas, 1997); assets at marriage (Thomas, Frankenberg, and 
Contreras, 1997); and current assets (Doss, 1996).  Ownership of these economic resources 
increases one‟s bargaining power or autonomy in the household because the threat to 
withdraw oneself and his/her resources may have an adverse effect on the welfare of the other 
household members. However, as noted by Quisumbling and Maluccio (1999), this threat is 
credible only if it is supported by norms or divorce laws. 
 
In addition to women‟s control over economic resources, factors such as legal rights of 
spouses in marriage, social norms, skills and knowledge of each spouse, their educational 
level and their capacity to acquire information tend to influence the bargaining process. 
Though some of these factors, such as legal rights and social norms, may be external to the 
individual; the majority of the factors that influence the bargaining process are internal to the 
individual and many of these factors are related to one‟s human capital or educational level 
(Quisumbling and Maluccio, 1999). For instance, education has been found to influence 
one‟s bargaining power with the more educated spouse more likely to make decisions in the 
household (Elder and Rudolph, 2003); so the educational level of a spouse affects his or her 
bargaining power (Lührmann and Maurer, 2007). In Ghana, when a wife is more educated 
than her husband, the former has more power to assert her preferences in the allocation of the 




Thirdly, memberships in organisation, access to one‟s kin and other social networks; as well 
as one‟s social capital may positively influence a person‟s power to affect household 
decisions. Thus, individuals can increase their bargaining power or autonomy by increasing 
their social networks or having others extended family members‟ support, either financially 
or socially. In Bangladesh, for instance, the assurance of a brother‟s support to his sister 
seems to increase the latter‟s economic value in her household; thus, most women give up 
their share of land inheritance for such supports (Subramanian 1998). Lastly, a woman‟s self-
esteem, self-confidence and other attitudinal attributes also affect her bargaining power or 
autonomy in the household (Quisumbling and Maluccio, 1999). Hence, most Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) use legal awareness, political participation, and 
contraceptive use to empower women (Schuler et al., 1997). In conclusion, in addition to 
women‟s control of economic resources, the strong cultural traits prevalent in developing 
countries may directly or indirectly influence women‟s decision-making power or autonomy 
in the household as these affect their capacities, social networks and their self-worth in 




Empirical papers on bargaining power and child welfare can be grouped into those that 
examine the correlation between bargaining power in the household and child related 
outcomes; and those that analyse the causal relationship between these two variables. In the 
case of the former, a woman‟s bargaining power is seen as an exogenous variable or the 
possibility of endogeneity in the estimation is ignored. As such, her bargaining power is 
measured by different proxies and its effects estimated directly in the outcome equation. On 
the other hand, papers that examine the causal relationship use institutional or policy changes, 
experimental and instrumental variable approaches to examine the effect of a woman‟s 
bargaining power or autonomy on child-related outcomes. 
 
Thomas (1990) examined the effect of unearned income on child health outcomes. Using 
survey data on family health and nutrition in Brazil, he showed that mother's unearned 
income has a bigger impact on family‟s health than the effect of unearned income under the 
control of the father; and in the case of the probability of child survival, the effect is almost 
twenty times bigger. He also found evidence of gender preferences as mothers devote more 
resources to improve the nutritional status of their daughters, while fathers to their sons. 
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Similar results were found in the US, Brazil and Ghana where mothers were found to allocate 
more resources to daughters, while fathers channelled their resources toward sons (Thomas, 
1994). Hou and Ma (2013) examined the effect of women‟s bargaining power on uptake of 
maternal health services with the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey. 
A woman‟s decision-making power was constructed from four questions about household 
expenditures on food, clothing, medical treatment and recreation. A woman has decision-
making power on a particular issue if she makes decisions jointly with husband or by herself. 
They found that women‟s decision-making power has a significant and positive correlation 
with maternal health services uptake after controlling for socio-economic indicators and 
supply-side conditions. 
 
In terms of studies on bargaining power and child labour and/or schooling, Galasso (1999) 
analysed the effect of intra-household bargaining power on child labour and schooling in 
Indonesia. Using transfers at marriage and assets brought to marriage as proxies for parents' 
bargaining power; she found that an increase in a mother's bargaining power is associated 
with a lower probability of child labour and greater schooling. Also, Ahmed and Ray (2011) 
examined the effect of bargaining power among parents on child labour and schooling with 
the Bangladesh National Child Labour Survey data of 2002. Using fathers‟ and mothers‟ 
level of education as a measure of bargaining power, they found that parents do not have 
identical preferences towards boys‟ and girls‟ schooling decisions. Specifically, the education 
of both mother and father shifts the trade-off towards girls‟ schooling, as opposed to 
engaging in market work, but the differential impact of mother‟s education on girls is 
significantly larger. 
 
Establishing the causal effect of women‟s bargaining power on child related outcomes has 
been difficult since women‟s bargaining power is determined in the household; and, as such, 
it is not exogenous. Most studies rely on policy or institutional changes that are exogenous to 
the household to examine how such changes affect child related outcomes. One of the earliest 
studies is Lundberg et al. (1997). They studied the impact of the change in the UK Child 
Benefit policy of the 1970s that resulted in a substantial shift in child allowance from fathers 
to mothers. Using family expenditure survey data, they found that this policy change resulted 




Furthermore, Rangel (2006) analysed the effect of the 1994 change in Brazil‟s law that 
extended alimony rights of couples living in consensual uniform or informal marriage. He 
used household surveys conducted before and after the change in the law; and formally 
married couples as comparison group. He found that the extension of the alimony rights of 
women in informal marriage which is associated with their outside options, and hence their 
bargaining power, increase these women‟s leisure hours and school attendance of their oldest 
daughters. In addition, Deininger et al. (2010) studied a change in inheritance law in 1994 in 
two Indian states: Maharashtra and Karnataka. They examined the effect of this change in 
inheritance law which gave daughters and sons equal right to family lands on educational 
attainment of girls. Using 2006 nationally representative Rural Economic and Demographic 
Survey (REDS) they employ a difference-in-difference estimation strategy. They found that 
the change in the inheritance regime had a positive impact on women‟s educational 
attainment as girls who started their education after the amendment had 0.3 years more of 
elementary education in 2006. 
 
In addition, changes in other economic indicators or resources that households do not have 
control over have also been used to measure women autonomy. For instance, Qian (2008) 
investigated the effect of an exogenous increase in female income due to post-Mao 
agricultural reforms in China that resulted in an increase in price of tea (crop traditionally 
grown by women) and an increase in price of orchard based crops (crops cultivated by men) 
on sex-differential survival of children. The sex ratios and educational attainment of boys and 
girls in cohorts born in tea planting communities is compared to those in non-tea planting 
communities before and after the agricultural reforms. She found that increasing female 
income improves survival rates for girls, whereas increasing male income worsens survival 
rates for girls. Also, increasing female income increases educational attainment of all 
children, whereas increasing male income decreases educational attainment for girls and has 
no effect on boys‟ educational attainment. Similarly, Duflo (2003) and Jensen (2004) used 
the fact that the eligibility criteria for participation in the South African Old Age Pension 
Programme was discontinuous at age 60 for women and 65 for men to examine the effect of 
this income on child nutrition. The result from comparison of children‟s health status in 
households with an eligible elder to those without eligible elder showed that pensions receive 
by women had a larger effect on  the anthropometric measures of girls, with little effect on 
boys. However, income that goes to men had no effect. Thus, the change in women‟s 
bargaining power led to positive outcomes for children. 
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Few studies have used the experimental approach to examine women‟s bargaining power. 
One of them was in Mexico. Bobonis (2009) used the fact that participating in the Mexican 
PROGRESA was randomised to estimate its causal effect on the measure of women‟s 
wellbeing which is measured by the household‟s expenditure share on adult female clothing. 
Using early phase-in households as treatment group and late phase-in as control, he found 
that increases in income to women have substantial positive effects on expenditure shares in 
children‟s clothing as well as adult female clothing expenditures.  
 
Reggio (2011) investigated the causal relationship between mothers‟ bargaining power and 
child labour in Mexico with an instrumental variable approach. Using data from the Mexican 
Family Life Survey (MxFLS) of 2002, he measured mothers‟ bargaining power with their 
control over household asset. Mothers‟ ownership and participation in decision making 
processes related to household assets show their bargaining power in the household. He used 
the difference in husband‟s and wife‟s ages, and sex ratio as instruments for women‟s 
bargaining power or autonomy. These findings revealed that an increase in the mother's 
bargaining power has a negative impact on the hours of work of her daughters, but not her 
sons. 
 
Similar conclusion was reached by Ambreen, (2013) when she explored the effects of a 
mother‟s decision-making power on her child‟s schooling and labour decision in Pakistan. 
She used data from Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) 
conducted in 2007-08. Employing an instrumental variable approach, she focused on a 
subsample of women in the age group 15-49 years who were married and lived with their 
husbands and also have children aged between 10 to 14 years. The women‟s bargaining 
power is measured with an index constructed from five questions relating to women‟s 
participation in decision making on employment, purchases of household food and clothing, 
taking of medical treatment and recreation decisions. Following Reggio (2011), she used 
difference between husband and wife‟s ages; and difference between education attainment 
levels between women and men as instruments in estimating women‟s bargaining power in 
the first stage regression. The results show that mothers‟ bargaining power has highly 
significant and negative effect on child labour. Also, an increase in a mother‟s bargaining 




Apart from child related outcome, other studies have examined the impact of women‟s 
bargaining power on other household decisions. For example, Brown (2003) used the size of 
a woman‟s dowry as a measure of her bargaining power and investigated how it affects the 
intra-household allocation of time between household chores and leisure and the share of 
household spending that goes to women‟s goods. The author instrumented for dowry with 
regional grain shocks in the year preceding marriage and sibling sex composition of the bride 
and groom.  The result indicated that higher dowries are associated with more potential 
leisure time for wives. In addition, Osmani (2007) studied the impact of participation in 
microcredit programme (which is a measure of bargaining power) in Bangladesh on land and 
non-land asset ownership. Osmani (2007) used the size of household labour force, number of 
dependents and principal occupation of the household as instruments for participation in 
microcredit programme. He found a significant and positive effect of bargaining power on 
land ownership. 
 
In summary, the review of the literature suggests that intra-household distribution of decision 
making power can have different impacts on investment in children. In addition, the literature 
seems to suggest that girls benefit more from resource allocation when their mothers have 
higher bargaining power, and this is true for boys and their fathers. However, there are few 
studies on women‟s autonomy and child labour and schooling particularly in SSA. The few 
studies that examine impact of women‟s autonomy on child labour and schooling either 
ignore the possibility of endogeneity in the estimation or concentrate on the extensive margin 
of child labour and school enrolment. This chapter extends the literature on bargaining power 
and child welfare by using a non-economic measure of mother‟s autonomy to establish its 




4.3.  Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
The data used in this chapter comes from a nation-wide survey conducted in 2010 by the 
Economic Growth Centre (EGC) of Yale University and the Institute of Statistical, Social and 
Economic Research (ISSER) of the University of Ghana. This survey is the first wave of an 
on-going longitudinal survey of individuals, households and communities in Ghana. The 
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survey uses household and community, as well as districts and municipal assemblies‟ 
questionnaires. The household module provides data on demographic characteristics, 
employment, education, migration, health and fertility, power relations for men and women, 
household expenditure and housing characteristics, asset ownership, psychology and social 
network, as well as child module (health, digit test, raven test, maths test, English test) for the 
10 regions of Ghana. The community questionnaire documents a broad range of natural and 
institutional features of the community, including political organisations, financial 
institutions, the presence of various development programmes, and community infrastructure. 
 
A two-stage stratified sample design was used for the survey with the stratification based on 
the regions of Ghana. The first stage involved random selection of 334 Enumeration Areas 
(EAs) or geographical clusters from the 10 regions of Ghana using an updated master 
sampling frame constructed from the 2000 Ghana Population and Housing Census. The 
number of EAs for each region was proportionately allocated based on estimated 2009 
population share for each region; however, EAs for Upper East and Upper West regions were 
over sampled to allow for a reasonable number of households to be interviewed in these 
regions. After this, a complete household listing was conducted in 2009 in all the selected 
clusters to provide a sampling frame for the second stage selection of households. The second 
stage of the selection involved a simple random sampling of 15 of the listed households from 
each selected cluster to ensure adequate numbers of completed individual interviews so that 
estimates for key indicators at the regional level can be undertaken with acceptable level of 
precision. 
 
This 2010 survey is not a self-weighting sample design because disproportionately larger 
samples from regions with smaller populations were drawn; so each household did not have 
the same chance of selection into the survey sample.  Hence, household sample weights are 
computed to reflect the different probabilities of selection into the sample in order to obtain 
the true contribution of each selected EA in the sample based on the first and second stages of 
selection. This is to facilitate estimation of the true contribution of each selected cluster in the 
sample. 
 
In total, 5,010 households were sampled and 5,009 households from 334 Enumeration Areas 
(EAs) were completely interviewed. Thus, 15 households were selected from each of the 334 
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EAs. From the 5,009 households, 18,889 individuals or household members were 
interviewed. Since this chapter examines the effect of mothers‟ bargaining power or 
autonomy on children‟s participation in school and labour market, it focuses on a separate 
section of the household module that deals with power relations for men and women. This 
section of the questionnaire applies to men and women aged 12 years and above. Moreover, 
since this chapter focuses on the effects of a mother‟s decision-making power or autonomy 
on her children, the sample is restricted to all women aged 18 years and above living with 
their partners and children. Thus, children (persons less than 18 years) of women who are 
either married or in consensual union and living in the same households form the sample for 
this study. Table 4.1 shows the sample size of the data for this chapter. 
 
Table 4. 1 Sample Size 
Indicators Total 
Total Enumeration Areas 334 
Total Households 5,009 
Total Individuals 18,889 
Target Households: Women living with their spouses and children 1,950 
Children (persons less than 18 years) in target households 5,985 
 
 
From table 4.1, the study sample comprises of 1,950 women (18 years and above) who are 
either married or are in consensual unions and are staying with their spouse(s) and have 
children who were less than 18 years. In these households, there are 5,985 children and these 
children form the sample for the analysis of mothers‟ autonomy on schooling in this study. 
 
4.3.2  Construction of Mothers’ Bargaining Power Index  
The power relation module of the household questionnaire contains questions related to intra-
household power relationship between men and women. Five questions that measure 
bargaining power or autonomy are selected to construct an index of bargaining power or 
autonomy. Specifically, the five questions that both men and women were asked are: 
 
1. The important decisions in the family should be made only by the men of the family 
2. A wife has a right to express her opinions even when she disagrees with what her 
husband is saying 
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3. When a wife has earned some money she has the right to spend it on herself or her 
children without asking her husband 
4. A wife‟s partner frequently tries to limit her contact with her family members 
5. A wife‟s partner insists on knowing where she is at all time 
 
The answers to these questions are categorised as: agree which takes the value of 1; or 
disagree which takes the valve of 0. This study uses the responses provided by the men
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instead of the women. Thus, the answers provided to the above questions by the spouse of a 
woman are used to construct her bargaining power or autonomy index, since man‟s responses 
to such questions have been found to provide a more accurate measure of a woman‟s 
autonomy in a household (Chakraborty and De, 2011). Also, from the above questions, 
agreement with questions 2 and 3 indicate an increase in a woman‟s autonomy, while an 
agreement with statements 1, 4 and 5 shows a decrease in a woman‟s autonomy or 
bargaining. For this reason, these responses are coded to ensure that a higher value signifies a 
higher autonomy or bargaining power. Thus, for statements 1, 4 and 5 disagreement takes the 
value 1; while agreement to these statements is coded 0. 
 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to determine the weights that each response 
should carry. PCA is a statistical tool for identifying patterns in data, and expressing the data 
in such a way as to highlight their similarities and differences by reducing the number of 
dimensions. It transforms a set of possibly correlated variables to a set of linearly 
uncorrelated variables called principal components or indices. Each component is a linear 
weighted combination of initial variables that captures the common patterns.  Hence, with 
five questions whose answers are used to construct a mother‟s bargaining power (MBP) or 
her autonomy; their linear combinations are given by: 
 
                                        (1) 
 
                                        (2) 
 
                                        (3) 
 
                                        (4) 
 
                                        (5) 
                                                          
31
 As a form of robustness check, responses provided by the women are used later in this chapter 
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Where    ……    are the weights. These weights are the eigenvectors of the correlation 
matrix or they are eigenvectors of the co-variance matrix if the original data are standardised. 
The eigenvalue of the corresponding eigenvectors is the variance for each principal 
component or the percentage of variation in the total data explained. Under the PCA, the 
transformation ensures that the first principal component explains the largest variation in the 
data subject to the constraint that the sum of square weights is equal to 1. Each succeeding 
component is uncorrelated with the previous and it, in turn, explains the highest variation in 
the data among the remaining components and is subject to the same constraint; but each 
explains smaller and smaller proportions of the variation of the original variables. For 
instance, the second component (PC2) is completely uncorrelated with the first component, 
and explains additional, but less variation than the first component, subject to the same 
constraint. The eigenvalues equal the number of variables (n) in the initial data set (in this 
case it is five), the proportion of the total variation in the original data set accounted by each 
principal component is given by λi/n, where λi  is the total variation. 
 
With PCA, the higher the degree of correlation among the original variables in the data, the 
fewer the components required to capture common information; hence the first three 
components are used to measure mother‟s bargaining power or autonomy, since they explain 
about 80 percent of the variability in the data. Also, under PCA, the variables with low 
standard deviations usually would carry a low weight (McKenzie, 2003). For instance, in the 
case of this study, a question which all households agree or no household agrees (no standard 
deviation) would exhibit no variation between households and would be zero weighted. The 
PCA is applied because it is expect that the weight attached to the indicator questions will 
differ.  
 
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Schooling 
As stated earlier, this chapter considers the schooling of children aged three to seventeen 
years (3-17 years)
32
 living with their parents. Overall, 3,767 children within this age group 
were surveyed and out of this 96 percent of them are enrolled in school. School enrolment 
rates in the urban centres are 2 percentage points higher than those in the rural areas (95 
                                                          
32
 The section on education in the questionnaire applies to persons three years and above; and also in Ghana 
children are persons below the age of eighteen. 
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percent) as depicted in table 4.2. This high enrolment rate is not surprising since GER in the 
country is relatively higher, particularly at the primary level. In terms of gender, boys and 
girls school enrolment rates are 96 percent and 95 percent respectively. Generally, children 
spend about six hours per day in school. Therefore, with five days of schooling, they are 
supposed to spend 30 hours per week in school. However, from table 4.2, on average 
children‟s weekly hours of class attendance is 22 hours. 
 
Table 4. 2 Enrolment Rate and Weekly Hours of Attendance by Location and Gender 
  Enrolment  Class Attendance 
  Number % Number Weekly Hours 
Location: Rural 2730 0.95 2574 22.4 
                Urban 1037 0.97 1006 21.55 
     Gender:  Boys 1993 0.96 1913 22.23 
               Girls 1774 0.95 1685 22.05 
Total 3767 0.96 3513 22.15 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows that a little over half (52 percent) of the children in the sample are boys, and 
the average age of a child in the sample is nine years. As far as household head characteristics 
are concerned, as much as 99 percent of households are headed by males; and they have an 
average age of 46 years. In addition, on average, seven people constitute a household, and the 
average number of children in a household is about four. In terms of the standard of living of 
these households, the average annual per capita expenditure is about GH¢516 with an average 
asset index of 0.05. Also, 77 percent of these households own farmland; and lastly, only 23 













Table 4. 3 Descriptive statistics of the Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child Characteristics 
    Age 8.77 4.95 3 17 
Boys 0.52 0.5 0 1 
Head Characteristics 
    Male 0.99 0.11 0 1 
Age 45.56 12.22 15 100 
Household Characteristics 
    Land ownership 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Per Capita Expenditure 515.47 381.05 101 5666.21 
Household size 6.8 2.68 2 20 
Number of children 4.08 2.17 1 15 
Asset Index 0.05 1.05 -2.26 2.03 
Located in urban area 0.23 0.42 0 1 




From table 4.4, a total of 1,666 households are engaged in farming and out of these, 1,346 
and 320 are found in rural and urban areas respectively. Among these farming households, 41 
percent of them (685) engage in child labour. Whereas 47 percent of farming households in 
rural areas use children on their farm, only 16 percent of those in urban centres engage in 
such practice. Though child labour participation rate in rural areas is higher than in urban 
centres, the intensity of work done by urban children is higher than their counterparts in rural 
areas. Specifically, the weekly hours of farm work done by children is about 3 hours less in 
rural areas than in urban areas, where children work for approximately 20 hours per week. 
 
Table 4. 4 Child Labour and Weekly Hours of Work by Location and Gender 
  Farming Child Labour 
  Number Participation  % Weekly Hours 
Location: Rural 1346 633 0.47 16.99 
                  Urban 320 52 0.16 19.83 
Total 1666 685 0.41 17.21 
 
 
The average age per child in these farming households is about 7 years (see table 4.5), which 
is slightly lower than the average age per child in the entire sample (see table 4.3). In 
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addition, the proportion of households headed by male (0.85) and the average age of a 
household head (44 years) are lower among this sub-sample than the main sample.  
 
Table 4. 5 Descriptive Statistics of Farming Households 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average Age of children 7.33 3.95 0 17 
Male Head 0.85 0.12 0 1 
Head Age 44.25 12.67 15 100 
Land ownership 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Per Capita Expenditure 593.04 437.97 91 5666.21 
Household size 5.59 2.13 2 20 
Number of children 3.02 1.71 1 14 
Asset Index 0.03 1.02 -2.26 2.03 
Located in urban area 0.19 0.45 0 1 
Sum of couples Age 81.18 22.55 3 172 
 
 
In terms of household characteristics, the average annual per capita expenditure is GH¢593; 
and, on average, a farming household consists of 6 members with about 3 of them being 
children. Also, from table 4.5, 71 percent of these households own farmland. This is not 
surprising since, in Ghana, farming can be done on rented lands or through a share cropping 
system where farmers cultivate on other people‟s lands and share the produces with them. 




As indicated earlier, this study assesses a woman‟s autonomy with an index constructed from 
responses given by their spouses to five questions. Table 4.6 presents the five main indicators 
or questions used in constructing the autonomy index and the responses given by women and 
men.  
 
For the first indicator, whereas 46 percent of women agree that important decisions in the 
family should be made by only men, about 51 percent of men agree with this statement. 
Secondly, whereas 84 percent of women believe that a wife has the right to express her 
opinion even when she disagrees with what her husband is saying, a lower percentage of men 
(73 percent) agree with this. When a wife has earned some money, more women (47percent) 
compared to men (34percent) agree that she has the right to spend it on herself or on her 
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children without asking her husband. In addition, though only 29 percent of women agree that 
their husbands try to limit their contacts with family members, 33 percent of men say they try 
to limit their wives contact with family members. Lastly, the proportion of women who agree 
(58percent) that their partners insist on knowing where they are at all time, is less than the 
proportion of men who agree (62percent) to the same indicator.  
 
Table 4. 6 Decision Making Indicators  
    Women Men 
 
Responses % % 
Important Decisions in the family should be  Agree 45.6 50.56 
made only by men of the family       
A wife has the right to express her opinions   Agree 84.18 72.85 
even when she disagree with what her husband 
   is saying       
When a wife has earned some money she has the  Agree 46.57 34.32 
right to spend it on herself or her children without  
   asking her husband       
A woman's partner frequently tried to limit her Agree 28.63 33.16 
contact with her family       
A woman's partner insists on knowing where Agree 58.23 61.81 
she is at all time       
The remaining percentages refer to those that disagree with the above statements. 
 
From table 4.6, women seem to have more autonomy if one consider the responses given by 
them vis-à-vis the responses by men. Men‟s responses tend to give an accurate measure of the 
level of autonomy of their wives (Chakraborty and De, 2011), since, in Ghana and other 
patriarchal society, men are mostly the heads of households. As stated earlier, this study uses 
the responses provided by the men in the construction of the autonomy index of mothers. 
Thus, the autonomy index shows the degree of autonomy husbands or partners are actually 
willing to grant to their wives (Chakraborty and De, 2011). Table 4.7 shows the summary 
statistics of all the five indicators, as well as the eigenvalues and weights assigned to each of 
the indicators in generating the index. The highest and lowest weights are respectively 
associated with decisions about limit of a woman‟s contact with her family (0.58) and a 











Important decisions in the family should not   0.49 0.5 1.96 0.38 
be made by only men         
A wife has the right to express her opinions   0.73 0.44 1.17 0.43 
even when she disagree with her husband         
A wife has a right to spend her earned money on 0.34 0.47 0.9 0.23 
herself or her children without asking her 
husband  
        
A woman's partner does not frequently try to  0.67 0.47 0.63 0.58 
limit her contact with her family 
    A woman's partner does not insist on knowing  0.38 0.49 0.33 0.53 




4.3.4 Estimation Strategy 
Empirical Model  
Recent studies have shown that parents have different preferences with respect to demand for 
children‟s products; and, as such, resource allocation in the household may be done to settle 
the difference in preferences (Emerson and Souza, 2007; Ambreem, 2013). This settlement of 
parents‟ preference depends on their relative bargaining power autonomy. Hence, this chapter 
uses the collective model of the household (Chiappori 1988, 1992) as a foundation to 
examine the effect of a mother‟s bargaining power on her children‟s schooling and child 
labour decisions. Unlike the unitary model that assumes that parents have the same 
preference and maximise a single utility function, the collective model of the household 
assumes that a household maximises a weighted average of the wife‟s and husband‟s utilities, 
where the weights capture each parent‟s bargaining power or their effectiveness in the 
decision-making process (Basu and Ray, 2002).  
 
Under this model, each parent has a separate utility function and the household maximises a 
weighted average of these utilities. Maximisation of these utilities subject to both the income 
and time constraints will yield a system of demand functions for schooling and child labour. 
Following Ahmed and Ray (2011), the demands for schooling (   
   and child labour 
(   




                                  (6) 
  
       )                                                (7) 
 
Where Z represents individual, household and community characteristics that affect the 
household utility and   is the weight on the mother‟s utility function and it is a measure of 
her bargaining power and   [   ]. Based on equations (6) and (7) and assuming a linear 
relationship the dependent and the explanatory variables, the empirical equations to be 
estimated are:  
 
                                                             (8) 
 
                                                                        (9) 
 
From equations (8) and (9),     is the schooling status of a child i in household h; and this is 
measured in two forms: school enrolment and hours of school attendance. In terms of school 
enrolment,     equals to 1 if a child was enrolled in school the previous year and he or she is 
still in school, otherwise 0; and, in terms of class attendance,     is the weekly hours of 
school attendance.    represents measurements of both extensive and intensive margin of 
child labour.    equals to 1 if a household h uses children for farming activities or exchanges 
children to work on other people‟s farms, otherwise 0. In terms of intensive margin of child 
labour,    is the number of hours per week that a child works on a farm. 
 
       refers to the child specific characteristics which have been found to influence 
schooling and child labour. They include a child‟s gender, age and age square (Lancaster and 
Ray, 2005; Bhalotra 2007). For the impact of mothers‟ autonomy on child labour, the average 
age of a child in a household and the proportion of boys in a household are used since the 
analysis is at the household level. A child‟s participation in child labour is expected to 
increase with his/her age since older children are stronger relative to younger children, and 
they may earn higher income than the later. Similarly, it is hypothesized that a child‟s school 
enrolment status will increase with age. In addition, it is expected that this relationship 
between a child‟s time use and his/her age to be non-linear, hence the inclusion of age square. 
In terms of the gender of the children, this study expects school enrolment and child labour to 
increase and decrease respectively if a child is male. This is based on the studies in Ghana 
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that have shown that girls are more likely to engage in child labour, but less likely to attend 
school (Blunch and Verner, 2000; Nielsen, 1998; Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1998).  
 
      and     represent characteristics of the household head and the household 
respectively. The head of the household‟s gender, household size, household‟s annual per 
capita income (measured by annual per capita expenditure), number of children in the 
household (persons less than 18 years) and ownership of farmland are included in both 
schooling and child labour regressions. In terms of community characteristics (COC), the 
location (rural or urban) of the household is included in the estimation to capture differences 
in labour and schooling markets. 
  
The main parameters of interest in this study are     and    which capture the impact of a 
mother‟s bargaining power (MBP) on her children‟s schooling and child labour respectively. 
A mother‟s bargaining power is measured by the autonomy index explained above. A 
mother‟s bargaining power is expected to impact positively on her children‟s schooling; but it 
should have a negative effect on her children‟s engagement in the labour market. These 
expectations are based on the collective model outlined above, which assumes that schooling 
provides both parents with positive externalities. So, as the mother‟s bargaining power 
increases, her demand for schooling also increases. On the other hand, child labour is a „bad 
consumption good‟ that gives both parents disutility; thus, an increase in bargaining power of 
a parent (in this case the mother‟s bargaining power) reduces child labour.  
 
Endogeneity of the Mother’s Bargaining Power  
One potential issue that may affect the estimation of equation (8) and (9) is that the mother‟s 
bargaining power in the decision making process may not be exogenous. Specifically, it may 
be influenced by many variables both observables and non-observables; hence estimating 
these equations by probit or Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model may lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates. This issue has been recognized by recent studies. For instance, 
Roushdy and Namoro (2007) argue that parents‟ bargaining powers in the decision making 
process is determined by several factors, such as their individual and households 
characteristics as well as social norms; hence, it is endogenously determined. Men and 
women have different preferences regarding their children‟s welfare. These preferences are 
influenced by many factors, such as the gender of the child, his or her age, and even the 
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number of children they have. In addition to these factors, an individual‟s power in a decision 
making process is influenced by factors that are unobservable. Women who contribute more 
income to the household are more likely to have greater power; however, this higher income 
contribution may be influenced by factors that cannot be observed such as her ability.  
 
Furthermore, the endogeneity in the bargaining power and decision-making outcomes may 
result from „reverse causality‟. As noted by Basu (2006), literature examining the impact of 
bargaining power or autonomy on decisions made often ignores the opposite effects of these 
decisions on bargaining power. Sometime the decisions made may in turn influence a 
mother‟s bargaining power or autonomy. For instance, the decision to engage in work outside 
the home may influence a woman‟s income which, in turn, may grant her higher bargaining 
power or autonomy. To account for the possibility of endogeneity in the mother‟s bargaining 
power or autonomy variable an instrumental variable approach is used to estimate equations 
(8) and (9). Specifically, they are estimated with two stage least square models (2SLS). 
Firstly, the autonomy index is assumed to be exogenous; and then a test for endogeneity is 
carried out in both equations before the 2SLS estimation method is applied.  
 
Instrumental variable approach requires that variables that serve as instruments must correlate 
with the endogenous variable (that is mother‟s bargaining power), but have no direct effect 
on the outcome variable (child labour and schooling). Thus, factors that affect distribution of 
power within the household but have no direct impact on household behaviour. The so called 
distribution factors used in previous studies include (i) difference between husband and 
wife‟s ages (ii) difference between husband and wife‟s years of schooling and (iii) sex ratio 
(number of men verses female) in the community (Reggio, 2011; Ambreem, 2013). 
Following these studies (Reggio, 2011; Ambreem, 2013), difference in years of schooling of 
the spouses; and the sex ratio in the district where the woman resides are used as distribution 
factors in the first stage estimation.  
 
It is expected that a woman‟s bargaining power or autonomy in a household is lower if the 
difference in years of school is higher. This is because more educated women may have 
better outside opportunities for jobs, and their withdrawal from the household may have 
adverse effects on all members; hence, they may be given higher bargaining power or 
126 
 
autonomy by their partners. Sex ratio
33
 is defined as the number of men within a specific age 
group over the number of women in the same age group in a district. Sex ratio has been found 
to be one of the important determinants of intra-household bargaining power (Chiappori, 
Fortin and Lacroix, 2002), since it reflects the relative supply of men and women in the 
marriage market (Reggio, 2011). It follows then that the lower the sex ratio (that is when 
there are more females than males in the community) the lower the autonomy of women. 
 
These distribution factors (sex ratio and differences in years of schooling) should not have 
direct effects on the outcome variables (child labour and schooling). Arguably, households do 
not consider the district sex ratio when deciding to send their children to school and/or work 
(Reggio, 2011). Also, the difference between the educational levels of parents is likely to 
affect these decisions only through its influence on bargaining power in the household as they 
determine whose preference with regard to investment in the children holds (Ambreem, 
2013). Therefore, the first stage estimation equation can be written as: 
 
                                   (10) 
 
Where MBP is the mother‟s bargaining power or autonomy index, D represents the 
distribution factors that affect household behaviour through the mother‟s bargaining power 
(that is the difference in years of school of the couple; and sex ratio); and X is a vector of 
factors that affect the decision making directly. These factors include the gender and age of a 
woman‟s children, gender of the household head, household size, number of children in the 
household, sum of the couples age, annual per capita income of the household, asset index of 
the household, ownership of farm land, durable asset index and location of the household. 
    
In the second stage, both the decision for a child to participate in the labour market and 
school, as well as the number of hours that he/she spends in school and the labour market are 
estimated. Thus, from equations (8), (9) and (10), the second stage equations are: 
 
            ̂                                                 (11) 
 
           ̂                                                                (12) 
 
                                                          
33
 Since in Ghana children are persons below the age of eighteen, the sex ratio is the number of men over the 
number of women at the district using 5 years interval beginning from persons within the age ranges 18-22 years 
followed by 23-27 years etc. There were 170 districts in Ghana in 2010. 
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Where   ̂ is the mother‟s bargaining power or autonomy estimated from the first stage 
regression.       and     represent characteristics of the household head and the 
household respectively.     is a vector of community variables that are likely to affect child 
labour and schooling. All other variables are as defined above; detail description of these 
variables is found in table C1 at the appendix.  
 
4.4.  Main Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the regression results, starting with the determinants of mothers‟ 
decision making autonomy, and then the impacts of mothers‟ autonomy on schooling and 
child labour.  
 
4.4.1 Determinants of Mothers’ Autonomy or Bargaining Power 
Most studies on women autonomy or bargaining power rely on their access or control over 
economic resources to measure autonomy since it is difficult to get good indicators of non-
economic autonomy and valid instruments for such indicators. As stated earlier, mothers‟ 
autonomy is constructed from five indicators that show women‟s abilities to take certain 
decisions and act on their own. Table 4.8 show the first stage regression results where 
mothers‟ bargaining power or autonomy is the dependent variable.  
 
From table 4.8, sex ratio has a significant and positive influence on bargaining power of 
women in both the overall sample and the subsamples. The positive relationship between sex 
ratio and mothers‟ autonomy implies that as the number of men (women) in a district 
increases (decreases), the autonomy of women increases. This result confirms prior 
expectation of a positive relationship between sex ratio and mothers‟ autonomy made. As 
noted by Angrist (2002), an increase in the sex ratio may increase a woman‟s bargaining 
power in the marriage market, thereby increasing her autonomy in the household. This may 
be possible because more men in the marriage market imply that a woman can get out of a 
marriage that prevents her from being independent and enter into another marriage easily.  
 
Generally, Ghanaian men have higher education (more years of schooling) than women 
(GSS, 2014a). Therefore, differences in the years of schooling between the man and his 
wife/partner were included in the estimation and the result shows that differences in 
education significantly increase a woman‟s bargaining power.  This implies that the higher 
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the difference in the educational levels of the spouses, the higher the autonomy of the 
woman. This result contradicts prior expectation that the higher the difference in education 
between spouses, the lower the woman‟s autonomy. This expectation is based on the fact that 
one requires some information in order to make certain decisions, and women with higher 
education can access such information and engage effectively in the household‟s bargaining 
process. However, it is also possible that women may benefit indirectly from the education of 
their spouses, since more educated men may know the importance of allowing their wives to 
be autonomous; hence, the  observed positive relationship between these variables.   
 
Table 4. 8 Determinants of Mother’s Autonomy or Bargaining Power 
Variables         All          Rural        Urban 
Sex Ratio 0.109** 0.170** 0.670*** 
 
(0.0443) (0.0683) (0.234) 
DiffYrSch 0.0298*** 0.0244*** 0.0434*** 
 
(0.00360) (0.00402) (0.00761) 
Age 0.0216 0.0221 0.0279 
 
(0.0170) (0.0184) (0.0406) 
Age2 -0.00923 -0.00849 -0.0148 
 
(0.00869) (0.00939) (0.0208) 
Boy 0.0627** 0.0604** 0.0811 
 
(0.0279) (0.0302) (0.0678) 
Ownland -0.0130 -0.0962 0.0929 
 
(0.0456) (0.0607) (0.0734) 
MaleHead -0.615*** -0.551*** -1.111*** 
 
(0.160) (0.195) (0.281) 
HHsize -0.0265* -0.0441*** 0.0123 
 
(0.0141) (0.0153) (0.0337) 
NoChildren 0.0397*** 0.0189*** 0.0897** 
 
(0.0172) (0.00186) (0.0429) 
Pcexphh 0.0129*** 0.00123** 0.00124 
 
(0.0047) (0.00053) (0.00091) 
Urban 0.266*** - - 
 
(0.0450) - - 
AssetIndexHH 0.0371** 0.00417 0.103*** 
 
(0.0157) (0.0136) (0.0362) 
CoupleAge 0.0277*** 0.0360*** -0.0150 
  (0.00733) (0.00771) (0.0208) 
Observations 4,746 3,691 1,055 
F-Statistics 30.11 27.39 24.76 
Prob. F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.216 0.218 0.204 




In addition to these two factors, the results indicate that a child‟s age does not have any 
significant effect on a woman‟s bargaining power; however, having a male child (boy) 
significantly increases a woman‟s bargaining power in the overall sample and rural 
subsample. This result is not surprising since, in Ghana, a male child is „valued‟ more than a 
female child and, as such, women who are able to give birth to boys may have more power in 
the household than their counterparts with girls. Also, having a male head influences a 
woman‟s bargaining power negatively. Thus, women tend to have lesser autonomy when the 
household is headed by a man. In addition, the sum of ages of the couple also has a positive 
effect on women‟s autonomy in the overall sample and rural subsample; but it has no effect in 
the urban subsample Thus, a rural woman has a higher bargaining power when she and her 
husband are older. Furthermore, if a household owns farmland, then a woman‟s bargaining 
power reduces in the overall sample and the rural sub-sample; but farmland ownership has no 
significant effect on the autonomy of women in the urban sub-sample. This result may be due 
to the fact that in rural areas, farmlands are important productive inputs for farming, which is 
the major economic activity in such areas, and they are usually owned by men. Hence, 
women with little or no access to such productive input may have lower autonomy. 
 
Lastly, a household asset index is significantly and positively related to a woman‟s 
bargaining power for the overall sample and urban subsample; but it has no effect in the rural 
subsample. This result is confirmed by the positive relationship between mothers‟ autonomy 
and households‟ annual per capita income. This means that the wealthier the household, the 
higher the bargaining power or autonomy of women. In addition, women in households with 
more people have lower autonomy relative to those with smaller households‟ size. Also, an 
increase in the number of children that a woman has increases her autonomy in the family. 
Traditionally, children are important outcomes of marriage. They tend to guarantee the 
continuous existence of the marriage. As such, women who cannot have children may have 
lesser bargaining power in the marriage market and the family since their partners may 
divorce them due to their childlessness. Living in an urban area increases the bargaining 
power or autonomy of women. Thus, women in urban areas have higher autonomy relative to 
their counterparts in rural areas. This may be because women in urban centres are more likely 






4.4.2 Impact of a Mother’s Autonomy on Schooling and Child Labour 
Now, this section examines the impact of mothers‟ decision making autonomy on their 
children‟s schooling and child labour. For each outcome, the mothers‟ autonomy variable is 
first treated as exogenous and either probit (for school enrolment and child labour 
participation) or tobit (for hours of class attendance and child labour) regression is ran.  Then, 
the possibility of endogeneity of mothers‟ autonomy variable is considered and 2SLS 




Impact on Schooling 
Tables 4.9 and 4.11 present the marginal effects of the impact of mothers‟ bargaining power 
on children‟s school enrolment and weekly hours of class attendance respectively; while 
tables 4.10 and 4.12 show the results  when the sample is split by the gender of the child. In 
tables 4.9 and 4.11, columns 1, 3 and 5 respectively show the probit results, while columns 2, 
4 and 6 show the IV-probit results (2SLS) for the overall, rural and urban samples. For tables 
4.10 and 4.12 columns 1 and 2 show the impact of mothers‟ autonomy on these outcomes for 




Before these results are discussed, it is important to look at the results of the diagnostic tests 
on the instruments. This is so because though instrumental variable (IV) estimation may be 
used to solve the problem of endogeneity of a regressor, IV estimates tend to have poor 
statistical properties and may perform worse than Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates 
when invalid and weak instruments are used (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002).  
 
The post estimation diagnostic tests show that mothers‟ autonomy is endogenous in all cases 
(tables 4.9 and 4.10). This is indicated by the significant Wald tests
34
. Also, the tests of over-
identifying restrictions
35
 show that the instruments used in this study are valid, since the tests 
are statistically insignificant in all cases. Finally, overall, the partial R squared results are a 
bit low suggesting the need for caution as far as instruments weakness is concerned. 
                                                          
34
 The Wald test for exogeneity is performed in this case since ivprobit was used in the estimation. 
35
 STATA does not have the post estimation commands for ivprobit and ivtobit to test the validity and weakness 
of instruments, so the ivregress command is used instead. The results are similar to the above results (see tables 
C2-C4 in the appendix). Hence, these post-estimation tests are from the ivregress estimations.  
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However, the F statistic results for the joint significance of the instruments excluded from the 
structural model are all considerably larger than the rule of thumb value of 10 (Stock, Wright 
and Yogo, 2002). The instruments, hence, do not seem to be weak. 
 
From table 4.9, a mother‟s autonomy has a significant and positive impact on school 
enrolment of her children. This positive relationship between mothers‟ autonomy and school 
enrolment is true for the overall sample as well as the sub-samples. However, for both the 
overall sample and the subsamples, the impact of mothers‟ autonomy on school enrolment is 
higher in the IV models relative to the probit models. These results suggest that ignoring the 
endogeneity of mothers‟ autonomy variable underestimate its true impact on school 
enrolment. This result supports earlier study on mothers‟ bargaining power and child labour 
in rural Senegal where the OLS estimates were lower than the IV estimates (Lépine and 
Strobl, 2013). 
 
Women‟s bargaining power increases the likelihood of a child‟s school enrolment by 
approximately 28 percentage points (IV estimate) for the overall sample. In addition, it 
increases school enrolment rate of rural children by 32 percentage points and that of urban 
children by 12.5 percentage points only. However, a unit increase in mothers‟ autonomy 
increases school enrolment by only 3 percentage points in the overall sample, 3.2 percentage 
points for the rural subsample, and 1.4 percentage points in the urban sub-sample when 
endogeneity is not accounted for. This result seems to suggest that increasing women‟s 
decision making power is very important for improvement in school enrolment particularly in 
rural areas. This positive relationship between mother‟s autonomy and school enrolment may 
be due to the fact that most indirect costs associated with schooling, such as preparing and 
transporting children to and from school, are borne by the mothers. These costs are very 
important, especially at the basic level of education, where the direct costs are relatively 
lower
36
. The result from this study is consistent with a study in Pakistan that showed that an 




                                                          
36
 This is the case because about 90 percent of children in our sample are at the basic level of education; and 




Table 4. 9 Impact of Mothers’ Bargaining Power on School Enrolment 
  All Rural Urban 
Variables 
Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit 
IV-
Probit 
MBP 0.031*** 0.28*** 0.032*** 0.32*** 0.0142* 0.125** 
 
(0.00665) (0.0337) (0.00831) (0.0396) (0.0081) (0.0602) 
Age 0.111*** 0.083*** 0.122*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.00782) (0.0111) (0.00947) (0.0148) (0.0108) (0.0121) 
Age2 -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0063) 
Boy 0.0300** 0.081*** 0.0172 -0.00485 0.06*** 0.0535** 
 
(0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0158) (0.0153) (0.0191) (0.0221) 
Ownland -0.07*** -0.048** -0.12*** -0.049** -0.0107 -0.0256 
 
(0.0218) (0.0227) (0.0326) (0.0036) (0.0216) (0.0264) 
MaleHead 0.0274 -0.147** 0.0535 -0.16*** 0.0122 -0.123 
 
(0.0630) (0.0739) (0.0822) (0.0908) (0.0668) (0.107) 
HHsize -0.017** -0.00674 -0.02*** -0.00633 0.0138 0.0120 
 
(0.00684) (0.0071) (0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0117) (0.0139) 
NoChildren -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.22*** -0.13*** 
 
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0099) (0.0093) (0.0137) (0.0172) 
Pcexphh 0.008*** 0.0025 0.012*** 0.00413 0.0023 0.00098 
 
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.003) (0.0031) 
Urban 0.127*** 0.293*** - - - - 
 
(0.0216) (0.0293) - - - - 
AssetIndexHH -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.0119 0.000487 
 
(0.00642) (0.00624) (0.00755) (0.00751) (0.0106) (0.0130) 
CoupleAge -0.0295 -0.088** -0.0029 -0.099** -0.147** -0.139** 
  (0.0356) (0.0353) (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0588) (0.0667) 
Observations 4,746 4,746 3,691 3,691 1,055 1,055 
Log 
pseudolikelihood  -2503.04 -9029.96 -2122.06 -7016.65 -364.347 -1947.93 





 Exogeneity Test 





























Test of Weak Instruments 














Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 




Other variables in the estimation show interesting results that are worth mentioning. For 
instance, the relationship between age and school enrolment is non-linear. In addition, the 
results from both the IV probit and probit estimations show that being a boy has a positive 
influence on the probability that a child will be enrolled in a school in the overall sample and 
urban subsample; but it has no influence in the rural subsample.  Also, it emerges that parent 
age and having a male as the head of the household are negatively associated with school 
enrolment in the overall sample and sub-samples. A household‟s ownership of farm land is 
associated with a reduction in the likelihood of going to school in the overall sample.  
 
Furthermore, household size has a negative and significant association with schooling in the 
overall sample and rural subsample; but this association disappears once mothers‟ autonomy 
is instrumented for. In addition, having more children is associated with a reduction in the 
probability of school enrolment of these children; and this influence is larger in urban areas. 
This result is possible since schooling costs in urban centres are higher relative to such costs 
in rural areas. 
 
Turning to households‟ wellbeing, it can be seen from table 4.9 that both households‟ annual 
per capita income and asset index have positive influence on school enrolment in the overall 
sample and rural subsample. Specially, an increase in a household‟s per capita income is 
associated with an increase in school enrolment of its children of 0.08 percentage point and 
1.2 percentage points in the overall sample and rural subsample respectively; but these results 
become insignificant when mothers‟ autonomy are treated as an endogenous variable. In the 
case of household‟s wealth, a unit increase in households‟ asset index is associated with an 
increase in school enrolment of 3 percentage points for both the overall sample and rural 
subsample. Finally, children living in households that are located in urban areas are more 
likely to be enrolled in schools than their counterparts living in rural areas. Thus, the 
probability of school enrolment is about 30 percentage points higher for children in urban 
areas vis-à-vis those in rural areas. 
 
The results are particularly revealing when the sample is split by the gender of the child. 
From table 4.10, a mother‟s bargaining power has a significant and positive impact on school 
enrolment of both boys and girls. A unit increase in a mother‟s autonomy increases girls‟ 
probability of enrolling in school by 31 percentage points; while it increases boys‟ school 
enrolment by only 26 percentage points. This result may imply that women care more about 
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their daughters than their sons when they have more bargaining power. This result is in line 
with studies in Bangladesh (Ahmed and Ray, 2011), where an increase in mothers‟ education 
(use as a proxy for bargaining power) has a larger impact on girls relative to boys; and in 
Brazil (Thomas, 1990), where an increase in women bargaining power results in bigger 
increases in the health and nutrition of girls relative to boys. Similar to above, the IV 
estimates are larger than those from the probit model. 
 
The results for the other explanatory variables in table 4.10 are not very different from that of 
the main results (table 4.9) in terms of the significance and the signs. For instance, the age of 
a child has a non-linear relationship with school enrolment. Whereas the gender of household 
head has a statistically insignificant influence on school enrolment; a household‟s ownership 
of farm land is associated with a reduction in boys‟ probability of school enrolment, but has 
no influence on girls‟ schooling. Similar to the overall sample, an increase in the household 
size by one more person is associated with a reduction in school enrolment of boys and girls 
of 2 percentage points and 7 percentage points respectively. In addition, the probability of 
enrolling in school is associated with a reduction of about 4 percentage points for girls when 
one more child is brought to the household; however, the number of children in the household 
has no influence on boys‟ schooling. 
 
Also, both per capita income and location in an urban area have a positive influence on 
school enrolment; but these influences become statistically insignificant when the 
endogeneity of mothers‟ autonomy variable is taken into account in the estimation. Finally, 
boys and girls in wealthier households (measured by the asset index) are more likely to enrol 
in schools than those in poor households. Having older parents is associated with a reduction 
in a boy‟s probability of school enrolment of 0.9 percentage points; and that of a girl of only 











Table 4. 10 Impact of Mothers’ Bargaining Power on School Enrolment by Gender 
  Boys Girls 
Variables Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
MBP 0.0405*** 0.258*** 0.0199** 0.308*** 
 
(0.00881) (0.0474) (0.0100) (0.0466) 
Age 0.100*** 0.0779*** 0.123*** 0.0871*** 
 
(0.0103) (0.0136) (0.0119) (0.0183) 
Age2 -0.0435*** -0.0334*** -0.0576*** -0.0418*** 
 
(0.00524) (0.00653) (0.00611) (0.00882) 
Ownland -0.0977*** -0.0917*** -0.0399 -0.00559 
 
(0.0292) (0.0312) (0.0325) (0.0329) 
MaleHead 0.0478 -0.133 0.00389 -0.138 
 
(0.0840) (0.0962) (0.0954) (0.115) 
HHsize -0.0248*** -0.0196** -0.092*** -0.0677*** 
 
(0.00950) (0.00963) (0.0101) (0.0105) 
NoChildren 0.00562 0.0114 -0.0203* -0.0392*** 
 
(0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0120) 
Pcexphh 0.0075*** 0.00033 0.0084* 0.00193 
 
(0.0028) (0.00035) (0.0044) (0.00412) 
Urban 0.144*** 0.0533 0.112*** 0.00845 
 
(0.0288) (0.0407) (0.0325) (0.0421) 
AssetIndexHH -0.0240*** -0.0239*** -0.0253*** -0.0249*** 
 
(0.00856) (0.00848) (0.00957) (0.00914) 
CoupleAge -0.00662 -0.00920* 0.00664 -0.00103* 
  (0.00474) (0.00472) (0.0538) (0.000541) 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,256 2,256 
Log pseudolikelihood  -1264.3477 -4692.9436 -1229.3419 -4323.0249 
Pseudo R2   0.1182 
 
0.1013 
 Exogeneity Test 





















Test of Weak Instruments 










Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000 




Hours of Class Attendance 
Enrolling children in schools is a first step toward improving their human capital; but their 
academic performance and other educational outcomes are highly linked to the number of 
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hours they spend in schools. Hence, the chapter examines the effect of mothers‟ autonomy in 
the household on the weekly hours of class attendance of children. Similar to the enrolment 
results, the post estimation tests show that a mother‟s autonomy variable is endogenous to 
weekly hours of class attendance for the overall sample and all subsamples except the urban 
subsample. This is given by significant of the Wald test of exogeneity (p>0.05) in table 4.11 
and 4.12. Also, the over-identifying test and the F-statistics show that the instruments are 
valid and not weak. 
 
From columns 1-4 of table 4.11, a mother‟s autonomy has a significant and positive impact 
on children‟s weekly hours of class attendance in the overall sample and rural sub-sample. 
However, in the urban sub-sample a mother‟s autonomy has no effect on the weekly hours of 
class attendance. Similar to the school enrolment estimates, the impact of mothers‟ autonomy 
on hours of class attendance is underestimated when the mothers‟ autonomy variable is 
assumed to be exogenous. Specifically, a mother‟s bargaining power increases hours of class 
attendance by approximately 1.7 hours and 4.3 hours for the tobit and IV-tobit models 
respectively in the overall sample. Among rural children, a unit increase in mothers‟ 
autonomy increases their hours of school attendance by 7.2 hours (column 4).  
 
A child‟s age has statistically significant non-linear relationship with hours of class 
attendance for the overall sample and rural sub-sample, but it has no influence in the urban 
sub-sample. Whereas a child‟s gender does not have statistically significant association with 
hours of class attendance, the gender of the household head has a significant influence on 
hours of class attendance. Also, though living in an urban area has a positive association with 
school enrolment, location in an urban centre has a negative association with the number of 
hours of class attendance.  
 
Also, an addition of one child to a household is positively associated with children‟s hours of 
class attendance and it increases the hour of schooling by about 1.4 in the rural subsample. 
Household asset index, an indicator of household wealth is associated with 1.4 hours 
reduction in the hours of class attendance in the rural sub-sample, but it increases class 
attendance in the urban subsample by the same magnitude. Moreover, ownership of farmland 
has negative association with children‟s hours of class attendance in the overall sample and 
rural subsample, but it has no influence on urban children. Finally, the age of the parent has a 
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negative influence on hours of class attendance in the rural sub-sample, but no influence in 
the overall sample and urban sub-sample. 
 
Table 4. 11 Impact of Mothers’ Bargaining Power on Class Attendance 
  All Rural Urban 
Variables Tobit IV-Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit 
MBP 1.702*** 4.324*** 1.509*** 7.222*** 1.199 2.425 
 
(0.139) (1.447) (0.154) (1.756) (1.272) (2.417) 
Age 0.147 0.0771 0.269 0.0739 -0.108 -0.112 
 
(0.184) (0.201) (0.204) (0.255) (0.390) (0.391) 
Age2 0.00160 0.00415 -0.00646 0.000167 0.0194 0.0197 
 
(0.0092) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0126) (0.0197) (0.0198) 
Boy 0.0528 -0.260 0.148 -0.364 -0.126 -0.181 
 
(0.302) (0.341) (0.333) (0.420) (0.651) (0.665) 
Ownland -1.253** -1.38*** -2.02*** -1.685** -0.216 -0.296 
 
(0.493) (0.517) (0.673) (0.744) (0.713) (0.760) 
MaleHead -0.111 -3.387** -2.989** -6.33*** 4.085** 3.332*** 
 
(1.232) (1.664) (1.216) (1.456) (2.043) (1.607) 
HHsize -0.247 -0.159 -0.253 0.0232 -0.354 -0.372 
 
(0.157) (0.172) (0.179) (0.224) (0.312) (0.318) 
NoChildren 1.336*** 1.415*** 1.420*** 1.380*** -0.0724 -0.0133 
 
(0.188) (0.208) (0.213) (0.255) (0.409) (0.440) 
Pcexphh 0.00263 -0.00359 0.00742 -0.00454 -0.00597 -0.00674 
 
(0.0045) (0.00559) (0.00574) (0.00743) (0.00817) (0.00848) 
Urban -1.64*** -2.69*** - - - - 
 
(0.480) (0.643) - - - - 
AssetIndexHH -1.17*** -1.31*** -1.31*** -1.39*** 1.490*** 1.416*** 
 
(0.141) (0.155) (0.156) (0.181) (0.325) (0.371) 
CoupleAge -0.0349 -0.0116 -1.09*** -1.02*** -0.0112 -0.0105 
  (0.0805) (0.0087) (0.0884) (0.0114) (0.0196) (0.0194) 
Observations 3,569 3,569 2,613 2,613 956 956 





 Exogeneity Test 






























Test of Weak Instruments 














Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.12 shows the marginal effect of both the tobit and IV-tobit estimation of the effect of 
mother‟s bargaining power on weekly hours of class attendance of boys and girls. The results 
show that mothers‟ bargaining power significantly affects girls‟ weekly hours of class 
attendance, but has no effect on boys‟ class attendance. An increase in a mother‟s autonomy 
increases weekly hours of girls‟ class attendance by about 1.4 hours. This effect increases to 
5.7 hours when the endogeneity of mothers‟ autonomy is taken into account. This result is 
consistent with an earlier study in Brazil which shows that an increase in a mother‟s 
bargaining power increases her children‟s school attendance, particularly girls (Rangel, 
2006).  
 
In terms of the other explanatory variables, a child‟s age is significant and positively 
associated with hours of class attendance for both boys and girls. While the relationship 
between age and class attendance is non-linear for girls, it is linear for boys. Furthermore, 
having a male head in a household has a positive and negative influence on hours of class 
attendance of both boys and girls respectively. This result seems to suggest that a child‟s 
hours of class attendance is more when his/her sex is the same as that of the mother or father. 
Thus, when a mother has more autonomy in the household, girls benefit; and boys benefit 
when a man is the head of the household. In addition, farmland ownership, asset index and 
household size have negative association with boys‟ hours of school attendance, but they do 
not affect girls‟ schooling. 
 
For household location, the results show that both boys and girls living in urban areas have 
fewer hours of class attendance relative to their counterparts in rural areas. Living in an urban 
area is associated with a reduction in the weekly hours of class attendance of 3 hours for boys 
and 2.2 hours for girls. Also, whereas a household‟s annual per capita income has a positive 
association with the weekly hours of class attendance of girls, having older parents has the 
reverse effects on girls‟ class attendance; but both factors have no influence on boys‟ hours of 
class attendance. Lastly, households‟ wealth negatively influences boys‟ hours of class 





   
139 
 
Table 4. 12 Impact of Mothers’ Bargaining Power on Class Attendance by Gender 
  Boys Girls 
Variables Tobit IV-Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit 
MBP 0.246 2.796 1.386*** 5.740*** 
 
(0.185) (2.025) (0.208) (2.168) 
Age 1.189*** 1.296*** 1.308*** 1.222*** 
 
(0.242) (0.255) (0.285) (0.320) 
Age2 0.00862 0.0107 -0.0728*** -0.049*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0145) (0.0162) 
Ownland -1.957*** -2.237*** -0.455 -0.207 
 
(0.643) (0.689) (0.762) (0.840) 
MaleHead 1.312*** 3.329*** -1.66*** -2.964*** 
 
(0.434) (1.074) (0.148) (0.779) 
HHsize -2.406*** -1.415*** -0.0779 0.176 
 
(0.209) (0.217) (0.235) (0.279) 
NoChildren 1.514*** 1.654*** 0.146 0.0530 
 
(0.250) (0.287) (0.281) (0.318) 
Pcexphh 0.0253 -0.0689 1.033*** 1.073*** 
 
(0.0586) (0.0681) (0.0714) (0.0948) 
Urban -2.250*** -3.030*** -1.998*** -2.157** 
 
(0.621) (0.897) (0.742) (0.959) 
AssetIndexHH -1.336*** -1.380*** 0.0152 0.287 
 
(0.180) (0.189) (0.222) (0.265) 
CoupleAge 0.00374 0.00119 -1.012*** -1.028*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0120) (0.0142) 
Observations 1,915 1,915 1,654 1,654 
Log pseudolikelihood  -6914.10 -9624.49 -6007.85 -8343.92 

























Test of Weak Instruments 










Prob>F   0.0000   0.0001 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Impact on Child Labour 
This section analyses the impact of mothers‟ bargaining power on households‟ decision to 
use or exchange children for farming activities (extensive margin of child labour); as well as 
the number of hours (intensive margin of child labour) that such children work per week. 
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Unlike the schooling estimations, the sample could not be split by the location of the 
household since only few farming households are located in urban areas (only 52 urban 
farming households engaged in child labour). In addition, this analysis is at the household 
level. This makes it impossible to split the sample by the gender of the child. Table 4.13 
reports the results of the impact of mothers‟ autonomy on both extensive and intensive 
margin of child labour. 
 
 
Extensive Margin of Child Labour 
Similarly, in estimating the impact of mothers‟ bargaining power on households‟ decision to 
engage children in farm work, both probit and IV-probit models are used. It is worth noting 
from column 2 of table 4.13 that the null hypothesis for the Wald tests of exogeneity is 
rejected. Therefore, mothers‟ bargaining power is endogenous. Also, the post estimation tests 
show that the instruments are valid and not weak. 
 
From table 4.13, bargaining power of mothers has significant and negative impacts on child 
labour participation. A unit increase in a mother‟s autonomy reduces the probability of child 
labour on the farm by approximately 19 percentage points (IV-probit), all things been equal. 
This implies that when a mother has a voice in the decision making process of the household, 
she may influence the process, such that the likelihood of the household using or exchanging 
children for farming activities may be reduced. This result is consistent with studies in 
Bangladesh (Ahmed and Ray, 2011) and Pakistan (Ambreen, 2013) that find that an increase 
in women‟s bargaining power reduces children‟s participation in the labour market.  This 
result may be explained by two factors. First, when mothers have more autonomy, especially 
access and control over their earned incomes, they may hire adult labourers to assist with 
farming activities instead of using children. Secondly, women have been found to be more 
altruistic. They prefer consumption goods that improve upon the welfare of all, particularly 
children. Men, in contrast, favour private consumption goods (DasGupta and Mani, 2015). 
Hence, when a woman has more autonomy in a household, she will choose more schooling 
and less child labour. 
 
As far as the control variables are concerned, the average age of a child in a household has 
statistically significant and positive influence on the likelihood of child labour in farming. 
Thus, as a child grows older, his/her probability of engaging in child labour also increases. 
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Table 4. 13 Impact of Mothers’ Bargaining Power on Child Labour 
  Participation Hours 
Variables Probit IV-Probit Tobit IV-Tobit 
MBP -0.0281** -0.191*** -1.310*** -1.059 
 
(0.0140) (0. 0122) (0.207) (4.435) 
Average Age 0.0916*** 0.0115*** 1.156*** 1.171*** 
 
(0.00692) (0.00708) (0.102) (0.136) 
Average Age2 0.0102*** 0.0118** 0.196*** 0.212*** 
 
(0.00573) (0.00593) (0.00806) (0.0128) 
PropBoys -0.134*** -0.080*** 0.166 0.0284 
 
(0.0167) (0.0175) (3.511) (3.809) 
Ownland 0.270*** 0.203*** 8.802*** 8.851*** 
 
(0.0113) (0.0155) (2.276) (2.295) 
HHsize 0.0244 0.0210 0.258 0.253 
 
(0.0151) (0.0147) (0.210) (0.213) 
NoChildren 0.0198*** 0.0105*** 1.131*** 2.111*** 
 
(0.00185) (0.0080) (0.0262) (0.0287) 
Pcexphh -0.0109*** -0.0791*** -2.170*** -2.0160** 
 
(0.00414) (0.00531) (0.0671) (0.0890) 
Urban -0.108** -0.037*** -1.165 -1.887 
 
(0.0456) (0.00751) (0.777) (1.972) 
AssetIndexHH 0.0123 0.0131 0.172 0.180 
 
(0.0125) (0.0120) (0.194) (0.205) 
CoupleAge 0.0188*** 0.0249*** 1.0491*** 1.0527*** 
  (0.00190) (0.00188) (0.0297) (0.0373) 
Observations 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 
Log pseudolikelihood  -814.94696 -2802.6222 -3059.7953 -4704.0826 
Pseudo R2   0.1781 
 
0.106 
 Exogeneity Test 





















Test of Weak Instruments 










Prob>F   0.0005   0.0112 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
The effect of average age on work gets stronger as a child grows older, since average age 
square has a positive relationship with child labour. A child‟s gender is statistically 
significant in explaining the likelihood of engaging in child labour as the proportion of boys 
in a household has a negative association with the probability of child labour. Furthermore, 
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parents‟ age has significantly positive influence on child labour. An increase in the parents‟ 
age by one year is associated with 2.5 percentage points increase in the probability of them 
using or exchanging their children for farming activities. Whereas household size has 
statistically insignificant influence on child labour, an increase in the number of children in 
the household positively influences child labour. Again, ownership of farmland is associated 
with 20 percentage points increase in the probability of child labour in farming. Households‟ 
annual per capita income and their location in urban areas have significantly negative 
association with the likelihood of children working on farms. Lastly, the probability that 
children in urban areas would engage in child labour is 4 percentage points lower than the 
likelihood for children in rural areas to engage in child labour. 
 
 
Intensive Margin of Child Labour 
Unlike the extensive margin of child labour, the post estimation diagnostic tests indicate that 
a mothers‟ bargaining power is exogenous since the Wald test of exogeneity is insignificant 
(column 4 of table 4.13). According to Cameron and Trivedi (2009), if the Wald test shows 
no endogeneity, then a non-instrumental estimation will suffice. Therefore, discussion on the 
impact of mothers‟ autonomy on hours of child labour is based on the results of the marginal 
effects of the tobit estimation. From table 4.13, a mother‟s bargaining power has a negative 
and significant effect on weekly hours of child labour in the tobit models. Specifically, a unit 
increase in mothers‟ bargaining power reduces children‟s weekly hours of work by 1.3 hours. 
This result is consistent with an earlier study in Mexico which shows that an increase in 
women‟s bargaining power leads to a fall in child labour hours particularly that of girls 
(Reggio, 2011). Thus, an improvement in a mother‟s autonomy in the household does not 
only prevent children from been engaged in farm works, but it reduces the number of hours 
that child labourers work in a week.  Note, however, that this is not the case for the IV-tobit 
estimation, which shows a coefficient of similar magnitude, but insignificant effect.  
 
Similar to child labour participation, the average age of a child in a household has a non-
linear relationship with the number of hours of work that he/she undertakes. Unlike the 
extensive margin of child labour, the number of hours of works that child labourers do is not 
influenced by their gender since the proportion of boys in a household has no influence on 
hours of child labour. In addition, the age of a child‟s parents has a statistically significant 
and positive association with the number of hours of child labour. Again, it is evident from 
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table 4.13 that household farmland ownership has the largest influence on the number of 
hours of child labour. Child labourers in households that own farmland work 8.8 hours more 
than their counterparts from landless households. Also, an additional child to the household is 
associated with 1.1 hours increase in the intensity of farm work done by children. Finally, the 
number of hours of work undertaken by working children in farming is associated with 2.2 




4.4.3  Robustness of the Results 
To investigate the robustness of the results, the mothers‟ bargaining power index is 
constructed as an un-weighted sum of the responses provided to the five questions listed 
above. Thus, instead of using the PCA to assign weights to the five questions, the bargaining 
power or autonomy index is constructed as the sum of the responses provided to the five 
questions to check the sensitivity of the results. Hence, the un-weighted autonomy index 
ranges from zero to five with higher value signifying higher autonomy. Similar to the 
autonomy index constructed using the PCA approach, the mean autonomy or bargaining 
power of women is higher when one considers the responses given by women to the five 
questions relative to the responses given by men (see table C10 in the appendix). 
 
The impact of mothers‟ autonomy on schooling (enrolment and hours of class attendance) 
and child labour (participation and hours of work) did not change when this un-weighted 
mothers‟ autonomy index is used. As evidenced in tables C5 and C6 in the appendix, 
mothers‟ autonomy has a positive impact on enrolment in both the overall sample and all 
subsamples. Also, an increase in mothers‟ bargaining power increases the hours of class 
attendance in the overall sample, rural and girls subsample, but it has no effect on boys and 
urban subsample (see tables C7 and C8 in the appendix). Finally, mothers‟ autonomy has a 
negative effect on child labour in farming, but no effect on hours of child labour when the 
autonomy variable is considered to be endogenous (table C9). 
 
Furthermore, two separate Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions are carried out for each 
distribution factor. Thus, for each IV regression, mothers‟ autonomy is instructed with one 
distribution factor (i.e. either the district sex ratio or difference in years of school completed 
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between the husband and wife). The IV results, where mothers‟ autonomy is instrumented 
with only the difference in years of school completed between the husband and wife is 
similar to the main results (see tables C11-C13). Similar results are obtained when district sex 
ratio is used as the only instrument for mothers‟ autonomy with respect to the impact of 
mothers‟ autonomy on hours of class attendance (see table C15 in the appendix) and child 
labour (table C16). However, a slightly different result with respect to the impact of mothers‟ 
autonomy on school enrolment is obtained. Unlike the main results, mothers‟ autonomy has a 
positive effect on all children, rural children, boys and girls; but it has no effect on urban 
children‟s school enrolment (see table C14). 
 
Finally, women‟s responses to the above questions were used to construct the autonomy 
index and separate regressions run for them. The results are similar to the ones obtained when 
their partners‟ responses were used (see tables  C17-C22 in the appendix). 
 
4.5.  Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Recent literature indicates that the household is not a homogenous entity and, in fact, parents 
have different preferences especially with regards to child products. Thus, who has much say 
in a household is very important for the welfare of the household, in particular for children. 
Empirical evidence from both developed and developing countries seem to suggest that 
children benefit most when their mothers have access to more economic resources relative to 
when such resources are in the hand of fathers. Hence, this chapter uses the collective model 
of the household to examine the effect of mothers‟ decision making autonomy on their 
children‟s schooling and labour supply in Ghana. 
 
A woman‟s autonomy is not only about her economic capacity, which is defined by her 
access to resources, but also her freedom to act independently. Women‟s abilities to 
formulate choices, control resources and participate in decision making are all part of their 
autonomy (Adhikari, 2016). Thus, women‟s non-economic autonomy is also very important, 
since it defines who decides on how economic resources are used in the households. This has 
subsequent effects on the outcomes of households‟ decisions. Therefore, the chapter 
estimates, specifically, the relationship between the non-economic autonomy of mothers and 
their children‟s welfare (that is, school enrolment and attendance, intensive and extensive 
margins of child labour). 
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The autonomy of mothers is an index constructed by applying Principal Component Analysis 
to five questions regarding mothers‟ independence in the household; namely the ability to (1) 
express themselves; (2) take part in important decisions in the household; (3) spend their 
earned incomes on themselves and their children without consulting their partners; (4) have 
unlimited contacts with family members; and (5) to go anywhere without restrictions from 
partners or husbands. Using the 2010 nation-wide representative survey conducted by Yale 
University in collaboration with the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research 
(ISSER) of the University of Ghana, this chapter applies both non-instrumental estimation 
technique that assume that the mothers‟ autonomy variable is exogenous; and an IV 
estimation method to account for the possibility of endogeneity between mothers‟ autonomy 
measurements and child welfare indicators (schooling and labour supply). The district sex 
ratio and the differences in the years of schooling of the spouses are used as instruments to 
estimate mothers‟ autonomy. 
 
The results show that a mother‟s autonomy is positively influenced by the sex ratio existing 
in the district that the mother resides. Thus, the more women (lesser men) a district has, the 
lower the autonomy of women, and vice versa. Also, the difference in years of schooling 
between a man and his partner, having a male child, having more children and residing in an 
urban area, all have a positive influence on mothers‟ autonomy in the household. In addition, 
women in wealthier households have more autonomy. This is indicated by the positive 
relationship between households‟ wealth (measured by annual per capita income and asset 
index) and women‟s autonomy. On the other hand, household‟s ownership of farm land and 
having a male household head both exert a negative influence on women‟s autonomy. Lastly, 
a woman has lesser autonomy when the household size is large.  
 
The results from the impact of mothers‟ decision making autonomy on children‟s schooling 
show that the more autonomy a mother has, the higher the probability that her children will 
be enrolled in school. This positive relationship between mothers‟ autonomy and school 
enrolment is true for the overall sample and all sub-samples (rural, urban, boys and girls) for 
both the instrumental and non-instrumental estimation models. However, the impact of 
mothers‟ autonomy on school enrolment is vastly underestimated when the mothers‟ 
autonomy variable is assumed to be exogenous. In addition, girls tend to benefit more when 
their mothers‟ autonomy is increased relative to boys. Also, children in rural areas have a 
higher probability of enrolling in school relative to those in urban centres when there is an 
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increase in mothers‟ autonomy. In terms of class attendance, the results of this study show 
that mothers‟ autonomy positively impact on the weekly hours of school attendance for the 
overall sample, girls and rural subsamples; but it has statistically insignificant effect on boys 
and urban children. Thus, whilst boys have a higher probability of being enrolled in schools 
when their mothers have more autonomy or bargaining power in households‟ decision-
making, their weekly hours of class attendance is not affected by their mothers‟ autonomy. 
 
In addition, an increase in a mother‟s autonomy reduces the extensive margin of child labour 
in farming. Thus, the probability that a household will use or exchange a child for farming 
activities is reduced when the mother in the household has higher autonomy. In addition, the 
intensity of work undertaken by working children is negatively affected by mothers‟ 
autonomy. Hence, children who are already in the labour market tend to work for fewer hours 
when their mothers‟ bargaining power or autonomy is increased. Overall, these findings 
support the use of models that incorporate different preferences for household members and 
the treatment of mothers bargaining power or autonomy as an endogenous variable.  
 
These results have strong policy implications. The study shows that the autonomy of mothers 
has a positive and a negative impact on schooling enrolment and child labour participation 
respectively. These results strongly suggest that policies and interventions, such as public 
education on gender equity in marriage and rights of women in relationships as well as the 
responsibilities of each partner in the relationship, may help to improve women‟s autonomy 
in the household. Also, as the results indicate, improvement in households‟ standard of living 
has a positive impact on women‟s autonomy. This implies that policies that reduce poverty 
are not only important for women‟s empowerment in relationships, but they may also help 
improve schooling and reduce child labour, particularly in farming. Hence, policies, such as 
the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme in Ghana, should be 
expanded and targeted at women. In conclusion, this thesis proposes that policies that legally 
protect the assets of women, such as changes in customary laws that would improve women‟s 
access to land, will go a long way to enhance their autonomy since the majority of rural 







CHAPTER 5: General Conclusion 
 
5.1  Summary 
Child labour is not only harmful to the physical and mental development of children, but it 
also impedes human capital formation. The fall in human capital development due to child 
labour further results in loss in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and economic development. 
The adverse effects of work on the economies of developing countries and the 1999 Child 
Deterrence Act of the USA, which prohibits the importation of goods produced with child 
labourers, have made the elimination of child labour a top development priority for most 
countries that rely heavily on agriculture, including Ghana. This renewed interest in child 
labour and the devastating effects of this trade motivated this thesis on child labour and 
schooling in Ghana. This thesis examined the correlates of child labour and schooling and the 
effect of work on schooling in Ghana, as well as the impacts of Ghana‟s cash transfer 
programme (Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty-LEAP) and mothers‟ bargaining 
power on these two child welfare indicators. This thesis consists of five chapters. The first 
chapter provides a general background on child labour and schooling in Ghana. 
  
The second chapter of this thesis investigated the main correlates of child labour (both 
extensive and intensive margins of child labour) and schooling (enrolment and hours of class 
attendance) among Ghanaian children aged 5-17 years. Unlike previous studies, this chapter 
considered both children‟s engagement in „normal‟ child labour and hazardous works.  Also, 
this chapter examined the effect of child labour on hours of class attendance and adjusted 
years of schooling. The chapter used data from Ghana‟s 2013 Living Standard Survey and 
employed a bivariate probit and tobit model to examine the correlates of participation and 
hours respectively. The results show that there is a gender gap in both child labour and 
schooling in Ghana. Boys are more likely to enrol in schools relative to girls. The former is 
also less likely to participate in the labour market. In addition, parent education, household 
wealth and income of the family all have a negative and a positive effect on a child‟s 
likelihood of working and schooling respectively. Also, a child‟s likelihood of working 
increases and his/her probability of schooling falls when his/her parents are employed, the 
household owns livestock, distance to  nearest school is far, child wage increases and 
schooling expenditure is higher. Furthermore, child labourers work for fewer hours when 
they are enrolled in school. Ownership of land, receipt of remittance, increase in household 
148 
 
income and wealth, as well as low school expenditure all lead to a reduction in the hours of 
child labour. Finally, the results in this chapter show that an additional hour of child labour is 
associated with 0.15 hour (9 minutes) reduction in class attendance. The effect is bigger for 
girls relative to boys. Also, one more hour of child labour increase the probability of a child 
falling behind in grade progression by 1.4 percentage points. 
 
The third chapter estimated the impact of Ghana‟s Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty 
(LEAP) cash transfer programme on educational outcomes (enrolment, attendance hours, 
repetition and test scores) and child labour in farming and non-farm enterprises. This chapter 
used the LEAP evaluation data collected in 2010 and 2012. It employed three quasi-
experimental methods (propensity score matching (PSM), difference-in-difference (DD), and 
difference-in-difference combined with matching (MDD)) in its analysis. The discussion of 
the results, however, is based on DD combined with matching estimation (MDD) method, 
since this ensures that both observable and un-observational differences between LEAP 
recipients and non-recipients that are likely to affect both participation and the outcome 
variables are accounted for. 
 
The results show that participation in the LEAP programme has no significant effect on 
school enrolment in the overall sample and subsample of girls and younger children aged 5-
12 years, but it did increase enrolment rates of boys (2.7 percentage points) and older 
children aged 13-17 years (9.6 percentage points). In terms of class attendance, the 
programme had a positive and statistically significant effect on weekly hours of class 
attendance for the overall sample, boys and younger children (5-12 years); but the LEAP 
scheme had no effect on the hours of class attendance of girls and older children. For class 
repetition, the LEAP programme had a significant and negative impact in the overall sample, 
as well as boys and older children. Furthermore, the LEAP programme had no statistically 
significant impact on test scores (cognitive ability). Lastly, one of the possible channels 
through which the receipt of the LEAP cash would impact on education is through the 
scheme‟s effect on educational expenses. However, the results showed that the LEAP 
programme had no impact on school expenses for the overall sample and girls; but the 
scheme increased the total school expenditure of boys and older children (13-17 years). 
 
With regard to child labour, the LEAP programme had no effect on the extensive margin of 
child labour in farming in the overall sample and all subsamples, except in female headed 
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households. However, participation in the LEAP programme reduced the daily hours of child 
labour on farms in the overall sample and all subsamples, except non-extremely poor 
households. The highest reduction in hours of farm work done by children occurred in female 
headed households. Lastly, unlike child labour in farming, the results show that the LEAP 
programme had no effect on both the extensive and intensive margins of child labour in non-
farm enterprise in the overall sample and sub-samples. These results may have been possible 
because the LEAP scheme reduced farming among households and it had no effect on 
households‟ operation of non-farm enterprises. 
 
The fourth chapter examined the impact of mothers‟ autonomy or bargaining powers in the 
household on their children‟s schooling and child labour in Ghana. The autonomy of mothers 
is an index constructed by applying Principal Component Analysis to five questions 
regarding mothers‟ independence in the household; namely the ability to express themselves; 
their participation in important decisions in the household; their ability to spend their earned 
incomes on themselves and their children without consulting their partners; their ability to 
have unlimited contacts with family members; and their abilities to go anywhere without 
restrictions from their partners. Using the 2010 nation-wide representative survey conducted 
in Ghana, the chapter used both non-instrumental estimation methods and instrumental 
variable (Two Stage Least Square-2SLS) approaches to account for the possibility of 
endogeneity between mothers‟ autonomy measurements and child welfare indicators 
(schooling and labour supply). In the 2SLS estimation, the district sex ratio and the 
differences in the years of schooling of the spouses were used as instruments to estimate 
women‟s autonomy variable. This estimated value was used in a second stage estimation of 
schooling and child labour decisions. Generally, the results show that the impact of mothers‟ 
autonomy on these child welfare indicators is vastly underestimated when the mothers‟ 
autonomy variable is assumed to be exogenous. 
 
In addition, the results showed a positive and significant relationship between a mother‟s 
autonomy and her child‟s probability of enrolling in school. This positive relationship 
between mothers‟ autonomy and school enrolment holds for the overall sample and all sub-
samples (rural, urban, boys and girls) in both the instrumental and non-instrumental 
estimation models. Girls tend to benefit more when their mothers‟ autonomy is increased. 
Also, children in rural areas have a higher probability of enrolling in school relative to those 
in urban centres when there is an increased in mothers‟ autonomy. In terms of class 
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attendance, the results show that mothers‟ autonomy positively impact on the weekly hours of 
school attendance for the overall sample, girls and rural subsamples; but it has statistically 
insignificant effect on boys and children in urban areas. In addition, an increase in a mother‟s 
autonomy reduces both the extensive and intensive margin of child labour in farming.  
 
Overall, this thesis shows that child labour and schooling decisions are interdependent and 
work has a negative association with schooling. Both child labour and schooling decisions are 
influenced by child, parent and households characteristics which are linked to parents‟ 
income generating abilities, households‟ standard of living and the level of bargaining power 
of mothers in the decision making process in households. In Ghana, both child labour and 
schooling are weakly responsive to the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
cash transfer programme. However, child labour and schooling seem to be strongly affected 
by mothers‟ bargaining power in households. These results suggest that policies aimed at 
eliminating child labour and improving upon schooling should include empowerment of 
women to enhance their autonomy in the family. Lastly, the results seem to suggest that the 




5.2 Some Limitations of the Study 
This thesis faced some limitations regarding data and measurement of variables. The first 
limitation is lack of data on child labour at the individual level. In chapters three and four of 
this study, the child labour variable was defined as households‟ use or exchange of children 
for farming activities. Though household level data may be used in certain economic 
analysis, in the case of child labour participation and hours of work, individual level data 
could have allowed for the disaggregation of the overall results by gender and age of 
children. In addition, the definition of child labour in farming used in these two chapters was 
limited to children below 15 years, because the dataset lacks information on the work status 
of children aged 15-17 years. Though, by the ILO definition, engagement of children below 
15 years in any economic activity is classified as child labour, the data on works situation of 




Moreover, women autonomy or bargaining power is difficult to measure (Goetz and Gupta, 
1996). Women autonomy or bargaining power is a multi-dimensional concept which is 
affected by social, economic, political and cultural factors that are interconnected and 
subjective in nature. Recent studies have used women‟s asset shares and earnings as 
indicators of their autonomy or bargaining power, However, this was not the case in chapter 
four, since the question on asset ownership was asked at the household level and, also, there 
was no data on women‟s earnings since most of them are employed in the informal sector of 
the economy and, generally, people do not want to respond to questions on earnings. The 
analysis would have improved if data on women‟s access to economic resources were 
available, such that comparison on the effect of women‟s economic and non-economic 
bargaining power on child welfare indicators could be made. However, in the absence of 
these variables, women‟s autonomy or bargaining power was measured as an index 
constructed from five questions which measure their participation in households‟ decision 
making.  
 
Lastly, the evaluation study of the LEAP programme in chapter three was done two years 
after the implementation of the scheme. Though two years may be long enough for the 
programme to have some impacts in the lives of beneficiaries, this duration may not be long 
enough to observe changes in the cognitive ability of children.  
 
5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
It is worth noting that the limitations outlined above do not undermine the conclusions of this 
thesis. Rather, addressing these issues will improve the analysis. These limitations and results 
indicate the need for further research on child labour and schooling in Ghana. In particular, 
there is the need for further study on the LEAP programme after five or more years of 
implementation since the impact of cash transfer schemes accumulate over time. In addition, 
there is the need for future study to consider both economic and non-economic measures of 
women‟s autonomy or bargaining power. Finally, the results on the impacts of LEAP 
programme points to the need for further research on why the programme‟s largest impact 
occurred in female headed households. Future research may examine how distribution of 
bargaining power in households affects the impact of a cash transfer scheme (LEAP 





Abou, P. E. (2014) „A Re-examination of the Determinants of Child Labour in Côte d‟Ivoire‟, 
AERC Research Paper, no.289, African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
 
Adhikari, R. (2016) „Effect of Women‟s autonomy on maternal health service utilization in 
Nepal: a cross sectional study‟, BMC Womens Health, 16: 26. 
Ahmed, S. and Ray, R. (2011) „Parent‟s Bargaining Powers, Child Labour and Education‟ 
http://www.web.uwa.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1655514/sahmed_adew2011
.pdf   
 
Akyeampong, K. (2009) „Revisiting free compulsory universal basic education (FCUBE) in 
Ghana‟, Comparative Education, 45(2):175-195. 
 
Akyeampong, K., Djangmah, J., Oduro, A., Seidu, A., and Hunt, F. (2007) „Access to basic 
education in Ghana: The evidence and the issues‟, Brighton, UK: CREATE, 
University of Sussex. 
 
Al Riyami, A., Afifi, M., and Mabry, R.M. (2004) „Women‟s autonomy, education and 
employment in Oman and their influence on contraceptive use‟, Reproductive Health 
Matters, 12(23): 144-154. 
 
Alderman, H., and King, E.M. (1998) „Gender differences in parental investment in 
education‟, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 9(4): 453–468. 
 
Allendorf, K. (2012) „Women‟s agency and the quality of family relationships in India‟, 
Population Research and Policy Review, 31(2):187–206. 
 
Allendorf, K. (2007) „Do women‟s land rights promote empowerment and child health in 
Nepal? World Development, 35(11):1975-1988. 
 
Ambreen, F. (2013) „Economics of child labour‟, PhD thesis: University of Nottingham. 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12967/1/Final-PhD-Thesis.pdf 
 
American Institutes for Research (2015) „Zambia’s Child Grant Programme: 48-month 
impact report‟, Washington, DCC E. 
  
Amin, S., Quayes, M. S., and Rives, J. M. (2006) „Market work and household work as 
deterrents to schooling in Bangladesh‟, World Development, (7):1271-1286. 
 
Anderson, S., and Eswaran, M. (2009) „What determines female autonomy? Evidence from 
Bangladesh‟, Journal of Development Economics, 90(2):179-191. 
 
Angrist, J., and Krueger, A. (1991) „Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect Schooling 




Anyanful, V.K., Mensah, G. and Mensah Bonsu, F. (2001) „The causes of low level 
participation of women in education: A case study of Agona District in the Central 
Region’. Unpublished long essay. University of Cape Coast, Ghana 
 
Asfaw, S., Davis, B., Dewbre, J., Federighi, G., Handa, S. and Winters, P. (2012) „The 
Impact of the Kenya CT-OVC Programme on Productive Activities and Labour 
Allocation’, Paper prepared for the From Protection to Production project. Rome, UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization. 
 
Attanasio, O, Fitzsimons, E., Gomez, A., Lopez, D., Meghir, C. and Mesnard, A., (2006) 
„Child Education and Work Choices in the Presence of a Conditional Cash Transfer 
Programme in Rural Colombia‟, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, WP06/01, London. 
 
Baden, S., Green, C., Otoo-Oyortey, N., and Peasgood, T. (1994) „Background paper on 
gender issues in Ghana‟, Institute of Development Studies, the University of Sussex 
Baez, J. and Camacho, A. (2011) „Assessing the Long-term Effects of Conditional Cash 
Transfers on Human Capital: Evidence from Colombia‟, IZA Discussion Paper No. 
5751. 
  
Balk, D. (1994) „Individual and Community Aspects of Women's Status and Fertility in Rural 
Bangladesh‟, Population Studies 48:21-45 
 
Balk, D. (1997) „Defying Gender Norms in Rural Bangladesh: A Social Demographic 
Analysis‟, Population Studies 51:153-172. 
 
Barrera-Osorio, F., Marianne B., Leigh L. and Perez-Calle, A.  (2011) „Improving the Design 
of Conditional Transfer Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Education 
Experiment in Colombia‟, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(2): 
167–95. 
 
Barrientos A, H. D (2009) „Social protection for the poor and poorest in developing 
countries: reflections on a quiet revolution‟, Oxford Development Studies 37(4): 439–
456. 
 
Barro, R., (1991) „Economic growth in a cross section of countries‟, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 106 (2): 407-443. 
 
Bass, L. E., (2004) „Child labour in Sub-Saharan Africa. Boulder‟ Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Basu K and Van P. H. (1998) „The Economics of Child Labour‟, American Economic 
Review, 88 (3): 412–27. 
 
Basu, A. M. (1992), „Culture, the status of women, and demographic behaviour: illustrated 
with the case of India,‟ Oxford & New York: Clarendon Press & Oxford University 
Press 
 
Basu, K. (2006), „Gender and Say: A Model of household behaviour with endogenously 




Basu, K. and Ray, R., (2002), „The collective model of the household and an unexpected 
implication for child labour: hypothesis and an empirical test, Policy Research 
Working Paper 2813, World Bank, Washington DC, World Bank 
 
Basu, K., (1999), „Child Labour: Cause, Consequence and Cure, with Remarks on 
International Labour Standards,‟ Journal of Economic Literature, 37:1083-1119 
 
Becker, G. S. (1965), „A Theory of the Allocation of Time‟. Economic Journal, 75:493-517. 
 
Becker, Gary, (1981), „A Treatise on the Family‟, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Bedi, A., and Marshall, J. (1999), „School attendance and student achievement: Evidence 
from Rural Honduras‟, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47 (3): 657-
682. 
 
Bedi, A., and Marshall, J. (2002), „Primary school attendance in Honduras‟, Journal of 
Development Economics, 69 (1): 129-153 
 
Beegle, K., Dehejia, R. and Gatti, R., (2006), „Child labour and agricultural shocks‟, Journal 
of Development Economics, 81(1): 80–96 
 
Beegle, K., Dehejia, R. and Gatti, R., (2004), „Why should we care about child labour? The 
education, labour market, and health consequences of child labour‟, NBER working 
paper 10980. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Behrman, J. R., Gallardo-Garcia, J., Parker, S., Todd, P., & Velez-Grajales, V. (2010), ‘How 
Conditional Cash Transfers Impact Schooling and Work for Children and Youth in 
Urban Mexico‟, Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Behrman, J.R., Parker, S.W. and Todd, P.E. (2011), „Do Conditional Cash Transfers for 
Schooling Generate Lasting Benefits? Five-year Follow-up of 
Progresa/Oportunidades‟, Journal of Human Resources 46(1): 93-122. 
 
Behrman, Jere, R. (1997), „Intra-household Distribution and the Family‟ in Rosenzweig, 
Mark R., and Oded Stark (eds.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics. 
Amsterdam, New York: Elsevier Science 
 
Behrman, J. R., Parker, W. S. and Todd E. P (2009), „Medium-Term Impacts of the 
Oportunidades Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Rural Youth in Mexico, In 
Poverty, Inequality and Policy in Latin America, eds. Stephan Klasen and Felicitas 
Nowak-Lehman, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp219-270 
 
Ben-Porath, Y., (1967) „The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings‟, 
Journal of Political Economy (August): 352-365. 
 
Bezerra, M. E., Kassouf, L. A. and Arends-Kuenning, M. (2009) „The impact of child labour 
and school quality on academic achievement in Brazil,‟ IZA Discussion Paper 4062 
 
Bhalotra S. (2007) „Is Child Work Necessary?‟‟ Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
69 (1): 29-55. 
155 
 
Bhalotra, S. and Heady, C. (1998) „Child Labour in Rural Pakistan and Ghana: Myths and 
Data,‟ Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. 
 
Bhalotra, S. and Heady, C., (2001) „Determinants of Child Farm Labour in Ghana and 
Pakistan: A Comparative Study,‟ University of Bath, UK. 
 
Bhalotra, S. and Heady, C., (2003) „Child farm labour: the wealth paradox,‟ World Bank 
Economic Review 17(2): 197–227. 
 
Bhalotra, S., (2007) „Is child work necessary? Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
69(1): 29–55. 
 
Bharadwaj, P., Lakdawala, L. K., and Li, N. (2013) „Perverse Consequences of Well 
Intentioned Regulation: Evidence from India‟s Child Labour Ban‟, NBER Working 
Paper No. 19602. 
 
Blunch, N. and D. Verner (2000) „Revisiting the Link between Poverty and Child Labour: 
The Ghanaian Experience,‟ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 2488. 
 
Blundell, R. and M. Costa Dias (2000) „Evaluation Methods for Non-Experimental Data‟, 
Fiscal Studies, 21(4): 427-468. 
 
Bobonis, G. J., (2009) „Is the Allocation of Resources within the Household Efficient? New 
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment‟, Journal of Political Economy, 
117(3):453-503. 
 
Bogale, B., M. Wondafrash, T. Tilahun, and E. Girma (2011) „Married women‟s decision-
making power on modern contraceptive use in urban and rural southern Ethiopia,‟ 
BioMed Central Public Health 11 (346). 
 
Bolt V. J. and Bird, K. (2003) „The Intra-household Disadvantages Framework: A 
Framework for the Analysis of Intra-household Difference and Inequality‟, Chronic 
Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) Working Paper No 32. 
 
Bonnet, M. (1993) „Child labour in Africa‟, International Labour Review, 132(3): 371–89. 
 
Boozer, Michael A. and Tavneet K. Suri, (2001) „Child Labour and Schooling Decisions in 
Ghana‟, Yale University, mimeo. 
 
Bourguignon, F. and Chiappori, P.A. (1994) „The Collective Approach to Household 
Behaviour‟, in Blundell, R., Preston, I., and Walker, I. (eds.), The Measurement of 
Household Welfare, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Brown, D., Deardoff, A., and Stern, R., (2002) „Child Labour: Theory, Evidence and Policy‟ 
University of Michigan. Discussion Paper No 486 
 
Brown, P. H., (2006) „Parental Education and Investment in Children‟s Human Capital in 




Brown, P. H. (2003) „Dowry and Intra-household Bargaining: Evidence from China,‟ William 
Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-608, University of Michigan 
 
Caldés, N., D. Coady, and J. A. Maluccio (2006) „The Cost of Poverty Alleviation Transfer 
Programs: A Comparative Analysis of Three Programs in Latin America,‟ World 
Development 34 (5): 818–37. 
 
Caldwell, J.C. (1986) „Routes to low mortality in poor countries‟, Population and 
Development Review 12(2): 171–220. 
 
Caliendo, M., and Kopeinig, S. (2008) „Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of 
Propensity Score Matching,‟ Journal of Economic Surveys, 22, 31-72. 
 
Cameron, C. and Trivedi, P. (2009) „Microeconometrics Using Sata‟, Stata Press 
 
Canagarajah, S. and H. Coulombe (1998) „Child Labour and Schooling in Ghana,‟ Policy 
Research Working paper no. 1844. The World Bank: Washington D.C. 
 
Canagarajah, S. and Nielsen, H. S. (2001) „Children Labour in Africa: A Comparative 
Study,‟ The Annals of the American Academy (May): 71-91. 
 
Cardoso, A. and D. Verner (2006) „School drop-out and push out factors in Brazil: the role of 
early parenthood, child labour and poverty‟, Policy Research Working Paper series 
4178,  
 
Cardoso, E. and Souza, A. P. (2004) „The Impact of Cash Transfers on Child Labour and 
School Attendance in Brazil‟, Vanderbilt University Working Paper No. 04-W07. 
 
Cartwright, K., (1999) „Child Labour in Columbia‟, In Grootaert, C. and Patrinos, H., eds. 
The Policy Analysis of Child Labour: A Comparative Study. New York: St. Martin‟s 
Press. 
 
Cartwright, K., and Patrinos, A., (1999) „Child Labour in Urban Bolivia”, In Grootaert, C. 
and Patrinos, H., eds. The Policy Analysis of Child Labour: A Comparative Study. 
New York: St. Martin‟s Press. 
 
Chakraborty, T. and P. K. De (2011) „Mother‟s Autonomy and Child Welfare: A New 
Measure and Some New Evidence‟, IZA Discussion Paper No. 5438. 
 
Chao, S. and Alper, O. (1998) „Accessing Basic Education in Ghana‟, Studies in Human 
Development No.1, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
Chen, M.A. and Dunn, E. (1996) „Household Economic Portfolios, Assessing the Impact of 
Microenterprise Services (AIMS),‟ Office of Microenterprise, USAID. 
 
Chiappori, P. (1992) „Collective Labour Supply and Welfare‟, Journal of Political Economy, 
100 (3): 437–467. 
 
Christofides, L., Stengos, T., and Swidinsky, R., (1997) „On the Calculation of Marginal 
Effects in the Bivariate Probit Model‟, Economic Letters, 54: 203- 208. 
157 
 
Cigno, A. and Rosati. C. F. (2000) „Why do Indian children work, and is it bad for them? 
Discussion Paper no. 115. Bonn: IZA, February.  
 
Cogneau D. and Jedwab, R. (2007) „Household Income and Investments in Child Health and 
Education in Ivory Coast‟, Mimeo, Paris School of Economics. 
 
Covarrubias. K., Davis. B. and Winters, P. (2012) „From Protection to Production: Productive 
Impacts of the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme‟, Journal of Development 
Effectiveness, 4(1): 50–77 
 
Daidone, S. and Davis, B., (2013) „The Impact of Cash Transfer on Productive Activities and 
Labour Supply: The Case of LEAP Programme in Ghana’, CSAE Conference Oxford 
 
Darvas, P., & Balwanz, D. (2013) „Basic education beyond Millennium Development Goals 
in Ghana. Washington, DC: World Bank, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16307  
 
De Hoop, J., and Rosati, F. C.  (2013) „What Have we Learned from a Decade of Child 
Labour Impact Evaluations?‟ Understanding Children’s Work Working Paper. 
Rome. 
 
De Hoop, J., Ranzani, M. and Rosati, F. C. (2014) „The Impact of the Kenya CT-OVC 
Programme on Children‟s Activities‟, Understanding Children’s Work Programme 
Working Paper, Rome 
 
De Groot, R., Handa, S., Park, M, Darko, R., Osei-Akoto, I., Bhalla, G. and Ragno, P., (2015) 
Heterogeneous Impacts of an Unconditional Cash Transfer Programme on Schooling: 
Evidence from the Ghana LEAP Programme, Innocenti Working Paper no. 2015-10, 
UNICEF Office of Research - Innocenti, Florence. 
 
Deb, P. and Rosati, F. C. (2002) „Determinants of Child Labour and School Attendance: The 
Role of Household Unobservables‟, Understanding Children’s Work Research 
Paper, Rome 
 
Deininger, K., Aparajita, G. and Nagarajan, H., (2010) „Inheritance law reform and women's 
access to capital: evidence from India's Hindu succession act‟, No 5338, Policy 
Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank. 
 
Dery, Isaac (2015) „Bride Price and Domestic Violence: Empirical Perspectives from 
Nandom District in the North Western Region of Ghana‟, International Journal of 
Development and Sustainability, 4(3): 258-271 
 
Dessy, S. and Pallage, S., (2005) „A theory of the worst forms of child labour‟, Economic 
Journal 15: 68–87. 
 
Devereux, S. (2001) „Can Social Safety Nets Reduce Chronic Poverty?‟ Institute of 
Development Studies, Sussex 
 
DFID. (2007) Gender Equality Action Plan 2007-2009 making faster Progress to Gender 
Equality, ADFID Practice Paper, UK. 
158 
 
Dharmalingam, A., and Morgan, S. P. (1996) „Women's work, autonomy, and birth control: 
Evidence from two South Indian villages’, Population Studies, 50(2): 187-201. 
 
Dimova R., Epstein G., and Gang I., (2008) „Migration, Remittances, and Child Labour‟, IZA 
Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA). 
 
DiNardo, J., and J. Tobias (2001) „Nonparametric Density and Regression Estimation‟, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 11–28. 
 
Doss, C. (1996) „Testing among models of intra-household resource allocation‟, World 
Development, 24(10): 1597-1609 
 
Doss, C. (2006) „The Effects of Intra-household Property Ownership on Expenditure Patterns 
in Ghana‟, Journal of African Economics, 15(1): 149-180. 
 
Doss, C. (2013) „Intra-household Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing 
Countries‟, Policy Research Working Paper Series 6337, The World Bank. 
 
Drèze, J. and Geeta G. Kingdon, (2001) „School Participation in Rural India,‟ Review of 
Development Economics 5 (1): 1–24 
 
Dubois, P., de Janvry, A., and Sadoulet, E. (2012) „Effects on school enrolment and 
performance of a conditional transfers program in Mexico‟, Journal of Labour 
Economics, 30(3): 555–589. 
 
Duflo, E. (2003) „Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-Age Pensions and Intrahousehold 
Allocation in South Africa,‟ World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, 
17(1): 1-25. 
 
Durrant, V.L. and Sathar, Z.A.  (2000) „Greater Investments in Children Through Women‟s 
Empowerment: A Key to Demographic Change in Pakistan‟, Paper prepared for 
presentation at the annual Population Association of America meetings, March 2000, 
Los Angeles, California. 
Duryea, S., and Morrison, A. (2004) „The effect of conditional transfers on school 
performance and child labour: Evidence from an ex-post impact evaluation in Costa 
Rica‟, Journal of Political Economy 75: 352-65. 
 
Duryea, S., Lam, D. and Levison, D., (2007) „Effects of economic shocks on children‟s 
employment and schooling in Brazil‟, Journal of Development Economics 84(1): 
188–214. 
 
Ebot J. O (2014) „Place matters: Community level effects of women‟s autonomy on 
Ethiopian children‟s immunization status‟, African Population Studies, 28: 1202–
1215. 
 
Edmonds, E. (2006) „Child labour and schooling responses to anticipated income in South 




Edmonds, E and Pavcnik, N. (2002) „Does Globalization Increase Child Labour? Evidence 
from Vietnam‟, NBER Working Paper No. 8760 
 
Edmounds, E and Nina Pavcnik, (2005) „Child Labour in the Global Economy‟, Journal of 
Economic Perspective, 19 (1): 199-220. 
 
Elder, H.W., Rudolph, P.M., (2003) „Who makes the financial decisions in the households of 
older Americans?‟ Financial Services Review 12: 293-308 
 
Ellis, F. (1988) ‘Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development‟, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Emerson, P. and Souza, A., (2007) „Child labour, school attendance, and intra-household 
gender bias in Brazil‟, The World Bank Economic Review 21(2): 301–316. 
 
Emerson, P., and Souza, A. P. (2006) „Is Child Labour Harmful? The Impact of Working 
Earlier in Life on Adult Earnings‟, manuscript. 
 
Engels, F. (1884) The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, trans. Alec West, 
rev. and ed. EB Leacock (New York, 1972), 129. 
 
Eswaran, M., and Malhotra, N. (2011) „Domestic violence and women's autonomy in 
developing countries: theory and evidence‟, Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue 
canadienne d'économique, 44(4): 1222-1263. 
 
Evans, D. K., Hausladen S., Kosec K., and Reese N. (2014) „Community-based Conditional 
Cash Transfers in Tanzania: Results from a Randomized Trial‟, Washington DC: The 
World Bank 
 
Felkey, A. J. (2005) „Husbands, Wives and the Peculiar Economics of Household Public 
Goods and Bads,‟ Seminar Presentation, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago IL, US. 
 
Filmer, D. and Schady, N. (2009) „School Enrolment, Selection and Test Scores‟, The World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4998, World Bank, Washington 
 
Fiszbein, A. and N. Schady, (2009) „Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and 
Future Poverty, Washington, DC: World Bank Policy Research Report 
 
Fors, H., (2012) „Child Labour: Review of Recent Theory and Evidence with Policy 
Implications‟, Journal of Economic Survey, 26 (4): 570-593. 
 
Francavilla, F., and Gianelli, G. C. (2007) „The Relationship between Child Labour and 
Mother‟s work: The Case of India‟, IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 3099. 
 
Frempong, A. G. and Codjoe, S. (2017) „Sex Preference for Children in Ghana: the Influence 
of Educational attainment‟, Journal of Population Research, 34(4): 313-325. 
 
Fuseini, K. and Kalule-Sabiti, I. (2015) „Women‟s Autonomy in Ghana: Does Religion 
Matter?, African Population Studies; 29 (2): 1831-1842 
160 
 
Galasso, E. (1999) „Intrahousehold Allocation and Child Labour in Indonesia‟, Manuscript, 
Boston College. 
 
Garcia, M. and Moore, C. (2012) „The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer 
Programmes in Sub Saharan Africa‟, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 
 
Gee, K., (2010) „Reducing Child Labour Through conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence   
from Nicaragua‟s Red de Proteccion social‟, Development Policy Review 28(6): 711-
732. 
 
Gertler, M. and Glewwe, P. (1990) „The Willingness to Pay for Education in Developing 
Countries: Evidence from Rural Peru,‟ Journal of Public Economics (August): 251-
275 
 
Ghana National Development Planning Commission, (2005). Growth and poverty reduction 
strategy (GPRS II) (2006 - 2009): V.1. Policy framework, Accra 
 
Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) Ghana Health Service (GHS), and ICF Macro (2009) Ghana 
Demographic and Health Survey (2008). Accra, Ghana: GSS, GHS, and ICF Macro. 
 
Ghana Statistical Service and UNICEF, (2006) Ghana Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey 
(MICS), Accra, Ghana 
 
Ghana Statistical Service, (1988, 1992, 1995) „Ghana Living Standards Survey Report on the 
First, Second and Third Round (GLSS 1,2,3)‟, GSS, Accra, Ghana 
 
Ghana Statistical Service, (2003) Child labour Report, Accra, Ghana 
 
Ghana Statistical Service, (2011) „Ghana Multiple Indicator Cluster survey with an Enhanced 
Malaria Module and Biomarker Final Report‟, Accra, Ghana. 
 
Ghana Statistical Service, (2014a) „Sixth Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS 6) Report‟, 
Accra, Ghana 
 
Ghana Statistical Service, (2014b) „GLSS 6 Child labour Report‟, Accra, Ghana 
 
Ghana Statistical Service, (2014c) „GLSS 6 Poverty Profile in Ghana‟, Accra, Ghana 
 
Ghana Statistical Service, (2016) „2015 Labour Force Report‟, Accra, Ghana 
 
Girma, S. and Görg, H., (2007) „Evaluating the Foreign Ownership Wage Premium Using a 
Difference-in-Differences Matching Approach‟, Journal of International Economics, 
72(1): 97-112. 
 
Gitter, S. R. and Barham B. L. (2008) „Women's Power, Conditional Cash Transfers, and 
Schooling in Nicaragua‟, The World Bank Economic Review, 22(2): 271-290. 
 
Glewwe, P. and Olinto, P. (2004) „Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on 




Grimm, M. (2011) „Does Household Income Matter for Children's Schooling? Evidence for 
Rural Sub- Saharan Africa‟, Economics of Education Review 30 (4): 740-754. 
 
Grootaert, C. and Patrinos H.A. (1999) (eds.), The Policy Analysis of Child Labour: A 
Comparative Study, St. Martin„s Press, New York. 
 
Gunnarsson, V., Orazem, P. F. and Sánchez, M., (2006) „Child Labour and School 
Achievement in Latin America‟, The World Bank Economic Review, 20(1): 31-54. 
Haddad, L, Hoddinott, J. and Alderman, H. (eds.) (1997) Intrahousehold Resource Allocation 
in Developing Countries: Methods Models and Policy, Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
Haddad, L. (1994) „Strengthening Food Policy through Intra-Household Analysis‟, Food 
Policy, 19 (4): 347-356. 
 
Haddad, L., and Hoddinott, J. (1994) „Women's Income and Boy-Girl Anthropometric Status 
in the Cote D'ivoire,‟ World Development, 22 (4): 543-53. 
 
Haile G. and Haile B., (2012) „Child Labour and Child Schooling in Rural Ethiopia: Nature 
and Trade-off,‟ Edu. Econ. 20(4): 365-385 
 
Handa, S., M. Park, I. Osei Akoto, R. Darko Osei, B. Davis, and S. Diadone (2014) 
„Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty Programme Impact Evaluation’, Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina, Carolina Population Centre 
 
Heady, C., (2003) „The Effect of Child Labour on Learning Achievement‟, World 
Development, 31(2): 385–398. 
 
Heyneman, S; Kafui, E; Smith, T; Koka, J; Boer, J; and Havi, E., (2009) „Review of Basic 
Education Quality in Ghana, Basic Education in Ghana: Progress and Problems 
Final Report, The Mitchell Group, Washington D.C.  
 
Hoddinott, J., and Haddad L. (1995) „Does Female Income Share Influence Household 
Expenditures? Evidence from Cote D„Ivoire‟, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 57 (1): 77-95 
 
Hou X and Ma N (2013) „The effect of women's decision-making power on maternal health 
services uptake: evidence from Pakistan‟, Health Policy Plan 28(2): 176-184 
 
Hou Xi. (2011) „Women„s Decision Making Power and Human Development: Evidence from 
Pakistan‟, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5830, The World Bank. 
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/hnp/files/edstats/GHAdprep09.pdf 
 
Huebler F. (2008) „Child labour and school attendance: Evidence from MICS and DHS 
surveys. Unpublished manuscript. Accessed on 20
th
 September, 2016 from 
http://www.childinfo.org/files/Child_labour_school_FHuebler_2008.pdf. 
 
IEG. (2011) „Evidence and lessons learned from impact evaluations on social safety nets‟, 




Ilahi, N., (2001) „Children‟s Work and Schooling: Does Gender Matter? Evidence from the 
Peru LSMS Panel Data,‟ Working Paper 2745, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
 
International Labour Organization (1996) „Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable,‟ Geneva. 
 
International Labour Organization (2013) „Making Progress Against Child Labour: Global 
Estimates and Trends 2000-2012‟, Geneva. 
 
Jacoby, H. G. and Skoufias, E. (1997). "Risk, Financial Markets and Human Capital in a 
Developing Country." The Review of Economic Studies 64 (July): 311-335. 
 
Jejeebhoy, S. J. and Sathar, Z. A. (2001) „Women‟s autonomy in India and Pakistan: The 
influence of religion and region‟, Population and Development Review 27(4): 687-
712. 
 
Jensen P. and Nielsen H. S. (1997) „Child labour or school attendance? Evidence from 
Zambia‟, Journal of Population Economics, 10 (4): 407-424. 
 
Jensen, R. T., (2004) „Do private transfers 'displace' the benefits of public transfers? Evidence 
from South Africa,‟ Journal of Public Economics, 88(1-2): 89-112 
 
Jones, M.C., Marron, J.S. and Sheather, S.J., (1996) „A brief survey of bandwidth selection 
for density estimation‟, Journal of the American Statistical Association 91: 401-407 
 
Kabeer N., Piza C., and Taylor, L. (2012) „What are the economic impacts of conditional 
cash transfer programmes? A systematic review of the evidence‟, Technical report. 
London: EPPI-Centre, University of London. 
 
Kakwani, N., Soares F. V. and Son H. H. (2005) „Conditional Cash Transfers in African 
Countries‟, Working Paper no 9. UNDP International Poverty Centre, Brasilia 
 
Katz, E. G., (1995) „Gender and trade within the household: Observations from rural 
Guatemala,‟ World Development, Elsevier, 23(2): 327-342 
 
Keller, T. E., Hilton, B. D. and Twumasi-Ankrah, K. (1999) „Teenage pregnancy and 
motherhood in Ghanaian Community‟, Journal of social Development in Africa, 
14(1): 69-84 
 
Keteku, W. N., (1999) „Educational Reform in Ghana: The senior Secondary School‟ 
Unpublished accessed online http://www.bibl.u-szeged.hu/oseas_adsec/ghana.htm   
on 12/01/2016 
 
Khan, S. (2013) „Women‟s Empowerment through poverty alleviation: A sociocultural and 
Politico-Economic Assessment of Conditions in Pakistan‟, European Journal of 
Business, Economics and Accountancy, 1 (1) 
 
Khanam, R., and Ross, R., (2011) „Is Child Work a deterrent to School Attendance and 
School Attainment?: Evidence from Bangladesh,‟ International Journal of Social 




Kim, J. and Zepeda, L., (2004) „Factor Affecting Children‟s Participation and Amount of 
Labour on Family Farms‟, Journal of Safety Research 35(4): 391-401 
 
Kondylis, F., and Manacorda, M., (2006) ‘School proximity and child labour. Evidence from 
rural Tanzania’, Working paper for the UCW access and quality workshop 
 
Korboe, D., Dogbe, T., and Marshall, C., (2011) „Participatory Poverty and Vulnerability 
Assessment (PPVA): Understanding the Regional Dynamics of Poverty with 
Particular Focus on Northern Ghana‟, GOG/DFID/UNICEF/World Bank: Accra, 
Ghana 
 
Kurosaki, T., Ito S., Fuwa N., Kubo K. and Sawada, Y., (2006) Child labour and school 
enrolment in rural India: whose education matters? Developing Economies 44(4): 
440–464. 
 
Lavy, V., (1996) „School Supply Constraints and Children‟s Educational Outcomes in Rural 
Ghana‟, Journal of Development Economics 51: 291-314 
 
Lavy, V., Spratt J., and Leboucher, N. (1997) „Patterns of incidence and change in Moroccan 
literacy‟, Comparative Education Review 41 (2), 120-141. 
 
Leclercq, F., (2002) „Child Work, Schooling and Household Resources in Rural North India‟ 
in Nira Ramachandran and Lionel Massun (editors) Coming to Grips with Rural 
Child Work. A Food Security Approach, New Delhi, Institute for Human 
Development and United Nations World Food Programme, p.170  
 
Lepine, A. and Strobl, E; (2013) ‘The Effect of Women‟s Bargaining Power on Child 
Nutrition in Rural Senegal‟, World Development 45: 17-30 
 
Levison, D., (1991) „Children‟s Labour Force Activity and Schooling in Brazil‟, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Michigan 
 
Lieten, G.K., (2002) „The Causes for Child Labour in India: the Poverty Analysis Indian‟, 
Journal of Labour Economics, 45(3) 
 
Lührmann, M. and Maurer, J., (2007) „Who wears the trousers? A semi-parametric analysis 
of decision power in couples‟, CeMMAP Working Paper CWP25/07. 
 
Lundberg, S. J., Pollak, R. A., and Wales, T. J. (1997) „Do husbands and wives pool their 
resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom child benefit‟, Journal of Human 
Resources, 463-480. 
 
Luz L and Agadjanian V. (2015) „Women‟s decision making autonomy and children‟s 
schooling in rural Mozambique‟, Demographic Research.; 32,775–796 
Maitra, P., (2003) „Schooling and Educational Attainment: Evidence from Bangladesh‟, 
Education Economics, 11(2): 129–153. 
Malhotra A, Vanneman R. and Kishor S. (1995) „Fertility, dimensions of patriarchy, and 
development in India‟, Population and Development Review, 21: 281–305. 
164 
 
Maluccio, J.A., and Flores, R. (2004) „Impact evaluation of a conditional cash transfer 
programme: The Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social‟, FCND Discussion paper No. 
184. 
 
Manacorda, M., (2006) „Child labour and the labour supply of other household members: 
evidence from 1920 America‟, American Economic Review 96: 1788–1800 
 
Manful, E. and McCystral, P. (2011) „Ghana‟s Children‟s Act 560: A Rethink of its 
Implementation‟, International Journal of Children’s Rights 19(2): 151–165 
 
Mason, K. and Smith, H. (2000) „Husbands‟ versus wives fertility goals and use of 
contraception: The influence of gender context in five Asian countries,‟ Demography 
37(3): 299-311. 
 
Mason, K. O. (1997) „Gender and Demographic Change: What Do We Know?, IN The 
Continuing Demographic Transition. Gavin W. Jones, Robert M. Douglas, John C. 
Caldwell, and Rennie M. D‟Souza, eds. Clarendon Press, Oxford, Pp. 158-182. 
 
McKenzie D.J (2003) „Measure inequality with asset indicators‟, BREAD Working Paper No. 
042; Cambridge, 
.  
McPeak, J. G. and Doss, C. (2006) „Are Household Production Decisions Cooperative? 
Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk Sales from Northern Kenya‟, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 88 (3): 525-541. 
 
Miller C,  Tsoka. M. and Reichert K., (2008) „Impact Evaluation Report: External Evaluation 
of the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot‟, School of Public Health, Boston 
University. 
 
Miller, C. (2009) „The Evaluation of Cash Transfer Schemes in Africa‟, Center for Global 
Health and Development, School of Public Health, Boston University, 
http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites/default/files/documents/1522.pdf 
 
Ministry of Education, (2014) „Ghana 2013 National Education Assessment Technical 
Report‟, Accra, Ghana.  
 
Ministry of Education, (2015, 2016) „Ghana Education Management Information System 
(EMICS) database‟, Accra, Ghana 
 
Ministry of Education, (2016) „Education Sector Performance Report 2015‟, Accra, Ghana.  
 
Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, (2016) „Programme Based Budget 
Estimates for 2016‟, Accra, Ghana 
 
Mochiah E. A. E., Osei R. D., and Isaac Akoto I. O. (2014) „The impact of conditional cash 
transfer programmes on household work decisions in Ghana‟, UNU WIDER Working 
Paper 2014/116. 
Moehling, C. (1995) „Intra-household Allocation of Resources and the Participation of 




Morgan, S.P. and Niraula, B. B. (1995) „Gender Inequality and Fertility in Two Nepali 
Villages‟, Population and Development Review, 21:541–61. 
 
Mutharayappa, R., (2013) „Household Incomes and Women Empowerment in Karnataka‟, 
Man and Development, 34 (2); Sardar Patel Institute of Economic & Social Research 
 
Mwebaze, T., (2004) „Extent and Determinants of Child Labour in Uganda‟, Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Linz. 
 
Ndanyou, L. and Djienouassi, S., (2010) „Characteristics and Determinants of child labour in 
Cameroon‟, CSAE Conference: Economic Development in Africa, Centre for Study 
of African Economies, 21st -23rd March, St. Catherine‟s College, Oxford, United 
Kingdom 
 
Nielsen, H. S., (1998) „Child Labour and School Attendance: Two Joint Decisions‟, Centre 
for Labour Market and Social Research, CLC-WP 98-15, Aarhus, Denmark 
 
Nkamleu, G.B., (2009) „Determinants of Child Labour and Schooling in the Native Cocoa 
Households of Cote d‟Ivoire‟, AERC Research Paper 190, African Economic 
Research Consortium, Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
Okpukpara, C. B. and Odurukwe, M., (2006) ‟Incidence of child Labour in Nigeria: 
Implication for Poverty Alleviation‟, The African Economic Research Consortium, 
Kenya, 2006 
 
Olinto, P. and de Souza, P. Z. (2005) „An Impact Evaluation of the Conditional Cash 
Transfers to Education Under PRAF: An Experimental Approach‟. Rio de Janeiro. 
(mimeo). 
 
Orazem, P. and Gunnarsson, L. V., (2004) „Child Labour, School Attendance and 
Performance: A Review‟, Working Paper #04001, Department of Economics, Iowa 
State University 
 
Osei, R. D., Owusu G. A., Asem F. E., and Afutu-Kotely, R. L. (2009) „Effects of Capitation 
Grant on Education Outcomes in Ghana‟, Global Development Network Working 
Paper 
 
Osmani, L. N. K. (2007) „A breakthrough in women's bargaining power: the impact of 
microcredit‟, Journal of International Development 19(5): 695-716. 
 
Owusu, V. and Kwarteye, A. G., (2008)  „An Empirical Analysis on the Determinants of 
Child Labour in Cocoa Production in Ghana‟, Paper Presentation at PENet 
Conference, 2008 
 
Pagan, A., and Ullah, A. (1999) „Nonparametric Econometrics‟, Cambridge University Press,  
 
Palmer, R., (2005) „Beyond the Basics: Post-basic Education and Training and Poverty 
Reduction in Ghana‟, Post-Basic Education and Training Working Paper Series No 




Park, M., Handa S., Darko Osei R. and Osei-Akoto I. (2012) „Livelihood Empowerment 
Against Poverty programme‟, Assessment of LEAP operations, Accra, Ghana 
 
Parker, S.W. and Skoufias, E (2000) „The impact of PROGRESA on work, leisure and time 
allocation‟, Report submitted to PROGRESA, International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington D C 
 
Patrinos, H. A. and Psacharapoulas, G., (1995) „Educational Performance and Child Labour 
in Paraguay‟, International Journal of Educational Development  15 (1): 47–60. 
 
Patrinos, H. A. and Psacharopoulos, G., (1997) „Family Size, Schooling and Child Labour in 
Peru – An Empirical Analysis,‟ Journal of Population Economics, 10(4):387–405. 
 
Pellerano, L., Moratti M., Jakobsen M., Bajgar, M. and Barca V. (2014) „Child Grants 
Programme Impact Evaluation‟ - Follow-up Report, Oxford: Oxford Policy 
Management. 
 
Phipps, A. S. and P. S. Burton, (1998) „What‟s Mine is Yours? The Influence of Male and 
Female Incomes on Patterns of Household Expenditure,‟ Economica 65, 599-613. 
 
Phoumin, H. and Fukui, S., (2006) „Hours Supplied of Cambodian Child Labour and School 
Enrolment: Simple Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for Policy Implications‟, 
GSICS Working Paper Series No. 5, Kobe University 
 
Pianto, D. M. and Soares, S. (2003) „Use of Survey Design for the Evaluation of Social 
Programmes: The PNAD and the Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour in 
Brazil‟, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Piza, C. and Portela Souza, A., (2016) „Short- and Long-term Effects of a Child-Labour Ban‟, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 7796, available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/146211471281195366/pdf/WPS7796.pdf 
 
Pollak, R. A. (2005) „Bargaining power in marriage: Earnings, wage rates and household 
production‟, National Bureau of Economic Research, (No. w11239) 
 
Ponce, J. and Bedi A. S. (2008) „The Impact of a Cash Transfer Program on Cognitive 
Achievement: The Bono de Desarrollo Humano of Ecuador‟, IZA Discussion Paper 
3658  
 
Pörtner, C. Chr., (2001) „Children as Insurance,‟ Journal of Population Economics, 14 (1): 
119-136. 
 
Psacharopoulos, G., (1997) „Child Labour versus Educational Attainment: Some Evidence 
from Latin America‟, Journal of Population Economics 10:337-386. 
 
Qian, N., (2008) „Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-Specific 





Quisumbing, A.R. and Maluccio, J.A. (2000) „Intra-Household Allocation and Gender 
Relations: New Empirical Evidence from Four Developing Countries‟, Food 
Consumption and Nutrition Division (FCND), Discussion Paper No. 84, IFPRI. 
 
Quisumbing, A.R. (1994) „Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages: Gender 
differences in traditional inheritance customs‟, Journal of Development Economics, 
43 (2): 167-195. 
 
Quisumbing, A.R. (2003) Household decisions, gender, and development: A synthesis of 
recent research, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. 
 
Quisumbing, Agnes, L. Haddad et al.  (1995) „Gender and Poverty: New Evidence from 10 
Developing Countries‟, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper 
No.9. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington D.C. 
 
Rahikainen, Marjatta, (2001) „Children and „the Right to Factory Work: Child Labour 
Legislation in Nineteenth-Century Finland,‟ Scandinavian Economic History Review, 
49 (1): 41-62. 
 
Rahman, L., & Rao, V. (2004) „The determinants of gender equity in India: examining Dyson 
and Moore's thesis with new data‟, Population and Development Review, 30(2), 239-
268 
 
Rangel, M. (2006) „Alimony Rights and Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources Evidence 
from Brazil,‟ The Economic Journal, July, pp-627-658. 
 
Ray R. (2000) „Analysis of Child Labour in Peru and Pakistan: A Comparative Study‟, 
Journal of Population Economics, 13: 3-19 
 
Ray, R., (2003) „The determinants of child labour and child schooling in Ghana‟, Journal of 
African Economics 11(4): 561–590. 
 
Ray, R. and Lancaster G. (2003), „Does Child Labour Affect School Attendance and School 
Performance? Multi Country Evidence on SIMPOC Data, report prepared for the 
ILO-IPEC, Geneva 
 
Ray, R. and Lancaster, G., (2005) „The impacts of Children‟s Work on Schooling: Multi 
Country Evidence‟, International Labour Review, 144(2), pp. 189-210 
 
Ravallion, M. and Wodon Q., (2000) „Does Child Labour Displace Schooling? Evidence on 
Behavioural Responses to an Enrolment Subsidy‟, Economic Journal 110 (March): 
C158-75. 
 
Rawlings, L.B., and Rubio, G.M. (2003) „Evaluating the impact of conditional cash transfer 
programs: Lesson from Latin America‟, World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3119. 
 
Reggio, I., (2011) „The Influence of the Mother‟s Power on Her Child‟s Labour in Mexico,‟ 




Rogers, A. C. and Swinnerton, K., (2008) A Theory of Exploitative Child Labour, Oxford 
Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, 60(1): 20-41 
 
Rosati, F. C. and Rossi, M., (2001) Children’s Working Hours, School Enrolment and 
Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence From Pakistan and Nicaragua, 
Understanding Children‟s Work. UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 
 
Rose, H. (2006) „Do gains in test scores explain labour market outcomes?‟ Economics of 
Education Review, 25 (4): 430-446 
 
Rosenbaum, P., and D. Rubin (1983) „The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects,‟ Biometrika, 70, 41(50) 
 
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Evenson, R. (1977) „Fertility, Schooling and the Econometric 
Contribution of Children in Rural India: An Econometric Analysis,‟ Econometrica 45 
(July):1065-1079 
 
Roushdy R. and Namoro S. (2007) „Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Egypt: Effect of 
Distribution of Power within the Household on Child Work and Schooling’, 
University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, Working Papers No. 331 
 
Rubalcava, L., and Thomas, D. (1997) Family Bargaining and Welfare, RAND mimeo 
 
Saavedra, J.E. and Garcia, S., (2012) „Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers on Educational 
Outcomes in Developing Countries: A Meta-analysis‟, RAND Corporation Working 
Papers, WR-921-1. 
 
Safa, H. I. (1992) „Development and Changing Gender Roles in Latin America and the 
Caribbean‟, Women’s Work and Women’s Lives, 69-86 
 
Schuler, S. R., Hashemi S. M.  and Riley A. (1997) „The influence of changing roles and 
status in Bangladesh‟s fertility transition: Evidence from a study of credit programs 
and contraceptive use‟, World Development 25(4) 
 
Schultz, T. P. (1990) „Testing the neoclassical model of family labour supply and fertility‟, 
Journal of Human Resources, 25 (4): 599-634. 
 
Schultz, T. P., (1997) „Demand for Children in Low Income Countries‟ In Mark R. 
Rosenzweig and Oded Stark, eds., Handbook of Population and Family Economics, 
vol. 1A. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 349-430 
 
Shroff, M.R., Griffiths, P.L., Suchindran, C., Nagalla, B., Vazir, S., and Bentley, M.E. (2011) 
„Does maternal autonomy influence feeding practices and infant growth in rural 
India? Social Science and Medicine 73(3): 447–455 
 
Siebert, W. S., (1990) „Developments in the Economics of Human Capital‟ In D. Carline and 
others. Labour Economics,  Longman: London 
 
Smith, J., and Todd P. (2005) „Does Matching Overcome LaLonde's Critique of Non 
experimental Estimators?,‟ Journal of Econometrics, 125(1-2): 305-353. 
169 
 
Smits, J. and Gündüz-Hosgör A., (2006) „Effects of Family Background Characteristics on 
Educational Participation in Turkey,‟ International Journal of Educational 
Development 26, (5): 545-560. 
 
Stock, J. H., Wright, J. H and Yogo, M. (2002) „A survey of weak instruments and weak 
identification in generalized method of moments‟, Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics 20: 518–529 
 
Strauss, J., Mwabu, G., and Beegle, K. (2000) „Intra-household allocations: a review of 
theories and empirical evidence‟, Journal of African Economies, 9 (Supplement 1): 
83-143. 
 
Strauss, J., and Thomas, D., (1995) Human Resources: Empirical Modelling of Household 
and Family Decisions, In: Behrman, J., Srinivasan, T. N., (Eds), Handbook of 
Development Economics, Vol. 3A, Elsevier Science. 
 
Subramanian, J. (1998) „Rural Women's Rights to Property: A Bangladesh Case Study’,  
Land Tenure Centre, University of Wisconsin-Madison, March 1998 (Mimeo). 
 
Thomas D., (1994) „Like Father, like Son; Like Mother, like Daughter: Parental Resources 
and Child Height‟, Journal of Human Resources, 29 (4): 950-988. 
 
Thomas, D. (1990) „Intra-Household Allocation: An Inferential Approach‟, Journal of 
Human Resources 25: 635–664. 
 
Thomas, D., Contreras D., and Frankenberg E. (1997) „Child Health and the Distribution of 
Household Resources at Marriage‟, RAND mimeo. 
 
Todd, Petra (1999) „A Practical Guide to Implementing Matching Estimators‟, A paper 
prepared for IADB Meeting in Santigo, Chile. Accessed on 13/ 10/ 2016 on 
http://athena.sas.upenn.edu/petra/papers/prac.pdf. 
 
Udry, Christopher, (1996) “Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the 
Household,‟ Journal of Political Economy, 104(5): 1010-46. 
 
United Nations Development Programme, (2015) Ghana Millennium Development Goals 
Report, Accra, Ghana. 
 
United Nations Education Scientific Cultural Organisation, (2011) „Global Education Digest 
2011: Regional Profile: Sub-Saharan Africa, Paris, France. 
 
UNICEF and Department of Social Development, SA. (2012) „The South African child 
support grant impact assessment: Evidence from a survey of children, adolescents 
and their households‟, Pretoria: UNICEF South Africa. 
 
UNICEF, (1997) „The State of the World Children. Report‟, UNICEF: New York 
 





UNICEF, (2012) „The State of the World's Children 2012: Children in an Urban World, New 
York 
 
UNICEF, (2015) „The State of the World’s Children: Reimagine the Future’, New York 
 
Villatoro, P. (2005), Los Nuevos Programas de Protección Social Asistencial en América 
Latina y el Caribe.” CEPAL. Mimeo 
 
Ward, P., A., Hurrell, A., Visram, N., Riemenschnedier, L., Pellerano, C., O'Brien, I., 
MacAuslan, and Willis, J. (2010) ‘Kenya CT-OVC programme operational and 
impact evaluation 2007–2009‟, Oxford: Oxford Policy Management. 
 
Webbink, E., Smits, J. and de Jong, E., (2011) „Child labour in Africa and Asia: Household 
and context determinants of hours worked in paid labour by young children in 16 
low-income countries‟, NiCE Working Paper 11-107 
 
Woldemicael, G. (2010) „Do Women With Higher Autonomy Seek More Maternal Health 
Care? Evidence From Eritrea and Ethiopia,‟ Health Care for Women International 
31(7): 599-620 
 
Yabiku, S. T., Agadjanian, V and Sevoyan, A. (2010) „Husbands‟ labour migration and 
wives‟ autonomy in Mozambique‟, Population Studies 64(3): 293-306. 
[PMC2976678]. 
Yap YT, Sedlacek G, Orazen P. F. (2002) Limiting child labour through behaviour-based 
income transfers: an experimental evaluation of the PETI programme in rural Brazil; 
mimeo. 
  
Yared, S, and Gurmu, S. (2015) „The role of birth order in child labour and schooling‟, 















Table A 1-A10 Appendix for Chapter Two 
Table A1. Variables Names and Definition 
Variables Definitions 
Childlabour 1 if a child is involved in  child labour in the last 7 days, 0 otherwise 
HazardousW 1 if a child is involved in  hazardous in the last 7 days, 0 otherwise 
Enrol 1 if a child is enrolled in school last year and now, 0 otherwise 
HoursCL Hours of child labour per week 
HoursH Hours of hazardous work per week 
ClassAtthrs Hours of class attendance per week 
Classmisshrs Hours of missed class attendance per week 
Homeworkhrs Hours of homework (study) per day 
Boy 1  if a child is a boy;   0 Otherwise (a girl) 
RelH 1 if a child is the son/daughter of household head; 0 otherwise 
Age Child 's age 
Age2 Square of a child's age 
FatherHH 1 if a child's father is in the Household; 0 otherwise 
MotherHH 1 if a child's mother is in the Household; 0 otherwise 
FatherEmptsta 1 if the father is employed; 0 otherwise 
MotherEmptsta 1 if the mother is employed; 0 otherwise 
FatherEduPrim 1 if the father has completed primary school; 0 No education 
FatherEduSec 1 if the father has completed post primary school ; 0 No education 
MotherEduPrim 1 if the mother has completed primary school; 0 No education 
MotherEduSec 1 if the mother has completed post primary school; 0 No education 
Typesch 1  if a child's school is public;  0  if a child's school is private 
LogTotalEduexp Log of schooling expenditure per cluster 
HeadAge Age of household head 
HeadAge2 Age of household head squared 
MaleHead 1 if a household head is male; 0 otherwise 
HeadMar 1 if a household head is married; 0 otherwise 
NoChildren Number household members below 18 years 
Elders 1 if a household has  members  above 60 years; 0 otherwise 
Ownland 1 if a household owns land;  0 otherwise 
Remittance 1 if a household received remittance, 0 otherwise 
Landsize  Farm size per household in acres 
Ownlivestock 1 if a household owns livestock;  0 otherwise 
HHsize Number of persons in a household (household size) 
RurUrb 1 if a household is located in urban area;  0 if it is in rural area 
AssetIndex Index of 40 durable assets based on Principal Component Analysis  
LogExpCapita Household expenditure per capita ( in logs) 
Scholarship 1 if the child has scholarship at school, 0 otherwise 
Childwage Wage per day per child in agriculture work in a  community 
DistPrimary Distance to the nearest primary school in a community in kilometres 




Table A2 Descriptive Statistics  
  
                 
Boys 
  
               
Girls 
  
              
Total 
  









Age 10.71 3.65 10.71 3.68 10.71 3.67 
Age2 127.97 80.31 128.2 80.94 128.08 80.62 
Age started work 8.82 2.59 8.91 2.67 8.86 2.63 
Boy 
    
0.51 0.5 
RelH 0.8 0.4 0.76 0.43 0.78 0.41 
Enrol 0.87 0.34 0.86 0.35 0.87 0.35 
Economic Work 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Childlabour 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.43 
HazardousW 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35 
Homeworkhrs 0.74 0.44 0.81 0.39 0.78 0.42 
ClassAtthrs 27.62 10.28 27.77 10.25 27.69 10.26 
HoursCL 21.9 17.93 20.2 16.69 21.12 17.4 
HoursH 27.76 21.13 24.89 20.02 26.48 20.68 
Typesch 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.43 
TotalEduexp 239.37 397.15 259.8 415.13 249.34 406.15 
FatherHH 0.68 0.47 0.62 0.48 0.65 0.48 
FatherEduPrim 0.62 0.48 0.57 0.5 0.6 0.49 
FatherEduSec 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 
FatherEmptsta 0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 
MotherEmptsta 0.51 0.5 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.5 
MotherEduPrim 0.72 0.45 0.68 0.47 0.7 0.46 
MotherEduSec 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 
ExpCapita 413.69 628.44 445.15 681.1 429.13 654.98 
MotherHH 0.8 0.4 0.78 0.42 0.79 0.41 
HeadAge 48.36 13.16 48.33 13.48 48.35 13.31 
HeadAge2 2512.2 1420.3 2517.31 1457.37 2514.71 1438.58 
MaleHead 0.78 0.41 0.75 0.43 0.76 0.42 
HeadMar 0.75 0.43 0.74 0.44 0.75 0.43 
NoChildren 4.19 2.34 4.07 2.32 4.13 2.33 
Elders 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 
Remittance 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 
Ownland 0.52 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.51 0.5 
Landsize 6.68 54.44 5.92 30.31 6.31 44.27 
Ownlivestock 0.61 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.6 0.49 
HHsize 6.99 3.26 6.85 3.26 6.92 3.26 
RurUrb 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 
Childwage 3.04 5.63 3.18 6.17 3.1 5.89 
DistPrimary 1.16 4.16 0.97 3.71 1.07 3.95 
DistJHS 3.55 7.3 3.28 7.08 3.42 7.2 
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Table A3a Correlates of School and Labour Market Participation for Boys (Model 1)  
Independent 
Variables 
Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
RelH 0.00328*** (0.00118) -0.0436*** (0.0107) 
Age 0.000413* (0.000244) 0.00332 (0.00559) 
Age2 -1.15E-04 (0.000109) -0.000332 (0.000262) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00172 (0.00112) 0.0346*** (0.0126) 
FatherEduSec -0.00137 (0.000868) 0.0282*** (0.00963) 
MotherEduPrim -0.000768 (0.000643) 0.0335*** (0.0113) 
MotherEduSec 0.000882 (0.000723) -0.0230* (0.0119) 
FatherEmptsta 0.00817*** (0.00233) -0.0961*** (0.0204) 
MotherEmptsta 0.00893*** (0.00256) -0.0924*** (0.0285) 
FatherHH 0.000176 (0.000697) -0.00221 (0.0108) 
MotherHH 0.000786 (0.000634) -0.0078 (0.00947) 
HeadAge -0.000049 (0.000056) 0.000826 (0.000843) 
HeadAge2 0.000072 (0.000055) -0.00012 (0.000076) 
MaleHead 0.00206** (0.000901) -0.0310*** (0.00829) 
HeadMar -0.00163** (0.000688) 0.0268*** (0.00561) 
NoChildren 0.000043 (0.000128) 0.000336 (0.00209) 
Elders -0.000395 (0.000414) 0.00775 (0.00611) 
Ownland -0.00006 (0.000279) 0.000308 (0.00457) 
Landsize -0.00007 (0.00009) 0.000127 (0.000171) 
Ownlivestock 0.000819* (0.000418) -0.00945* (0.00564) 
HHsize -0.000009 (0.000094) -0.000758 (0.00156) 
RurUrb -0.000423 (0.000357) 0.00538 (0.00532) 
Remittance -0.000682 (0.0007) 0.0145 (0.0105) 
AssetIndex -0.00031** (0.00013) 0.00432*** (0.00136) 
LogExpCapita -0.00007 (0.000195) 0.00509 (0.0033) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.00024 (0.000279) 0.000394 (0.00472) 
Rho -0.28891 0.040201 
 
 






Sample     11,319   









Table A3b Correlates of School and Labour Market Participation for Boys (Model 2)  
Independent 
Variables 
Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
RelH 0.00293*** (0.000883) -0.0394*** (0.00952) 
Age -0.00092*** (0.000351) 0.0163*** (0.00366) 
Age2 6.37e-05*** (0.0000197) -0.0011*** (0.000164) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00425*** (0.0016) 0.0510*** (0.0137) 
FatherEduSec -0.00281** (0.00121) 0.0326*** (0.0104) 
MotherEduPrim -0.000945 (0.000608) 0.0329*** (0.011) 
MotherEduSec 0.00112 (0.000733) -0.0235** (0.0118) 
FatherEmptsta 0.00675*** (0.00153) -0.0830*** (0.0145) 
MotherEmptsta 0.00521*** (0.0011) -0.0558*** (0.0106) 
FatherHH 0.00128 (0.000814) -0.0149 (0.0114) 
MotherHH -0.000199 (0.000578) 0.00308 (0.00856) 
HeadAge -0.000128* (0.000067) 0.00168* (0.000884) 
HeadAge2 0.0000014** (0.0000006) -0.00019** (0.00008) 
MaleHead 0.00175*** (0.000648) -0.0265*** (0.00758) 
HeadMar -0.000894** (0.000437) 0.0175*** (0.00537) 
NoChildren -0.000032 (0.000142) 0.001 (0.00208) 
Elders -0.000407 (0.000425) 0.00736 (0.0062) 
Ownland -0.000309 (0.000306) 0.00342 (0.00458) 
Landsize -0.00006 (0.00009) 0.000104 (0.000165) 
Ownlivestock 0.000753** (0.000374) -0.00894* (0.00519) 
HHsize 0.000093 (0.000111) -0.00172 (0.00154) 
RurUrb -0.000109 (0.000357) 0.00188 (0.00529) 
Remittance -0.00170** (0.000818) 0.0246** (0.011) 
AssetIndex -0.00040*** (0.000126) 0.00532*** (0.00143) 
LogExpCapita 0.000297 (0.000198) 0.000156 (0.00337) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.000408 (0.000311) 0.00288 (0.00468) 
DistPrimary 0.000329** (0.000149) -0.0042*** (0.000981) 
DistJHS 0.000091* (0.000058) -0.0013*** (0.000502) 
Childwage 0.000077 (0.000048) -0.000886 (0.00065) 
Rho -0.22489 0.0482 
  Wald Test, rho=0; chi2(1) Pro 20.1275 0.0000 
 Log Pseudolikehood 
  
-1022395 
 Sample     6,731   







Table A4a Correlates of School and Labour Market Participation for Girls (Model 1) 
Independent 
Variables 
Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
RelH -0.0286*** (0.0102) 0.00194** (0.00076) 
Age 0.00708 (0.00664) 0.000703** (0.000298) 
Age2 -0.00064** (0.00031) -0.000207 (0.000128) 
FatherEduPrim 0.0383*** (0.0134) -0.0016 (0.000975) 
FatherEduSec 0.0159 (0.0101) -0.000847 (0.00067) 
MotherEduPrim 0.0212* (0.0114) -0.00055 (0.000599) 
MotherEduSec -0.0024 (0.0108) -0.000129 (0.00565) 
FatherEmptsta -0.0951*** (0.0197) 0.00881*** (0.00202) 
MotherEmptsta -0.105*** (0.027) 0.0104*** (0.00264) 
FatherHH 0.0113 (0.0138) -0.00093 (0.00756) 
MotherHH -0.0129 (0.0125) 0.00184** (0.000809) 
HeadAge -0.00185* (0.00112) 0.000137* (0.0000779) 
HeadAge2 0.000014 (0.000011) -0.000011 (0.000007) 
MaleHead -0.0471*** (0.00876) 0.00273*** (0.000958) 
HeadMar 0.0240*** (0.00677) -0.0016*** (0.000577) 
NoChildren -0.00405 (0.00254) 0.000187 (0.00016) 
Elders 0.00313 (0.00798) -0.000847 (0.00462) 
Ownland 0.00434 (0.00545) -0.000161 (0.000318) 
Landsize -0.00017** (0.00008) 0.000009 (0.000007) 
Ownlivestock -0.00181 (0.00588) 0.000274 (0.000349) 
HHsize 0.00233 (0.00195) -0.000104 (0.000119) 
RurUrb 0.00596 (0.00606) -0.000492 (0.000373) 
Remittance -0.0087 (0.0109) 0.000385 (0.000641) 
AssetIndex -0.00337** (0.00134) 0.00022** (0.000102) 
LogExpCapita -0.0029 (0.00398) 0.000473** (0.000239) 
LogTotalEduexp 0.0173*** (0.00616) -0.00118** (0.00048) 
Rho -0.23016 0.040218 
 
 







Sample     10,941   









Table A4b Correlates of School and Labour Market Participation for Girls (Model 2) 
Independent 
Variables 
Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
RelH -0.0344* (0.0197) 0.00231 (0.00148) 
Age -0.0237 (0.0161) 0.00099* (0.000591) 
Age2 0.000865 (0.00077) -0.000024 (0.000027) 
FatherEduPrim 0.0631*** (0.0234) -0.00549* (0.00292) 
FatherEduSec 0.0372** (0.0171) -0.00369* (0.0022) 
MotherEduPrim 0.0123 (0.018) -0.000761 (0.00118) 
MotherEduSec 0.00959 (0.018) -0.000437 (0.00123) 
FatherEmptsta -0.203*** (0.0382) 0.0127*** (0.00308) 
MotherEmptsta -0.244*** (0.0568) 0.0153*** (0.00395) 
FatherHH -0.0167 (0.0259) 0.00065 (0.00165) 
MotherHH -0.0205 (0.0207) 0.00102 (0.00125) 
HeadAge -0.000364 (0.00181) 0.000016 (0.000129) 
HeadAge2 0.000006 (0.000017) -0.000003 (0.000012) 
MaleHead -0.0607*** (0.0173) 0.00451** (0.00183) 
HeadMar 0.0324*** (0.0117) -0.00235** (0.00112) 
NoChildren -0.00728* (0.00395) 0.000547 (0.000344) 
Elders -0.0169 (0.0148) 0.00109 (0.00113) 
Ownland 0.00556 (0.0086) -0.000481 (0.00063) 
Landsize -0.000089 (0.000171) 0.000075 (0.00011) 
Ownlivestock -0.0092 (0.0113) 0.000566 (0.00081) 
HHsize 0.00510* (0.003) -0.000366 (0.000247) 
Remittance -0.00184 (0.0179) 0.000372 (0.00129) 
AssetIndex -0.00364 (0.00296) 0.000283 (0.000238) 
LogExpCapita -0.00981 (0.00653) 0.0006 (0.00045) 
LogTotalEduexp 0.0398*** (0.0103) -0.00280** (0.0011) 
DistPrimary 0.000827 (0.00159) -0.000027 (0.000102) 
DistJHS 0.0021*** (0.000667) -0.00016** (0.00008) 
Childwage -0.00134 (0.000884) 0.00008 (0.00008) 
Rho -0.13204 0.0525 
  Wald Test, rho=0; chi2(1) Pro 6.1855 0.000 
 Log Pseudolikehood 
  
-944942 
 Sample     6,160   







Table A5a Correlates of School and Labour Market Participation for Rural Children  
Independent 
Variables 




Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Boy -0.000434 (0.000399) 0.00592 (0.0049) 
RelH 0.00370*** (0.00118) -0.0477*** (0.0129) 
Age 0.000610* (0.000366) -0.00621 (0.00887) 
Age2 -0.00014 (0.0017) 0.00087 (0.00431) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00464** (0.00189) 0.0564*** (0.0153) 
FatherEduSec -0.00283** (0.00134) 0.0328*** (0.0112) 
MotherEduPrim -0.00144 (0.00102) 0.0280** (0.0128) 
MotherEduSec 0.000222 (0.00093) -0.00613 (0.0126) 
FatherEmptsta 0.0142*** (0.00257) -0.181*** (0.0301) 
MotherEmptsta 0.0162*** (0.00313) -0.205*** (0.0411) 
FatherHH 0.00028 (0.00106) 0.000667 (0.0148) 
MotherHH 0.00200** (0.000995) -0.0253* (0.0135) 
HeadAge -0.00034 (0.000084) 0.00048 (0.0011) 
HeadAge2 0.000038 (0.00078) -0.00054 (0.00102) 
MaleHead 0.00404*** (0.00124) -0.0529*** (0.0107) 
HeadMar -0.00276*** (0.000857) 0.0360*** (0.00753) 
NoChildren 0.000245 (0.000191) -0.00308 (0.00255) 
Elders 0.000297 (0.000608) -0.00355 (0.00808) 
Ownland -0.00046 (0.000403) 0.00609 (0.0051) 
Landsize 0.00003 (0.000774) -0.00048 (0.00101) 
Ownlivestock 0.000802 (0.000532) -0.0104 (0.00661) 
HHsize -0.000129 (0.000143) 0.00157 (0.00197) 
Remittance -0.000157 (0.000892) 0.00183 (0.0118) 
AssetIndex -0.000310* (0.00016) 0.00415** (0.00182) 
LogExpCapita 0.000433 (0.00027) -0.00521 0.00408) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.00181*** (0.000583) 0.0233*** (0.00658) 
Rho -0.18275 0.03412 
 
 







Sample   13,963     





















Boy -0.000748 (0.000468) 0.00819* (0.00493) 
RelH 0.00319*** (0.00115) -0.0349*** (0.0119) 
Age -0.00197*** (0.00054) 0.0216*** (0.00474) 
Age2 0.000138*** (0.0000287) -0.00151*** (0.000209) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00793*** (0.0023) 0.0727*** (0.0164) 
FatherEduSec -0.00461*** (0.00172) 0.0373*** (0.0119) 
MotherEduPrim -0.00200* (0.00117) 0.0288** (0.0125) 
MotherEduSec -0.00059 (0.00116) -0.00398 (0.0127) 
FatherEmptsta 0.00967*** (0.0015) -0.106*** (0.012) 
MotherEmptsta 0.0112*** (0.00157) -0.122*** (0.0128) 
FatherHH 0.000819 (0.00133) -0.00892 (0.0147) 
MotherHH 0.000789 (0.00106) -0.00862 (0.0117) 
HeadAge -0.000179* (0.000101) 0.00195* (0.00108) 
HeadAge2 0.00159* (0.00928) -0.00017* (0.00001) 
MaleHead 0.00353*** (0.000977) -0.0387*** (0.00982) 
HeadMar -0.000514 (0.000621) 0.00566 (0.00686) 
NoChildren 0.000374 (0.000233) -0.00408 (0.00252) 
Elders 0.00031 (0.000746) -0.00338 (0.00811) 
Ownland -0.000187 (0.000468) 0.00206 (0.00514) 
Landsize 1.94e-05*** (0.00000658) -0.00021*** (0.0000685) 
Ownlivestock 0.00150** (0.000629) -0.0164** (0.00654) 
HHsize -0.000256 (0.000175) 0.0028 (0.00191) 
Remittance -0.00152 (0.00112) 0.0167 (0.0123) 
AssetIndex -0.000499*** (0.000179) 0.00546*** (0.00183) 
LogExpCapita 0.00108*** (0.000341) -0.0117*** (0.00371) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.00218*** (0.000559) 0.0238*** (0.00557) 
Rho -0.2365 0.03498 





  Sample   13,963     








TableA6a Correlates of School and Hazardous Child Labour Participation for Boys (Model 1) 
Independent Variables Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
RelH 0.00293*** (0.000883) -0.0394*** (0.00952) 
Age -0.000920*** (0.000351) 0.0163*** (0.00366) 
Age2 6.37e-05*** (1.97e-05) -0.00106*** (0.000164) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00425*** (0.00160) 0.0510*** (0.0137) 
FatherEduSec -0.00281** (0.00121) 0.0326*** (0.0104) 
MotherEduPrim -0.000945 (0.000608) 0.0329*** (0.0110) 
MotherEduSec 0.00112 (0.000733) -0.0235** (0.0118) 
FatherEmptsta 0.00675*** (0.00153) -0.0830*** (0.0145) 
MotherEmptsta 0.00521*** (0.00110) -0.0558*** (0.0106) 
FatherHH 0.00128 (0.000814) -0.0149 (0.0114) 
MotherHH -0.000199 (0.000578) 0.00308 (0.00856) 
HeadAge -0.000128* (0.000067) 0.00168* (0.000884) 
HeadAge2 0.0014** (0.00064) -0.0019** (0.00079) 
MaleHead 0.00175*** (0.000648) -0.0265*** (0.00758) 
HeadMar -0.000894** (0.000437) 0.0175*** (0.00537) 
NoChildren -0.00003 (0.000142) 0.00100 (0.00208) 
Elders -0.000407 (0.000425) 0.00736 (0.00620) 
Ownland -0.000309 (0.000306) 0.00342 (0.00458) 
Landsize -0.00058 (0.00094) 0.000104 (0.000165) 
Ownlivestock 0.000753** (0.000374) -0.00894* (0.00519) 
HHsize 0.00009 (0.000111) -0.00172 (0.00154) 
RurUrb -0.000109 (0.000357) 0.00188 (0.00529) 
Remittance -0.00170** (0.000818) 0.0246** (0.0110) 
AssetIndex -0.000404*** (0.000126) 0.00532*** (0.00143) 
LogExpCapita 0.000297 (0.000198) 0.000156 (0.00337) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.000408 (0.000311) 0.00288 (0.00468) 
Rho 0.28773 0.0407 





    Sample     11,359   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 








Table A6b Correlates of School and Hazardous Work Participation for Boys (Model 2) 
Independent Variables 
Hazardous work 
Participation School Participation 
  
Marginal 
Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
RelH 0.00303** (0.00141) -0.0374** (0.0154) 
Age -0.00160** (0.000672) 0.0219*** (0.00607) 
Age2 0.000106*** (3.69e-05) -0.00142*** (0.000271) 
FatherEduPrim -0.00934** (0.00382) 0.0901*** (0.0261) 
FatherEduSec -0.00546** (0.00274) 0.0442** (0.0180) 
MotherEduPrim -0.00149 (0.00148) 0.0365* (0.0207) 
MotherEduSec 0.000423 (0.00132) -0.0191 (0.0187) 
FatherEmptsta 0.00913*** (0.00215) -0.109*** (0.0200) 
MotherEmptsta 0.00951*** (0.00211) -0.111*** (0.0223) 
FatherHH 0.00210 (0.00153) -0.0241 (0.0198) 
MotherHH 0.000873 (0.00131) -0.0124 (0.0162) 
HeadAge -0.000133 (0.000109) 0.00171 (0.00133) 
HeadAge2 0.00133 (0.0099) -0.00174 (0.0118) 
MaleHead 0.00166 (0.00102) -0.0214* (0.0117) 
HeadMar -0.000456 (0.000696) 0.00820 (0.00887) 
NoChildren 1.87e-05 (0.000242) 0.000347 (0.00322) 
Elders 0.000238 (0.000729) -0.00230 (0.00936) 
Ownland -0.000523 (0.000528) 0.00666 (0.00653) 
Landsize 0.00132 (0.00936) -0.000151 (0.000124) 
Ownlivestock 0.000510 (0.000660) -0.00584 (0.00836) 
HHsize 6.96e-05 (0.000179) -0.00142 (0.00237) 
Remittance -0.00245* (0.00128) 0.0303** (0.0149) 
AssetIndex -0.000245 (0.000188) 0.00316 (0.00236) 
LogExpCapita 0.000546 (0.000342) -0.00525 (0.00497) 
LogTotalEduexp -0.000724 (0.000560) 0.00768 (0.00765) 
DistPrimary 0.000395*** (0.000126) -0.00513*** (0.000946) 
DistJHS 9.19e-05* (5.31e-05) -0.00129** (0.000516) 
Childwage 0.000141*** (5.02e-05) -0.00160*** (0.000618) 
Rho -0.22972 0.04775 
  Wald Test, rho=0; chi2(1) Pro 21.5312 0.000 
 Log Pseudolikehood 
  
-973448 
 Sample     6,731   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 









Table A7a Correlates of School and Hazardous Work Participation for Girls (Model 1) 
Independent Variables Child Labour Participation School Participation 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
RelH -0.0238** (0.0110) 0.00218** (0.00111) 
Age 0.0183*** (0.00493) -0.000962** (0.000475) 
Age2 -0.00131*** (0.000216) 8.43e-05*** (2.47e-05) 
FatherEduPrim 0.0437*** (0.0138) -0.00339** (0.00147) 
FatherEduSec 0.0129 (0.0106) -0.000865 (0.00110) 
MotherEduPrim 0.0214* (0.0116) -0.00123 (0.00104) 
MotherEduSec -0.00116 (0.0112) -0.000208 (0.000989) 
FatherEmptsta -0.0736*** (0.0148) 0.00860*** (0.00179) 
MotherEmptsta -0.0772*** (0.0118) 0.00964*** (0.00172) 
FatherHH 0.00790 (0.0144) -0.00045 (0.00126) 
MotherHH -0.00872 (0.0113) 0.00164 (0.00105) 
HeadAge -0.000882 (0.00113) 0.00696 (0.0103) 
HeadAge2 0.00571 (0.00107) -0.00044 (0.00096) 
MaleHead -0.0389*** (0.00890) 0.00308*** (0.000966) 
HeadMar 0.0114* (0.00686) -0.000680 (0.000659) 
NoChildren -0.00542** (0.00265) 0.000472* (0.000252) 
Elders 0.00449 (0.00839) -0.000334 (0.000751) 
Ownland 0.00597 (0.00564) -0.000462 (0.000494) 
Landsize -0.00208*** (0.00071) 0.0188** (0.0076) 
Ownlivestock -0.00460 (0.00598) 0.000640 (0.000531) 
HHsize 0.00351* (0.00208) -0.000316 (0.000195) 
RurUrb 0.00360 (0.00618) -0.000360 (0.000549) 
Remittance 0.000195 (0.0117) -0.000476 (0.00106) 
AssetIndex 0.00446*** (0.00143) -0.000444*** (0.000151) 
LogExpCapita -0.00757* (0.00394) 0.00110*** (0.000363) 
LogTotalEduexp 0.0166*** (0.00600) -0.00155*** (0.000565) 
Rho 0.3155 0.04158 





   
1780829.8 
Sample     10,967   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 












Table A7b Correlates of School and Hazardous Work Participation for Girls (Model 2) 
Independent Variables 
Hazardous work 
Participation School Participation 
  
Marginal 
Effect Std. Error Marginal Effect Std. Error 
RelH -0.0187 (0.0202) 0.00169 (0.00188) 
Age 0.0134* (0.00761) -0.00167** (0.000791) 
Age2 -0.00122*** (0.000338) 0.000136*** (4.16e-05) 
FatherEduPrim 0.0611*** (0.0221) -0.00686** (0.00304) 
FatherEduSec 0.0420** (0.0172) -0.00508** (0.00245) 
MotherEduPrim 0.0189 (0.0169) -0.00169 (0.00165) 
MotherEduSec 0.0116 (0.0189) -0.000890 (0.00180) 
FatherEmptsta -0.105*** (0.0175) 0.00876*** (0.00230) 
MotherEmptsta -0.137*** (0.0173) 0.0115*** (0.00232) 
FatherHH -0.00578 (0.0223) 5.45e-05 (0.00209) 
MotherHH -0.0101 (0.0184) 0.000565 (0.00169) 
HeadAge 0.00173 (0.00172) -0.000153 (0.000163) 
HeadAge2 -0.00124 (0.00165) 0.0011 (0.00155) 
MaleHead -0.0478*** (0.0171) 0.00476*** (0.00161) 
HeadMar -0.00122 (0.0111) -0.000263 (0.00102) 
NoChildren -0.0110*** (0.00398) 0.00102** (0.000435) 
Elders -0.0117 (0.0144) 0.000995 (0.00142) 
Ownland 0.00147 (0.00839) -0.000289 (0.000780) 
Landsize -0.000142 (0.000127) 1.41e-05 (1.12e-05) 
Ownlivestock -0.0217** (0.0108) 0.00181* (0.00107) 
HHsize 0.00862*** (0.00299) -0.000772** (0.000321) 
Remittance 0.00394 (0.0180) -0.00022 (0.00167) 
AssetIndex 0.00739** (0.00292) -0.000683** (0.000310) 
LogExpCapita -0.0185*** (0.00588) 0.00153** (0.000601) 
LogTotalEduexp 0.0330*** (0.00842) -0.00309*** (0.000974) 
DistPrimary -0.000397 (0.00134) 0.000062 (0.000118) 
DistJHS -0.00201*** (0.000698) 0.000202** (0.00007) 
Childwage -0.00161** (0.000665) 0.000130* (0.00006) 
Rho -0.22765 0.05586 
  Wald Test, rho=0; chi2(1) Pro 15.4699 0.000 
 Log Pseudolikehood 
  
-907149 
 Sample     6,160   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 









Table A8 Correlates of Weekly Hours of Child Labour for Rural Children (5-17 years) 















Enrol 0.946 (0.905) 2.27 (2.124) 0.126 (1.039) 
Boy 0.222 (0.166) - - - - 
ClassAtthrs 0.416 (0.421) 0.101 (0.645) 0.836 (0.521) 
RelH 0.699*** (0.164) 0.306 (0.225) 1.124*** (0.237) 
Age -0.022*** (0.0073) -0.0044 (0.009) -0.041*** (0.0108) 
Age2 -0.0153 (0.0103) -0.0244* (0.013) -0.0057 (0.0156) 
FatherEduPrim -0.715* (0.405) -0.835 (0.607) -0.577 (0.525) 
FatherEduSec -0.25 (0.314) -0.724 (0.49) 0.25 (0.388) 
MotherEduPrim 0.436 (0.32) -0.65 (0.453) 1.173*** (0.429) 
MotherEduSec -0.21 (0.299) -0.566 (0.465) -0.0325 (0.388) 
FatherEmptsta 8.127*** (1.035) 8.278*** (1.137) 8.125*** (1.763) 
MotherEmptsta 11.56*** (0.933) 13.51*** (1.57) 9.900*** (1.02) 
FatherHH 0.954** (0.457) 0.984 (0.702) 1.030* (0.59) 
MotherHH 2.118*** (0.425) 3.494*** (0.539) 0.811 (0.608) 
HeadAge 0.0105 (0.0377) -0.0468 (0.0551) 0.0772 (0.0476) 
HeadAge2 -0.00012 (0.0003) 0.00046 (0.0005) -0.00077* (0.0004) 
MaleHead 0.772** (0.309) 0.7 (0.458) 0.636 (0.408) 
HeadMar -0.439** (0.207) -0.738** (0.292) -0.0463 (0.287) 
NoChildren 0.0268 (0.090) 0.0678 (0.115) -0.0283 (0.14) 
Elders 0.482** (0.227) 0.536 (0.331) 0.429 (0.306) 
Ownland -0.537*** (0.18) -0.638*** (0.242) -0.364 (0.259) 
Landsize -0.017*** (0.0041) -0.016*** (0.0056) -0.022*** (0.0064) 
Ownlivestock 0.0616 (0.208) -0.0498 (0.296) 0.184 (0.278) 
HHsize 0.067 (0.068) 0.0284 (0.0878) 0.118 (0.104) 
Remittance -0.500* (0.277) -0.39 (0.406) -0.636* (0.342) 
AssetIndex 0.0266 (0.085) 0.0168 (0.137) 0.0276 (0.095) 
LogExpCapita -0.513*** (0.118) -0.577*** (0.168) -0.414*** (0.16) 
LogTotalEduexp 1.391*** (0.17) 1.426*** (0.245) 1.250*** (0.235) 
DistPrimary 0.154*** (0.048) 0.252*** (0.0522) 0.0223 (0.0684) 
DistJHS 0.0384** (0.019) 0.0281 (0.0186) 0.058 (0.0362) 
Childwage 0.120*** (0.0197) 0.123*** (0.0286) 0.119*** (0.0262) 








Sample 8,582     4,508   4,074 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 








Table A9 Correlates of Weekly Hours of Hazardous Works for Rural Children (5-17 years) 















Enrol 1.368 (2.128) -0.277*** (0.0302) 3.251 (2.99) 
Boy -0.0729 (0.17) - - - - 
ClassAtthrs 0.4 (0.58) 0.145 (0.153) 0.932 (0.794) 
RelH 0.215 (0.221) -0.0769*** (0.0152) 0.588* (0.327) 
Age -0.000084 (0.0098) 0.0122*** (0.0043) -0.0176 (0.0149) 
Age2 -0.0106 (0.0134) -0.0180*** (0.0023) 0.000863 (0.02) 
FatherEduPrim -1.591*** (0.616) -1.615*** (0.391) -1.535* (0.836) 
FatherEduSec -0.434 (0.471) -0.647*** (0.135) -0.093 (0.621) 
MotherEduPrim 1.646*** (0.428) 0.628** (0.294) 2.237*** (0.609) 
MotherEduSec -0.0833 (0.395) -0.141** (0.0704) -0.242 (0.519) 
FatherEmptsta 7.202*** (1.613) 29.80*** (9.387) 6.026*** (1.517) 
MotherEmptsta 8.372*** (0.967) 30.25*** (9.527) 6.619*** (0.913) 
FatherHH 1.353** (0.645) 1.418*** (0.546) 1.239 (0.905) 
MotherHH 0.282 (0.573) 1.151** (0.462) -0.704 (0.866) 
HeadAge -0.0245 (0.0479) -0.0252*** (0.0057) -0.0152 (0.0653) 
HeadAge2 0.000135 (0.0004) 0.000173** (0.00008) 0.00003 -0.0006) 
MaleHead 0.585 (0.424) -0.0517 (0.0897) 0.962* (0.58) 
HeadMar 0.789*** (0.3) 0.633** (0.297) 1.101*** (0.426) 
NoChildren 0.102 (0.125) 0.0239 (0.0258) 0.136 (0.192) 
Elders 0.914*** (0.342) 0.945** (0.374) 0.78 (0.475) 
Ownland -0.711*** (0.239) -0.921*** (0.2) -0.219 (0.347) 
Landsize -0.0114** (0.0057) -0.0087*** (0.0015) -0.0213* (0.0118) 
Ownlivestock 0.890*** (0.313) 0.378* (0.22) 1.306*** (0.435) 
HHsize -0.105 (0.095) -0.0293*** (0.0033) -0.151 (0.147) 
Remittance -0.621 (0.514) -0.575*** (0.116) -0.441 (0.715) 
AssetIndex -0.0797 (0.105) -0.0362** (0.0157) -0.228* (0.13) 
LogExpCapita -1.276*** (0.175) -1.219*** (0.399) -1.123*** (0.233) 
LogTotalEduexp 1.296*** (0.239) 0.968*** (0.244) 1.289*** (0.334) 
DistPrimary 0.276*** (0.0499) 0.336*** 90.115) 0.139** (0.0681) 
DistJHS -0.0386 (0.0303) 0.0287*** (0.0044) -0.0363 (0.0505) 
Childwage 0.149*** (0.0195) 0.172*** (0.0595) 0.133*** (0.0251) 














Sample   8,582   4,508   4,074 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 







Table A10 Effect of Hours of Child Labour on Class Attendance for Rural Children 















Boy 0.372 (0.286) - - - - 
RelH -1.459** (0.644) -1.638* (0.853) -1.163 (0.962) 
Age 0.871*** (0.277) 1.345*** (0.387) 0.362 (0.394) 
Age2 -0.040*** (0.013) -0.0627*** (0.0181) -0.0156 (0.0184) 
TypeSch -1.257*** (0.465) -1.571** (0.632) -0.997 (0.681) 
LogHoursCL -0.135*** (0.0186) -0.124*** (0.023) -0.147*** (0.031) 
FatherEduPrim 2.064*** (0.744) 2.243** (1.062) 2.042** (1.021) 
FatherEduSec 0.539 (0.505) 0.862 (0.716) 0.407 (0.709) 
MotherEduPrim -0.483 (0.718) -0.353 (1.043) -0.526 (0.978) 
MotherEduSec -0.703 (0.64) 0.0255 (0.916) -1.476* (0.881) 
FatherEmptsta -0.025 (0.665) 0.245 (0.88) -0.221 (1.003) 
MotherEmptsta 2.381*** (0.626) 1.946** (0.826) 2.805*** (0.941) 
FatherHH 0.0278 (0.944) -0.539 (1.334) 0.58 (1.32) 
MotherHH 0.45 (0.807) 1.08 (1.117) -0.434 (1.159) 
HeadAge -0.0769 (0.0636) -0.112 (0.0894) -0.0487 (0.0898) 
HeadAge2 0.000511 (0.0006) 0.000846 (0.0008) 0.000264 (0.0008) 
MaleHead -0.654 (0.567) -0.146 (0.787) -1.106 (0.805) 
HeadMar -1.512*** (0.385) -1.841*** (0.522) -1.201** (0.563) 
NoChildren 0.175 (0.148) 0.00275 (0.201) 0.356* (0.215) 
Elders -0.109 (0.476) -0.191 (0.659) -0.0861 (0.679) 
Ownland 1.176*** (0.303) 1.406*** (0.416) 0.991** (0.437) 
Landsize 0.00648** (0.0031) 0.00615 (0.0045) 0.00707 (0.0043) 
Ownlivestock -1.316*** (0.358) -1.140** (0.496) -1.427*** (0.516) 
HHsize 0.0339 (0.11) 0.142 (0.149) -0.0775 (0.161) 
Remittance 1.935*** (0.635) 1.205 (0.916) 2.758*** (0.843) 
AssetIndex 0.0497 (0.119) 0.206 (0.164) -0.0899 (0.169) 
LogExpCapita 0.378* (0.198) -0.0192 (0.276) 0.770*** (0.284) 
LogTotalEduexp -3.565*** (0.323) -3.052*** (0.455) -4.118*** (0.457) 
DistPrimary -0.277*** (0.0534) -0.229*** (0.079) -0.321*** (0.071) 
DistJHS -0.226*** (0.0262) -0.235*** (0.036) -0.213*** (0.038) 
Childwage -0.0207 (0.0233) -0.0347 (0.034) -0.00814 (0.0312) 
















Sample   12,072   6,319   5,753 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 






Table B 1-B15 Appendix for Chapter Three 
 








VARIABLES                                                MEANING and DEFINITION 
Dependent Variables 
Enrol A child was in school last year and  still in school; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
ClassAtt Number of hours that a child enrolled in school attended class in a week 
Repetition A child has ever repeated a class\level; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Test Scores Scores obtained by a child on Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices Test 
ChildlabourF A household used or exchanged children for farming; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
HoursF Average daily hours of work done by a child on a farm 
ChildlabourNF A child worked in a non-farm enterprise; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
HoursNF Daily hours of work done by a child in a non-farm enterprise 
Independent and other  Variables 
treatmentyr This is the variable measuring the effect of the LEAP  
pcexphh Annual expenditure per capita in 2010  GH¢ per household 
MaleHead Household head is a male; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
HeadAge Age of the household head 
HeadMar Marital status of the household head; 1 if he/she is married; 0 otherwise 
Eduhead Years of schooling of a household head 
Age Age of a child  
Boy Gender of a child; 1 if boy; 0 otherwise 
RelH Relationship of a child to the head;1 if a son/daughter; 0 otherwise 
Childage Average age of a child in a household 
PropBoys Proportion of boys in a household 
Ownanimal A household owns livestock;1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
NoChildren Number of children in a household (of age<18 years) 
HHsize Household size 
Ownland A household owns farmland; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Landsize Size of farm land in acres 
WidowHH Whether there is a widow in the household; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
OrphanHH Whether there is an orphan in the household; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Debtowe Whether household owes debts; 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
NoElder Number of person 60+ years in the household 
187 
 
Table B2  Educational Outcomes of Children in LEAP and Non-LEAP by Gender and Age   
  Baseline (2010) Follow-Up (2012) 
  
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
NON-
LEAP LEAP Diff 
Boys (5-17 Years) 
Enrol 0.945 0.977 -0.032** 0.960 0.990 -0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) 
Class Attendance² 25.638 19.910 5.728** 19.061 16.072 2.99 
 
(0.562) (0.629) (0.842) (1.217) (1.079) (0.011) 
Repetition² 0.123 0.225 -0.102** 0.150 0.169 -0.02 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.016) (0.018) (1.624) 
Test Scores 4.812 4.386 0.426** 5.667 5.144 -0.019** 
 
(0.113) (0.119) (0.168) (0.128) (0.140) (0.024) 
Sample 544 430 
 
503 399 
 Girls (5-17 Year) 
Enrol 0.934 0.978 -0.044** 0.989 0.994 -0.005 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Class Attendance² 23.954 20.393 3.561** 18.146 18.080 0.066 
 
(0.634) (0.701) (0.946) (1.397) (1.145) (1.803) 
Repetition² 0.151 0.174 -0.024 0.149 0.148 0.001 
 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.030) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025) 
Test Scores 4.687 4.431 0.256 5.156 4.728 0.428** 
 
(0.115) (0.119) (0.170) (0.129) (0.148) (0.196) 
Sample 499 367 
 
455 360 
 Age 5-12 Years 
Enrol 0.969 0.990 -0.021** 0.993 0.999 -0.006 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Class Attendance² 24.789 20.154 4.634** 18.747 16.607 2.140 
 
(0.516) (0.576) (0.772) (1.159) (0.969) (1.505) 
Repetition² 0.103 0.150 -0.048 0.095 0.114 -0.019 
 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.034) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) 
Test Scores  4.425 4.094 0.331** 4.895 4.540 0.355** 
 
(0.088) (0.099) (0.134) (0.109) (0.123) (0.164) 
Sample 643 504 
 
598 489 
 Age 13-17 Years 
Enrol 0.893 0.956 -0.063** 0.942 0.978 -0.036** 
 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.009) (0.016) 
Class Attendance² 24.905 20.096 4.809** 18.388 17.848 0.540 
 
(0.731) (0.804) (1.087) (1.532) 1.346) (2.041) 
Repetition² 0.146 0.290 -0.144** 0.243 0.242 0.001 
 
(0.017) (0.027) (0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.034) 
Test Scores 5.669 5.128 0.541** 6.433 5.697 0.736** 
 
(0.171) (0.150) (0.233) (0.150) (0.169) (0.225) 
Sample 400 293 
 
360 270   




Table B3 Characteristics of Farming Households 
       Pre-LEAP (2010)  Post-LEAP (2012) 
  Non-LEAP LEAP Diff. Non-LEAP LEAP Diff. 
Male head 0.56 0.53 0.03 0.56 0.51 0.05 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Head Age 56 59 -3.00** 58 61 -3.01** 
 
(0.69) (0.98) (1.17) (0.69) (1.02) (1.21) 
Head Married 0.50 0.48 0.02 0.53 0.47 0.06 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Average age of children  9.60 9.00 0.60 9.70 9.30 0.40 
 
(0.19) (0.28) (0.52) (0.19) (0.25) (0.32) 
Orphans in Household 0.03 0.27 -0.24** 0.02 0.24 -0.22** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Widow in Household 0.30 0.46 -0.16** 0.28 0.52 -0.24** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Number of Elders (60+) 1.00 2.00 -1.0*** 1.00 2.00 -1.0** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) 
Number of children 3.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) 
Annual Expenditure/head 561.99 461.84 100.2** 739.97 485.09 254.9** 
 
(14.62) (20.47) (24.80) (24.22) (20.74) (36.84) 
Land size (in acres) 3.10 2.90 0.30 2.80 2.50 0.30 
 
(0.14) (0.30) (0.29) (0.15) (0.16) (0.24) 
Livestock ownership 0.54 0.57 -0.03 0.67 0.58 0.09** 
 
(0.02) (0.030 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Remittance 0.37 0.27 0.10** 0.38 0.27 0.11** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Debt owe 0.20 0.28   -0.08* 0.32 0.33 -0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.030 
Household size 4.00 5.00 -1.00** 5.00 6.00 -1.00** 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.11) (0.15) (0.02) 
Note: Standard errors are parentheses and ** means difference is significant at 5% significant level. These 














Table B4 Characteristics of LEAP and Non-LEAP Households With Non-Farm Enterprises 





LEAP LEAP Diff. 
Non-
LEAP LEAP Diff. 
Male head 0.45 0.46 -0.01 0.47 0.46 0.01 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.036) (0.025) (0.029) (0.038) 
Head Age 52.90 50.4 2.50** 53.8 57.1 -3.3** 
 
(0.665) (0.863) (1.072) (0.801) (0.944) (1.238) 
Head Marital Status 0.48 0.51 -0.03 0.52 0.51 0.01 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.036) (0.026) (0.029) (0.038) 
Orphans in Household 0.033 0.31 -0.27** 0.08 0.12 -0.04 
 
(0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) 
Widows in Household 0.35 0.42 -0.07** 0.26 0.45 -0.19** 
 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.035) (0.022) (0.029) (0.036) 
Number of children 3.76 3.67 0.09 3.33 3.61 -0.28** 
 
(0.109) (0.084) (0.143) (0.082) (0.098) (0.127) 
Annual Expenditure/head 450 388 62** 568 430 138** 
 
(12.60) (12.91) (18.20) (17.16) (15.02) (23.49) 
Livestock ownership 0.62 0.49 0.13** 0.64 0.46 0.18** 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.036) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) 
Remittance 0.33 0.23 0.1** 0.44 0.37 0.07 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) 
Debt owe 0.24 0.36 -0.12** 0.45 0.37 0.08** 
 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) 
Household size 6.04 6.22 -0.18 6.4 6.8 -0.4** 
  (0.128) (0.112) (0.174) (0.118) (0.134) (0.178) 
Note: These refer to sub-sample of households with non-farm enterprises ** mean the difference is significant at 















Table B5 Probit Result of Selection into LEAP Programme at Baseline (Matching Results) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. 
Log of Per capita expenditure per annum  -0.4565*** 0.0612 
Male Head 0.0544 0.0791 
Age of household head 0.0035 0.0021 
Number of Children -0.0123 0.0183 
Drinking water  is pipe -0.2085** 0.0852 
Cooking fuel is gas/electricity/kerosene -0.5443*** 0.0909 
Household uses of child labour on farm 0.2493*** 0.0762 
Ownership of Livestock -0.028*** 0.0015 
House roofing is iron slate 0.4907*** 0.0755 
Refuse dumping place -0.4895*** 0.0733 
Ownership of house 0.0747 0.0770 
Electricity availability  0.1167 0.0719 
Presence of a widow in the household 0.0954*** 0.0114 
Presence of an orphan in the household 0.9384*** 0.0154 
Number of Elders (60+ years) 0.4802*** 0.0539 
Number of Household Members with Health Insurance -0.1706** 0.0770 
Receipt of remittance -0.2291*** 0.0744 
Land Ownership -0.5832*** 0.0886 
Debt owing -0.0067 0.0753 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 



















Table B6a Balancing Among LEAP and Non-LEAP at Baseline for Matched and Unmatched  
      Unmatched       Matched     
Variable Treated Control %bias t-test p>|t| Treated Control %bias t-test p>|t| 
Bias 
Red. 
Enrol  0.98 0.94 19 3.93 0.000 1 0.99 3.3 1.12 0.263 82.5 
ClassAtt 20.13 24.83 -35.6 -7.45 0.000 22.01 23.83 -11 -1.17 0.201 -42.8 
Repetition 0.2 0.14 17.7 3.16 0.002 0.17 0.12 13.3 1.36 0.174 25.2 
Test scores 4.41 4.75 -14.7 -2.88 0.004 4.41 4.64 -9.5 -1.24 0.216 35.5 
childwork 0.41 0.38 6.8 1.56 0.119 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.02 0.984 97.9 
HeadAge 55.48 53.43 12.7 2.95 0.003 52.92 53.98 -6.6 -0.92 0.358 48.1 
MaleHead 0.47 0.54 -14.4 -3.29 0.001 0.54 0.6 -12.1 -1.69 0.091 15.9 
NoChildren 3.78 3.68 5.1 1.18 0.240 3.7 3.68 1 0.16 0.871 80.5 
NoElder 0.67 0.44 33.8 7.82 0.000 0.57 0.6 -4.6 -0.61 0.539 86.3 
OrphanHH 0.43 0.03 106.5 25.71 0.000 0.21 0.2 3 0.38 0.705 97.2 
WidowHH 0.46 0.27 40.1 9.26 0.000 0.38 0.32 11.9 1.64 0.101 70.3 
HHsize 6.18 5.99 7.9 1.82 0.070 6.15 6.22 -3 -0.5 0.62 61.7 
pcexphh 348.51 426.3 -33.6 -7.67 0.000 384.55 388.74 -1.8 -0.27 0.786 94.6 
Landsize 2.25 2.8 -11.9 -2.8 0.005 2.67 2.4 5.8 0.67 0.5 50.8 
Ownanimal 0.52 0.6 -15.7 -3.61 0.000 0.59 0.61 -2.8 -0.39 0.697 82.3 
Remittance 0.21 0.32 -25.1 -5.7 0.000 0.25 0.25 -0.9 -0.12 0.904 96.6 
Debtowe 0.29 0.25 10.7 2.46 0.014 0.27 0.31 -9.5 -1.3 0.195 10.9 
 
Table B6b Reduction in the Mean and Median Bias After Matching   
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med Bias 
Raw 0.249 729.63 0 24.9 14.4 















Figure B 1 Propensity Scores of Households in and off Common Support 
 
 
Multivariate Results (Estimations with controls) 
Table B7 Impact of LEAP on Enrolment Rate for Children Aged 5-17 Years 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample 0.0131** -0.00572 0.0101 
s.e. (0.00567) (0.00975) (0.0106) 
N 2095 3,557 2,765 
  Boy  0.0275** 0.0206 0.0277*** 
s.e. (0.0117) (0.0160) (0.0100) 
N 1,112 1,876 1,445 
  Girls 0.00647 0.00650 0.00303 
s.e. (0.00484) (0.0127) (0.0128) 
N 953 1,681 1,289 
  Younger Children (5-12 years) 0.00743** -0.0140 -0.0143 
s.e. (0.00378) (0.0802) (0.0091) 
N 1,379 2,234 1,635 
  Older Children (13-17 years) 0.0251 0.0715** 0.0775** 
s.e. (0.0215) (0.0361) (0.0386) 
N 431 1,323 850 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1, N=sample size 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score




Table B8  Impact of LEAP on  Weekly Hours of Class Attendance  for Children   
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample -2.404 2.892** 2.925*** 
s.e. (1.477) (1.366) (1.102) 
N 938 2,526 2,001 
  Boys -3.309 5.382** 5.118*** 
s.e. (2.134) (2.531) (1.861) 
N 483 1,321 1,040 
  Girls -0.465 6.222 5.238 
s.e. (1.913) (6.106) (3.329) 
N 440 1,205 949 
  Younger Children (5-12 years) -3.910** 5.884** 5.223*** 
s.e. (1.908) (2.489) (1.760) 
N 1,068 1,604 1,220 
  Older Children (13-17 years) -2.597 5.891 5.227 
s.e. (2.826) (3.709) (3.962) 
N 461 922 660 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Table B9 Impact of LEAP on Repetition Rate  for Children Aged 5-17 Years 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample 0.0311 -0.121*** -0.113*** 
s.e. (0.0236) (0.0264) (0.0309) 
N 1,809 3,130 2,319 
  Boys 0.0547 -0.138*** -0.128** 
s.e. (0.0359) (0.0481) (0.0503) 
N 990 1,678 1,231 
  Girls -0.0103 -0.0827 -0.102 
s.e. (0.0354) (0.0635) (0.0661) 
N 787 1,452 1,053 
  Younger Children (5-12 years) 0.0494* -0.126 -0.130 
s.e. (0.0255) (0.1754) (0.1784) 
N 1,331 1,773 1,157 
  Older Children (13-15 years) 0.0375 -0.185*** -0.174** 
s.e. (0.0502) (0.0691) (0.0715) 
N 324 1,357 873 



















Table B10  Impact of LEAP on Test Scores (Cognitive Ability) for Children 
  PSM DD  MDD 
Overall Sample -0.328** -0.0612 -0.109 
s.e. (0.154) (0.214) (0.240) 
N 1,878 3,168 2,460 
  Boys -0.672*** -0.0421 -0.0595 
s.e. (0.235) (0.307) (0.335) 
N 1,022 1,672 1,282 
  Girls -0.179 -0.150 -0.326 
s.e. (0.223) (0.312) (0.347) 
N 850 1,496 1,151 
  Younger Children (5-12 years) -0.300* 0.0554 -0.0487 
s.e. (0.172) (0.271) (0.292) 
N 901 2,173 1,637 
  Older Children (13-17 years) -0.955** -0.490 -0.502 
s.e. (0.385) (0.574) (0.650) 
N 218 995 578 




Table B11 Impact of LEAP on School Expenses for Children by Gender and Age 
  PSM DD  MDD  PSM DD  MDD  
  Girls Boys 
Uniform and Clothing -0.0681 0.197 0.132 -0.0508 0.0962 0.0561 
 
(0.0755) (0.140) (0.164) (0.0725) (0.0959) (0.113) 
Sample 399 1,027 804 636 1,206 934 
       Books & School Supplies -0.116 -0.176* -0.173 -0.21** -0.0822 -0.0353 
 
(0.0747) (0.105) (0.118) (0.0809) (0.0925) (0.101) 
Sample 622 1,261 983 798 1,441 1,126 
       Food and Boarding -0.4*** 0.0694 -0.0300 -0.4*** -0.0243 -0.0353 
 
(0.119) (0.172) (0.200) (0.0920) (0.151) (0.101) 
Sample 460 1,009 804 590 1,152 1,126 
       Total Expenses -0.3*** -0.0811 -0.0921 -0.3*** 0.141 0.226*** 
 
(0.0837) (0.129) (0.143) (0.0969) (0.106) (0.110) 
Sample 607 1,653 1,263 1,106 1,883 1,445 
  
Younger Children (5-12 
Year) Older Children (13-17 Years) 
Uniform and Clothing -0.0869 0.235** 0.218* -0.153 -0.0683 -0.170 
 
(0.0562) (0.101) (0.123) (0.154) (0.173) (0.256) 
Sample 685 1,412 1,067 153 821 516 
       Books and School 
Supplies -0.069 -0.3*** -0.20** -0.103 0.00301 0.0615 
 
(0.0684) (0.0902) (0.0997) (0.129) (0.149) (0.179) 
Sample 981 1,677 1,273 273 1,025 660 
       Food and Boarding -0.4*** -0.178 -0.252 -0.49** -0.353 -0.380 
 
(0.0885) (0.148) (0.187) (0.202) (0.270) (0.339) 
Sample 679 1,370 1,049 205 1,370 519 
       Total Expenses -0.3*** -0.0496 0.0266 -0.4*** 0.188 0.268*** 
 
(0.0699) (0.110) (0.127) (0.146) (0.162) (0.073) 
Sample 1,010 2,233 1,629 274 1,303 827 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








Table B12 Impact of LEAP Programme on Children Participation in Farming 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall Sample 0.0263 -0.0930* -0.0903 
s.e. (0.0347) (0.0513) (0.0817) 
N 774 1,899 1,695 
  Extremely Poor 0.0914 -0.0999 -0.0998 
s.e. (0.0612) (0.0906) (0.0915) 
N 235 608 550 
  Non-Extremely Poor 0.0327 0.0901 0.0901 
s.e. (0.0421) (0.117) (0.117) 
N 521 1,284 1,139 
  Male Headed 0.0743 -0.0454 -0.0362 
s.e. (0.0466) (0.0682) (0.0691) 
N 451 1,029 941 
  Female Headed 0.0904* -0.0867*** -0.0859*** 
s.e. (0.0518) (0.0081) (0.00823) 
N 317 868 753 
  Table B13 Impact of LEAP Programme on Children's Hours of Work in Farming 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall -1.020*** -2.746*** -2.498*** 
s.e. (0.297) (0.445) (0.44) 
N 311 759 683 
  Extremely Poor -0.982* -2.856*** -2.604*** 
s.e. (0.584) (0.727) (0.735) 
N 197 252 228 
  Non-Extremely Poor -0.728** -0.967 -0.967 
s.e. (0.338) (1.447) (1.447) 
N 205 504 453 
    Male Headed -0.168 -2.383*** -1.899*** 
s.e. (0.33) (0.611) (0.579) 
N 187 417 385 
    Female Headed -1.687*** -2.662*** -2.354*** 
s.e. (0.529) (0.784) (0.782) 
N 121 341 298 




Table B15 Impact of LEAP Programme on Hours of Work in Non-Farm Business 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall -2.411 -1.975 -1.822 
s.e. (0.908) (1.593) (2.503) 
N 210 234 122 
    Extremely Poor 0.339 0.684 4.872*** 
s.e. (0.801) (2.104) (1.356) 
N 101 188 172 
    Non-Extremely Poor -6.735*** -2.376 -0.606 
s.e. (0.409) (1.851) (2.701) 
N 123 386 295 
    Boys -7.782*** 1.906 3.709 
s.e. (1.722) (1.42) (3.017) 
N 105 294 252 
    Girls -4.064** -2.542 -0.426 
s.e. (1.712) (2.348) (1.464) 
N 101 240 170 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table B14  Impact of LEAP Programme on  Children Participation  in Non-Farm Works 
  PSM DD  MDD  
Overall -0.0832 -0.0557 -0.00275 
s.e. (0.0761) (0.0480) (0.0667) 
N 512 1,450 680 
  Extremely Poor -0.0146 0.0414*** 0.086*** 
s.e. (0.0415) (0.0185) (0.0182) 
N 156 452 279 
  Non-Extremely Poor -0.0795 -0.0609 -0.0364 
s.e. (0.0798) (0.0768) (0.0977) 
N 404 1,098 801 
  Boys 0.0288 0.00754 0.0935 
s.e. (0.0784) (0.0565) (0.0823) 
N 205 741 553 
  Girls -0.288*** -0.122* -0.105 
s.e. (0.108) (0.0663) (0.0818) 





Table C 1-C21 Appendix for Chapter Four 
 
Table C1 Variables Definitions 
Enrol 1 If a child was in school the previous year and is still in school;   0  otherwise 
ClassAtt A child's weekly hours of class attendance if he/she is enrolled in school 
Childlabour 1 If a  household engages in child labour; 0 otherwise  
HourW Average weekly hours of child labour in farming per household 
MBP Mothers' bargaining power constructed from five questions on autonomy 
Sex Ratio Number of men divided by number of women in a district  
DiffYrSch Difference between husband and wife years of schooling 
Age A child's age 
Age2 Square of a child's age 
Boy If a child is a boy; and is 1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
Average Age Average age of a child in a household 
Average Age2 Squared of average age of a child in a household 
PropBoys Proportion of boys in a household 
MaleHead If a household head is male ; and is 1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
CoupleAge Sum of the ages of husband and wife 
Ownland If a household owns farm land; and is 1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
AssetIndexHH An index of durable assets own by the household 
Pcexphh A household's annual per capita expenditure 
Urban If a household is located in an urban area; and is 1 if yes and 0 otherwise 
HHsize Household size or number of persons in a household 

















Table C2 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Enrolment (IV-Regress) 
Variables All Rural Urban Boys Girls 
MBP 0.310*** 0.380*** 0.113** 0.257*** 0.383*** 
 
(0.0589) (0.0913) (0.0514) (0.0651) (0.113) 
Age 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.0745*** 0.0917*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.00922) (0.0114) (0.0140) (0.0117) (0.0150) 
Age2 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.000468) (0.000576) (0.000717) (0.000587) (0.000775) 
Boy 0.00952 -0.00427 0.0488** - - 
 
(0.0152) (0.0190) (0.0220) - - 
Ownland -0.0497** -0.0547 -0.0274 -0.086*** -0.00403 
 
(0.0232) (0.0378) (0.0268) (0.0286) (0.0391) 
MaleHead -0.172** -0.0716 -0.105 -0.155 -0.169 
 
(0.0862) (0.112) (0.102) (0.104) (0.144) 
HHsize -0.0108 -0.0109 0.0135 -0.0241** 0.00525 
 
(0.00804) (0.0106) (0.0135) (0.0106) (0.0135) 
NoChildren -0.00616 -0.00588 -0.0167 0.0111 -0.0256* 
 
(0.00957) (0.0119) (0.0167) (0.0130) (0.0150) 
Pcexphh 0.00155 0.00387 0.00105 0.00198 0.00122 
 
(0.0023) (0.00318) (0.00256) (0.00258) (0.00430) 
Urban 0.0214 - - 0.0359 0.00628 
 
(0.0283) - - (0.0344) (0.0481) 
AssetIndexHH -0.029*** -0.032*** 0.00182 -0.027*** -0.033*** 
 
(0.00725) (0.00856) (0.0125) (0.00922) (0.0120) 
CoupleAge -0.0009** -0.0012** -0.0019** -0.00102* -0.00121 
  (0.000446) (0.000583) (0.000755) (0.000553) (0.000786) 
Observations 4,746 3,691 1,055 2,490 2,256 
Endogeneity Test 
     Robust Score Chi2  35.153 26.0532 3.53657 15.5886 18.9531 
P-Valve 0.0000 0.0000 0.06 0.0001 0.0000 
Robust Regression F 35.3783 26.7293 3.38485 15.68 18.9473 
P-Valve 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066 0.0001 0.0000 
Over identifying Test 
     Score Chi2 (ODT) 0.334127 0.035265 0.266011 0.671896 0.001658 
P-valve 0.5632 0.8510 0.6060 0.4124 0.9675 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Partial R-Square 0.0251 0.0216 0.0297 0.0192 0.0171 
Robust F 36.3206 20.4153 17.7578 25.8999 18.9373 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







Table C3 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Attendance (IV-Regress) 
Variables All Rural Urban Boys Girls 
MBP 4.004*** 7.569*** 0.439 2.292 6.091** 
 
(1.304) (1.905) (1.501) (1.499) (2.379) 
Age 0.0863 0.0890 -0.127 -0.0155 0.230 
 
(0.206) (0.274) (0.414) (0.256) (0.344) 
Age2 0.00427 -1.23e-05 0.0215 0.0103 -0.00456 
 
(0.0103) (0.0136) (0.0209) (0.0126) (0.0174) 
Boy -0.239 -0.379 -0.200 - - 
 
(0.347) (0.452) (0.705) - - 
Ownland -1.43*** -1.869** -0.318 -2.23*** -0.236 
 
(0.536) (0.803) (0.807) (0.689) (0.908) 
MaleHead -3.112* -6.76*** 3.564 -2.959* -3.065 
 
(1.610) (1.599) (2.757) (1.796) (3.005) 
HHsize -0.182 0.00753 -0.399 -0.427* 0.180 
 
(0.177) (0.240) (0.338) (0.220) (0.301) 
NoChildren 0.429** 0.422 -0.00930 0.644** 0.0650 
 
(0.215) (0.276) (0.466) (0.279) (0.343) 
Pcexphh -0.00276 -0.00407 -0.00710 0.00118 -0.00726 
 
(0.00561) (0.00799) (0.00901) (0.00661) (0.0102) 
Urban -2.70*** - - -2.94*** -2.339** 
 
(0.641) - - (0.809) (1.050) 
AssetIndexHH -0.309* -0.429** 0.442 -0.378** -0.312 
 
(0.159) (0.196) (0.394) (0.191) (0.286) 
CoupleAge -0.0110 -0.0217* -0.0112 0.00181 -0.0297* 
  (0.00886) (0.0122) (0.0206) (0.0112) (0.0155) 
Observations 3,569 2,613 956 1,915 1,654 
Endogeneity Test 
     Robust Score Chi2  9.02944 21.2786 0.188342 1.99708 6.99136 
P-Valve 0.0027 0.0000 0.0043 0.0076 0.0082 
Robust Regression F 9.12376 21.8394 0.186237 1.99209 7.14126 
P-Valve 0.0025 0.0000 0.0062 0.0083 0.0076 
Over identifying Test 
     Score Chi2 (ODT) 7.37745 1.6562 0.424943 10.282 0.444858 
P-valve 0.6600 0.1981 0.5145 0.513 0.5048 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Partial R-Square 0.014 0.0113 0.0174 0.0277 0.0205 
Robust F 26.8607 19.324 22.627 19.141 17.1494 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







Table C4 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on Child Labour (IV-Regress) 
Variables Participation Hours 
MBP -0.176*** -8.287 
 
(0.0130) (7.024) 
Age 0.00992 0.102 
 
(0.00699) (0.128) 
Age2 -0.0100* -0.00184* 
 
(0.00598) (0.00111) 
Boy -0.0582 1.000 
 
(0.135) (4.037) 
Ownland 0.392*** 7.243*** 
 
(0.0285) (0.602) 
HHsize 0.0193 0.210 
 
(0.0141) (0.294) 
NoChildren 0.00994 0.386 
 
(0.0178) (0.378) 
Pcexphh -0.00472 -0.0142** 
 
(0.00357) (0.00714) 
Urban -0.0126 -0.892 
 
(0.0578) (1.194) 
AssetIndexHH 0.0136 0.182 
 
(0.0121) (0.262) 
CoupleAge 0.00228 0.0710* 
  (0.00197) (0.0367) 
Observations 1,462 1,462 
Endogeneity Test 
  Robust Score Chi2  1.57559 0.162122 
P-Valve 0.0209 0.6872 
Robust Regression F 1.53627 0.16074 
P-Valve 0.0215 0.6885 
Over identifying Test 
  Score Chi2 (ODT) 0.025679 8.54008 
P-valve 0.8727 0.0035 
Test of Weak Instruments 
  Partial R-Square 0.0094 0.0078 
Robust F 16.5617 4.5091 
Prob>F 0.0005 0.0112 









Using the Un-weighted Index of Mothers’ Autonomy 
Table C5 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Enrolment (Marginal Effect) 
  All Rural Urban 
Variables Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
MBP 0.0262*** 0.254*** 0.0248*** 0.290*** 0.0179** 0.115** 
 
(0.00615) (0.0309) (0.00767) (0.0358) (0.00738) (0.0565) 
Age 0.111*** 0.0831*** 0.122*** 0.0827*** 0.0668*** 0.0676*** 
 
(0.00781) (0.0110) (0.00946) (0.0145) (0.0107) (0.0120) 
Age2 -0.050*** -0.038*** -0.054*** -0.0379*** -0.0319*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0053) (0.00482) (0.00673) (0.0055) (0.0062) 
Boy 0.0304** 0.0118 0.0177 -0.00203 0.0592*** 0.0572*** 
 
(0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0158) (0.0152) (0.0190) (0.0215) 
Ownland -0.067*** -0.0441* -0.119*** -0.0400 -0.0117 -0.0257 
 
(0.0217) (0.0226) (0.0325) (0.0357) (0.0216) (0.0262) 
MaleHead 0.0294 -0.134* 0.0555 -0.0484 0.00744 -0.117 
 
(0.0632) (0.0741) (0.0824) (0.0940) (0.0663) (0.105) 
HHsize -0.0169** -0.00708 -0.027*** -0.00695 0.0134 0.0116 
 
(0.00682) (0.00693) (0.00824) (0.00844) (0.0117) (0.0141) 
NoChildren -0.00736 -0.00348 0.000713 -0.00379 -0.0214 -0.0128 
 
(0.00823) (0.00810) (0.00988) (0.00893) (0.0137) (0.0171) 
Pcexphh 0.0795*** 0.0291 0.0120*** 0.0496 0.0224 0.0891 
 
(0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0031) (0.0314) (0.0276) (0.308) 
Urban 0.127*** 0.0227 - - - - 
 
(0.0216) (0.0297) - - - - 
AssetIndexHH -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.025*** 0.0111 -0.0021 
 
(0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0107) (0.0137) 
CoupleAge -0.0286 -0.0882** 0.00603 -0.0881** -0.0149** -0.0160** 
  (0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0418) (0.0415) (0.00583) (0.00650) 
Observations 4,746 4,746 3,691 3,691 1,055 1,055 
Log pseudo 
likelihood  -2504.18 -9474.83 2124.29 -7357.97 -363.03 -2049.51 





 Exogeneity Test 






























Test of Weak Instruments 














Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 





Table C6 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Enrolment by Gender 
  Boys Girls 
Variables Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
MBP 0.0345*** 0.232*** 0.0169*** 0.275*** 
 
(0.00811) (0.0439) (0.00529) (0.0429) 
Age 0.101*** 0.0801*** 0.123*** 0.0861*** 
 
(0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0181) 
Age2 -0.0438*** -0.0350*** -0.057*** -0.0413*** 
 
(0.00524) (0.00636) (0.00610) (0.00874) 
Ownland -0.0963*** -0.0841*** -0.0400 -0.00628 
 
(0.0291) (0.0309) (0.0325) (0.0329) 
MaleHead 0.0524 -0.110 0.00388 -0.139 
 
(0.0842) (0.0962) (0.0956) (0.115) 
HHsize -0.0248*** -0.0191** -0.00915 0.00533 
 
(0.00948) (0.00952) (0.0101) (0.0103) 
NoChildren 0.00567 0.0112 -0.0201* -0.0179 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0118) 
Pcexphh 0.0758*** 0.0324 0.0852* 0.0285 
 
(0.0278) (0.0308) (0.0439) (0.0404) 
Urban 0.144*** 0.0521 0.111*** -0.00436 
 
(0.0288) (0.0409) (0.0326) (0.0429) 
AssetIndexHH -0.0239*** -0.0240*** -0.025*** -0.0268*** 
 
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0092) 
CoupleAge -0.00642 -0.00876* 0.00698 -0.0105* 
  (0.00475) (0.00471) (0.0539) (0.00548) 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,256 2,256 
Log pseudo likelihood  -1265.5767 -4936.4466 -1229.591 -4525.8136 
Pseudo R2   0.1173 
 
0.1012 
 Exogeneity Test 










Over identifying Test 










Test of Weak Instruments 










Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table C7 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on Class Attendance   
  All Rural Urban 
Variables Tobit IV-Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit 
MBP 0.403*** 3.624*** 0.683*** 6.643*** -0.217 0.464 
 
(0.129) (1.403) (0.143) (1.748) (0.251) (1.338) 
Age 0.146 0.0962 0.268 0.116 -0.107 -0.114 
 
(0.184) (0.197) (0.204) (0.251) (0.390) (0.392) 
Age2 0.0157 0.0287 -0.0655 -0.0281 0.0193 0.0199 
 
(0.0922) (0.0981) (0.101) (0.124) (0.0197) (0.0198) 
Boy 0.0479 -0.179 0.133 -0.333 -0.132 -0.169 
 
(0.302) (0.332) (0.332) (0.416) (0.651) (0.656) 
Ownland -1.253** -1.320*** -1.98*** -1.415** -0.209 -0.311 
 
(0.492) (0.506) (0.668) (0.721) (0.713) (0.770) 
MaleHead -0.215 -3.008* -3.12*** -6.37*** 4.121** 3.252 
 
(1.227) (1.698) (1.201) (1.588) (2.041) (2.602) 
HHsize -0.243 -0.154 -0.241 0.0525 -0.354 -0.373 
 
(0.157) (0.166) (0.178) (0.211) (0.312) (0.317) 
NoChildren 0.338* 0.398** 0.419** 0.366 -0.0732 -0.0115 
 
(0.188) (0.199) (0.211) (0.235) (0.408) (0.435) 
Pcexphh 0.0245 -0.0270 0.0713 -0.0344 -0.0591 -0.0687 
 
(0.0453) (0.0550) (0.0572) (0.0732) (0.0817) (0.0853) 
Urban -1.700*** -2.777*** - - - - 
 
(0.479) (0.696) - - - - 
AssetIndexHH -0.178 -0.302* -0.308** -0.362** 0.501 0.393 
 
(0.141) (0.155) (0.156) (0.180) (0.326) (0.394) 
CoupleAge -0.0394 -0.123 -0.0168 -0.212* -0.108 -0.112 
  (0.0804) (0.0877) (0.0880) (0.115) (0.196) (0.194) 
Observations 3,569 3,569 2,613 2,613 956 956 
Log pseudo 
likelihood  -12924.418 -18284.28 -9254.15 -13039.1 -3613.08 -5145.34 





 Exogeneity Test 














Over identifying Test 














Test of Weak Instruments 














Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Table C8 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on Class Attendance by Gender 
  Boys Girls 
Variables Tobit IV-Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit 
MBP 1.394 1.844 0.425** 5.091*** 
 
(1.712) (1.945) (0.193) (1.975) 
Age 0.0226 0.0193 0.301 0.149 
 
(0.242) (0.246) (0.285) (0.322) 
Age2 0.00836 0.00812 -0.00696 -0.00153 
 
(0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0145) (0.0161) 
Ownland -1.968*** -2.108*** -0.451 -0.206 
 
(0.641) (0.672) (0.761) (0.826) 
MaleHead -1.437 -2.612 1.589 -2.892 
 
(1.417) (2.063) (2.152) (2.817) 
HHsize -0.403* -0.394* -0.0753 0.155 
 
(0.208) (0.207) (0.235) (0.268) 
NoChildren 0.520** 0.591** 0.147 0.0853 
 
(0.249) (0.271) (0.280) (0.306) 
Pcexphh 0.0229 0.0028 0.0326 -0.0572 
 
(0.0587) (0.0670) (0.0714) (0.0922) 
Urban -2.317*** -2.838*** -1.048 -2.518** 
 
(0.621) (0.946) (0.743) (1.043) 
AssetIndexHH -0.341* -0.374** 0.0115 -0.269 
 
(0.180) (0.187) (0.222) (0.261) 
CoupleAge 0.00341 0.00131 -0.0117 -0.0296** 
  (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0145) 
Observations 1,915 1,915 1,654 1,654 
Log pseudo likelihood  -6912.5275 -9801.1318 -6007.212 -8473.537 
Pseudo R2   0.028 
 
0.019 
 Exogeneity Test 










Over identifying Test 










Test of Weak 
Instruments 










Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table C9 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on Child Labour (Mag. Effects) 
  Participation Hours 
Variables Probit IV-Probit Tobit IV-Tobit 
MBP -0.0276** -0.172*** -1.310* -1.643 
 
(0.0126) (0.0196) (1.187) (3.734) 
Age 0.00898 0.0104 0.154 0.159 
 
(0.00692) (0.00705) (0.102) (0.118) 
Age2 -0.0893 -0.0111* -0.0194** -0.0201* 
 
(0.0572) (0.0059) (0.0081) (0.0110) 
Boy -0.132 -0.0782 -0.146 -0.0455 
 
(0.168) (0.180) (3.521) (3.786) 
Ownland 0.870*** 0.802*** 14.79*** 14.80*** 
 
(0.112) (0.152) (2.273) (2.269) 
HHsize 0.0245 0.0223 0.260 0.260 
 
(0.0151) (0.0147) (0.210) (0.210) 
NoChildren 0.00808 0.00224 0.129 0.117 
 
(0.0185) (0.0183) (0.262) (0.293) 
Pcexphh -0.0110*** -0.0831* -0.0171** -0.0167** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0489) (0.00671) (0.00838) 
Urban -0.105** -0.0257 -1.131 -0.970 
 
(0.0457) (0.0803) (0.776) (1.923) 
AssetIndexHH 0.0124 0.0136 0.172 0.177 
 
(0.0125) (0.0120) (0.194) (0.206) 
CoupleAge 0.00192 0.00267 0.0497* 0.0518 
  (0.00190) (0.00192) (0.0298) (0.0381) 
Observations 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 
Log pseudo likelihood  -814.58508 -2938.0236 -3064.406 
 Pseudo R2   0.1785 
 
0.0544 
 Exogeneity Test 










Over identifying Test 
    Score Chi2 (ODT) 
 
0.012238 
  P-valve 
 
0.9119 
  Test of Weak Instruments 
   Partial R-Square 
 
0.01 
  Robust F 
 
7.33278 
  Prob>F   0.0007     
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table C10 Summary of Mothers' Autonomy Based on 5 Indicators 
            Mean              Std. Dev.    Min     Max 
Un-weighted Index  
    Men Responses 
 
3.208 1.089 0 5 





Instrumental Variable Estimation for Each Instrument 
Using Difference in Years of Schooling Completed as Instrument 
 
Table C11 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Enrolment   
Variables All Rural Urban Boys Girls 
MBP 0.280*** 0.327*** 0.135** 0.254*** 0.309*** 
 
(0.0342) (0.0405) (0.0667) (0.0477) (0.0471) 
Age 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) 
Age2 -0.0038*** -0.0037*** -0.0032*** -0.0034*** -0.0042*** 
 
(0.00053) (0.00072) (0.00064) (0.00065) (0.00089) 
Boy 0.00834 -0.00532 0.0526** - - 
 
(0.0135) (0.0153) (0.0225) - - 
Ownland -0.0484** -0.0472 -0.0270 -0.092*** -0.0055 
 
(0.0227) (0.0361) (0.0270) (0.0312) (0.0329) 
MaleHead -0.146** -0.0609 -0.135 -0.130 -0.138 
 
(0.0740) (0.0909) (0.113) (0.0962) (0.115) 
HHsize -0.00680 -0.00586 0.0115 -0.0197** 0.00689 
 
(0.00710) (0.00897) (0.0141) (0.00965) (0.0106) 
NoChildren -0.00418 -0.00505 -0.0114 0.0113 -0.0193 
 
(0.00828) (0.00935) (0.0177) (0.0116) (0.0120) 
Pcexphh 0.0256 0.0402 0.0092 0.0316 0.0193 
 
(0.0257) (0.0320) (0.0321) (0.0305) (0.0413) 
Urban 0.0304 - - 0.0553 0.00812 
 
(0.0295) - - (0.0407) (0.0425) 
AssetIndexHH -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.0058 -0.024** -0.025*** 
 
(0.0063) (0.0076) (0.014) (0.0091) (0.0092) 
CoupleAge -0.0881** -0.010** -0.014** -0.0918* -0.0103* 
  (0.0354) (0.0042) (0.0067) (0.047) (0.0054) 
Observations 4,746 3,691 1,055 2,490 2,256 
Exogeneity Test 
     Wald Test: Chi2 31.02 21.68 4.38 14.64 16.03 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0364 0.0001 0.0001 
Test of Weak Instruments 
    Partial R-Square 0.0149 0.0103 0.0258 0.019 0.0107 
Robust F 70.131 33.975 31.055 50.771 22.387 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 









Table C12 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Attendance   
Variables All Rural Urban Boys Girls 
MBP 3.046** 5.364*** 1.00674 1.743 4.994** 
 
(1.257) (2.054) (1.563) (1.457) (2.310) 
Age 0.101 0.134 -0.109 -0.00949 0.237 
 
(0.193) (0.238) (0.390) (0.247) (0.311) 
Age2 0.0335 -0.0181 0.0195 0.0988 -0.0535 
 
(0.0962) (0.117) (0.019) (0.122) (0.158) 
Boy -0.160 -0.219 -0.144 - - 
 
(0.327) (0.403) (0.667) - - 
Ownland -1.35*** -1.819** -0.243 -2.13*** -0.245 
 
(0.505) (0.715) (0.751) (0.668) (0.826) 
MaleHead -2.346 -5.46*** 3.838 -2.500 -2.302 
 
(1.537) (1.491) (2.740) (1.756) (2.846) 
HHsize -0.189 -0.0590 -0.360 -0.413* 0.140 
 
(0.166) (0.214) (0.318) (0.212) (0.274) 
NoChildren 0.393** 0.400* -0.0529 0.598** 0.0672 
 
(0.200) (0.238) (0.445) (0.268) (0.310) 
Pcexphh -0.0159 -0.0106 -0.0623 0.0065 -0.0576 
 
(0.0526) (0.0739) (0.085) (0.0638) (0.0936) 
Urban -2.37*** - - -2.71*** -2.003** 
 
(0.602) - - (0.779) (0.966) 
AssetIndexHH -0.267* -0.375** 0.466 -0.363** -0.245 
 
(0.151) (0.170) (0.377) (0.185) (0.266) 
CoupleAge -0.0906 -0.0153 -0.0109 0.00225 -0.0257* 
  (0.0839) (0.0110) (0.019) (0.0109) (0.0141) 
Observations 3,569 2,613 956 1,915 1,654 
Exogeneity Test 
     Wald Test: Chi2 4.71 5.25 0.02 1.07 3.73 
Prob>Chi2 0.03 0.022 0.085 0.031 0.034 
Test of Weak Instruments 
     Partial R-Square 0.0131 0.0072 0.0315 0.0175 0.0086 
Robust F 48.846 17.153 37.887 37.086 18.9555 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 









Table C13 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on Child Labour   
Variables Participation Hours 
MBP -0.191*** -1.168 
 
(0.022) (2.382) 
Age 0.0115 0.173 
 
(0.0709) (0.115) 
Age2 -0.0118** -0.0214** 
 
(0.00594) (0.00975) 
Boy -0.08 0.0566 
 
(0.175) (3.664) 
Ownland 0.804*** 14.86*** 
 
(0.156) (2.279) 
HHsize 0.021 0.252 
 
(0.0147) (0.211) 
NoChildren 0.00307 0.108 
 
(0.018) (0.271) 
Pcexphh -0.0791 -0.0159** 
 
(0.0503) (0.00752) 
Urban -0.0371 -0.847 
 
(0.0752) (1.150) 
AssetIndexHH 0.0131 0.181 
 
(0.012) (0.198) 
CoupleAge 0.00249 0.0532 
  (0.00188) (0.0324) 
Observations 1,462 1,462 
Exogeneity Test 
  Wald Test: Chi2 1.44 0.13 
Prob>Chi2 0.023 0.715 
Test of Weak Instruments 
  Partial R-Square 0.0093 0.0093 
Robust F 23.062 13.062 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0002 












Using District Sex Ratio as Instrument 
Table C14 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Enrolment   
Variables All Rural Urban Boys Girls 
MBP 0.336*** 0.287** 0.0598 0.374*** 0.300*** 
 
(0.115) (0.116) (0.125) (0.129) (0.102) 
Age 0.0657 0.0919*** 0.0671*** 0.0406 0.0895 
 
(0.0439) (0.0296) (0.0113) (0.0702) (0.0551) 
Age2 -0.0030 -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.0169 -0.0429* 
 
(0.002) (0.0013) (0.00576) (0.0309) (0.0253) 
Boy -6.32e-05 -0.00126 0.0562*** - - 
 
(0.0226) (0.0183) (0.0214) - - 
Ownland -0.0395 -0.0623 -0.0174 -0.0676 -0.00802 
 
(0.0347) (0.0523) (0.0291) (0.0637) (0.0453) 
MaleHead -0.190* -0.0422 -0.0438 -0.251 -0.133 
 
(0.115) (0.102) (0.170) (0.175) (0.142) 
HHsize -0.00354 -0.0101 0.0125 -0.0113 0.00554 
 
(0.0111) (0.0132) (0.0128) (0.0187) (0.0156) 
NoChildren -0.00198 -0.00419 -0.0178 0.0141 -0.0188 
 
(0.00898) (0.00966) (0.0187) (0.0110) (0.0135) 
Pcexphh 0.0068 0.0055 0.0018 -0.0091 0.0022 
 
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0031) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
Urban -0.00502 - - -0.0349 0.0136 
 
(0.0831) - - (0.142) (0.0978) 
AssetIndexHH -0.219** -0.269*** 0.0732 -0.0168 -0.025** 
 
(0.0902) (0.0941) (0.167) (0.0151) (0.0109) 
CoupleAge -0.100** -0.0856 -0.0143** -0.094** -0.0988 
  (0.0402) (0.0578) (0.0061) (0.0468) (0.0885) 
Observations 4,746 3,691 1,055 2,490 2,256 
Exogeneity Test 
     Wald Test: Chi2 2.23 2.67 0.15 1.03 1.07 
Prob>Chi2 0.0135 0.0102 0.016 0.007 0.0030 
Test of Weak 
Instruments 
     Partial R-Square 0.043 0.17 0.042 0.025 0.067 
Robust F 21.5867 16.9181 15.2045 14.3495 15.62798 
Prob>F 0.0001 0.0086 0.0022 0.0042 0.0021 









Table C15 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Attendance   
Variables All Rural Urban Boys Girls 
MBP 11.65** 9.028*** 2.407 19.32 7.871*** 
 
(5.916) (2.818) (3.497) (23.82) (2.024) 
Age -0.0755 0.0114 -0.121 -0.351 0.176 
 
(0.301) (0.285) (0.402) (0.716) (0.359) 
Age2 0.00860 0.00219 0.0207 0.0216 -0.00376 
 
(0.0148) (0.0140) (0.0204) (0.0350) (0.0178) 
Boy -0.842 -0.508 -0.354 - - 
 
(0.650) (0.479) (0.724) - - 
Ownland -1.409** -1.525* -0.546 -3.432 -0.0904 
 
(0.717) (0.790) (0.926) (3.176) (0.914) 
MaleHead -9.378* -7.139*** 0.883 -16.04 -4.878 
 
(5.113) (1.966) (4.640) (19.28) (4.811) 
HHsize 0.0412 0.107 -0.425 -0.341 0.281 
 
(0.262) (0.256) (0.336) (0.496) (0.372) 
NoChildren 0.505* 0.354 0.175 1.401 0.0106 
 
(0.307) (0.274) (0.534) (1.505) (0.351) 
Pcexphh -0.0154 -0.0804 -0.0906 -0.0224 -0.0116 
 
(0.0119) (0.0864) (0.0949) (0.0337) (0.0137) 
Urban -4.362** - - -7.390 -2.585* 
 
(1.703) - - (7.669) (1.378) 
AssetIndexHH -0.531* -0.405** 0.172 -0.559 -0.409 
 
(0.291) (0.200) (0.552) (0.630) (0.379) 
CoupleAge -0.0259 -0.0262* -0.0081 -0.0166 -0.0342 
  (0.0171) (0.0141) (0.0199) (0.0347) (0.0213) 
Observations 3,569 2,613 956 1,915 1,654 
Exogeneity Test 
     Wald Test: Chi2 4.38 7.97 3.57 3.74 4.97 
Prob>Chi2 0.0259 0.0048 0.0316 0.0395 0.0216 
Test of Weak Instruments 
     Partial R-Square 0.11 0.047 0.066 0.031 0.012 
Robust F 14.5439 13.759 17.2466 18.7368 14.5851 
Prob>F 0.0031 0.0002 0.0021 0.0013 0.0032 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 










Table C16 Impact of Mothers' Bargaining Power on Child Labour   
Variables Participation Hours 
MBP -0.265*** 105.4 
 
(0.127) (609.8) 
Age 0.0120 -1.776 
 
(0.00912) (11.23) 
Age2 -0.00125 0.0200 
 
(0.00126) (0.127) 
Boy -0.0488 -26.98 
 
(0.874) (156.2) 
Ownland 0.714 18.59 
 
(2.591) (20.46) 
HHsize 0.0185 1.002 
 
(0.0856) (5.161) 
NoChildren -0.000575 3.356 
 
(0.0802) (18.87) 
Pcexphh -0.00584 -0.0158 
 
(0.0565) (0.0816) 
Urban -0.00198 -39.27 
 
(0.971) (220.3) 
AssetIndexHH 0.0128 -0.972 
 
(0.0198) (6.908) 
CoupleAge 0.00268 -0.436 
  (0.00342) (2.822) 
Observations 1,462 1,462 
Exogeneity Test 
  Wald Test: Chi2 0.01 0.04 
Prob>Chi2 0.9166 0.8389 
Test of Weak Instruments 
  Partial R-Square 0.019 0.011 
Robust F 12.0365 9.0365 
Prob>F 0.0014 0.0048 












Using  Women’s Responses to Construct the Autonomy Index 
Table C17  Impact of  Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Enrolment   
Variables All Rural Urban 
  Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
MBP 0.0319*** 0.421*** 0.0436*** 0.403*** 0.0588** -0.0828** 
 
(0.0065) (0.0219) (0.00812) (0.0483) (0.00091) (0.0104) 
Age 0.110*** 0.0163 0.121*** 0.0434 0.0682*** 0.0683*** 
 
(0.00776) (0.0397) (0.00946) (0.0373) (0.0107) (0.0109) 
Age2 -0.005*** -0.0007 -0.005*** -0.0019 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0018) (0.00048) (0.00167) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Boy 0.0269** -0.00421 0.0126 0.00446 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.0130) (0.0154) (0.0157) (0.0143) (0.0190) (0.0221) 
Ownland -0.073*** 0.0538 -0.132*** -0.0197 -0.0134 -0.0128 
 
(0.0211) (0.0370) (0.0320) (0.0535) (0.0214) (0.0343) 
MaleHead 0.0544 0.0404 0.0222 0.134** 0.0861 0.0851 
 
(0.0561) (0.0410) (0.0756) (0.0540) (0.0528) (0.0638) 
HHsize -0.019*** -0.018** -0.032*** -0.039*** 0.0139 0.0140 
 
(0.00672) (0.00796) (0.00828) (0.00830) (0.0114) (0.0116) 
NoChildren -0.00482 0.0169** 0.00669 0.0350*** -0.0217 -0.0219 
 
(0.0081) (0.00737) (0.00993) (0.00828) (0.0134) (0.0165) 
Pcexphh 0.081*** -0.002 0.001*** 0.0284 0.004 0.032 
 
(0.004)   (0.032) (0.00036) (0.0147) (0.0025) (0.0281) 
Urban 0.122*** -0.0301 - - - - 
 
(0.0209) (0.0500) - - - - 
AssetIndexHH -0.023*** -0.0103 -0.029*** -0.0151 0.0113 0.0111 
 
(0.00633) (0.00946) (0.00752) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0118) 
CoupleAge -0.000301 -0.01*** 6.87e-05 -0.0009** -0.0015** -0.0015** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.000418) (0.000395) (0.000595) (0.000741) 






























Test of Weak 
Instruments 












Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table C18  Impact of  Mothers' Bargaining Power on School Enrolment by Gender   
Variables Boys Girls 
  Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
MBP 0.0372*** 0.1501*** 0.0260*** 0.415*** 
 
(0.0088) (0.0214) (0.0097) (0.0228) 
Age 0.101*** 0.0938 0.122*** 0.0163 
 
(0.0103) (0.0734) (0.0117) (0.0349) 
Age2 -0.0044*** -0.00408 -0.0057*** -0.000739 
 
(0.0005) (0.0033) (0.0006) (0.0016) 
Ownland -0.103*** -0.112*** -0.0449 0.0917*** 
 
(0.0286) (0.0277) (0.0312) (0.0347) 
MaleHead 0.0564 0.0592 0.0522 0.0874 
 
(0.0799) (0.0902) (0.0802) (0.0560) 
HHsize -0.0270*** -0.0144 -0.0125 -0.00930 
 
(0.0094) (0.0658) (0.00977) (0.0087) 
NoChildren 0.00781 -0.00453 -0.0169 0.00649 
 
(0.0115) (0.0567) (0.0118) (0.0111) 
Pcexphh 0.082*** 0.094*** 0.087** 0.019 
 
(0.0029) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) 
Urban 0.144*** 0.174** 0.102*** 0.00775 
 
(0.0284) (0.0727) (0.0310) (0.0401) 
AssetIndexHH -0.0213** -0.0152 -0.0236** -0.00565 
 
(0.0085) (0.036) (0.0093) (0.0102) 
CoupleAge -0.0006 -0.00013 -0.0001 -0.001*** 
  (0.00048) (0.00247) (0.000528) (0.00045) 
Observations 2,490 2,490 2,256 2,256 
Exogeneity Test 





















Test of Weak Instruments 










Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000 








Table C19  Impact of  Mothers' Bargaining Power on Hours of Class Attendance   





Tobit IV-Tobit Tobit 
IV-
Tobit 
MBP 0.547*** 6.42*** 0.543*** 9.128*** -0.522* 1.202 
 
(0.142) (2.697) (0.159) (2.105) (0.301) (2.258) 
Age 0.144 0.379 0.243 4.389 -0.0261 0.0165 
 
(0.184) (0.363) (0.203) (32.93) (0.387) (0.393) 
Age2 0.0016 -0.012 -0.0048 -0.181 0.0142 0.0124 
 
(0.0091) (0.0179) (0.0101) (1.378) (0.0195) (0.0197) 
Boy 0.148 0.559 0.244 1.111 -0.0363 -0.196 
 
(0.301) (0.576) (0.331) (9.132) (0.643) (0.681) 
Ownland -1.168** -2.49** -1.89*** 0.516 -0.199 0.252 
 
(0.477) (1.268) (0.642) (12.93) (0.705) (0.854) 
MaleHead 0.642 -1.183 -1.701 -47.98 3.987** 3.567** 
 
(1.158) (1.953) (1.430) (361.7) (1.716) (1.773) 
HHsize -0.236 0.453 -0.240 10.82 -0.399 -0.344 
 
(0.158) (0.446) (0.183) (83.41) (0.307) (0.313) 
NoChildren 0.301 -0.558 0.381* -13.82 -0.0235 -0.167 
 
(0.189) (0.547) (0.218) (106.7) (0.397) (0.445) 
Pcexphh 0.0007* 0.0018* 0.0013** 0.0136 -0.00029 -0.0004 
 
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.00057) (0.100) (0.00079) (0.0008) 
Urban -1.62*** 0.536 - - - - 
 
(0.466) (1.328) - - - - 
AssetIndexHH -0.118 0.169 -0.265* 0.812 0.539* 0.444 
 
(0.137) (0.278) (0.154) (7.424) (0.307) (0.347) 
CoupleAge 0.00085 0.0417 0.0038 0.301 -0.0034 -0.0118 
  (0.0081) (0.0279) (0.00886) (2.283) (0.0196) (0.0215) 
Observations 3,569 3,569 2,613 2,613 956 956 
Exogeneity Test 

























Test of Weak Instruments 












Prob>F   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table C20 Impact of  Mothers' Bargaining Power on Hours of Class Attendance   
Variables Boys Girls 
  Tobit IV-Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit 
MBP 0.745 1.421 1.313*** 8.05*** 
 
(1.190) (3.704) (0.211) (1.508) 
Age 0.0218 0.0805 0.310 -0.585 
 
(0.240) (0.312) (0.284) (0.777) 
Age2 0.00927 0.00713 -0.00839 0.0347 
 
(0.0119) (0.0155) (0.0144) (0.0391) 
Ownland -1.961*** -2.100*** -0.300 3.161 
 
(0.628) (0.786) (0.729) (2.784) 
MaleHead -0.740 -1.048 2.255 -1.688 
 
(1.353) (1.808) (1.876) (3.340) 
HHsize -0.344 0.292 -0.108 -0.107 
 
(0.212) (0.378) (0.233) (0.329) 
NoChildren 0.405 -0.364 0.174 0.509 
 
(0.253) (0.456) (0.279) (0.485) 
Pcexphh 0.00069 0.0014* 0.00089 0.00027 
 
(0.00058) (0.00073) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
Urban -2.240*** -0.374 -0.979 -3.782 
 
(0.614) (1.170) (0.709) (2.577) 
AssetIndexHH -0.270 -0.0642 0.0561 -0.358 
 
(0.177) (0.234) (0.213) (0.454) 
CoupleAge 0.00776 0.0228 -0.00718 -0.0591 
  (0.0109) (0.0149) (0.0119) (0.0453) 
Observations 1,915 1,915 1,654 1,654 
Exogeneity Test 



















Test of Weak Instruments 










Prob>F   0.0000   0.0001 








Table C21  Impact of  Mothers' Bargaining Power on Child Labour   
Variables Participation Hours 
Variables Probit IV-Probit Tobit IV-Tobit 
MBP -0.0274** -0.041*** -2.127*** 5.756 
 
(0.0136) (0.0107) (0.204) (3.900) 
Average Age 0.0072 0.0076 0.130 -0.0334 
 
(0.0069) (0.0091) (0.104) (0.160) 
Average Age2 -0.007 -0.0075 -0.0017** -0.0003 
 
(0.0059) (0.0076) (0.00081) (0.0013) 
PropBoys -0.194 -0.190 -1.720 -3.703 
 
(0.149) (0.163) (3.188) (3.726) 
Ownland 0.866*** 0.864*** 14.95*** 16.38*** 
 
(0.110) (0.110) (2.283) (2.560) 
HHsize 0.0284* 0.0290 0.294 0.0540 
 
(0.0154) (0.0176) (0.213) (0.302) 
NoChildren 0.00414 0.00339 0.111 0.436 
 
(0.0189) (0.0218) (0.269) (0.397) 
Pcexphh -0.0011** -0.00012** -0.0015** -0.0017** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.00088) 
Urban -0.123*** -0.121** -1.432* -2.441** 
 
(0.0453) (0.0582) (0.787) (1.227) 
AssetIndexHH 0.0111 0.0109 0.186 0.295 
 
(0.0125) (0.0131) (0.199) (0.270) 
CoupleAge 0.00185 0.00188 0.0474 0.0354 
  (0.00194) (0.00202) (0.0307) (0.0355) 
Observations 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 
Exogeneity Test 





















Test of Weak Instruments 










Prob>F   0.0005   0.011 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
